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ABSTRACT
In this thesis I consider the development of space-based ballistic missile defence in the late
1970's and early 1980's, leading up to President Reagan's speech on 23 March 1983, in
which he announced a research and development programme to make nuclear weapons
"impotent and obsolete". I focus on four groups, which I call the 'space-weapons lobby',
which were pushing for the development of ballistic missile defence during this period:
the 'laser lobby'. High Frontier, Edward Teller and his colleagues, and a group of
strategists from the Hudson Institute. The study of these groups is used for two
purposes. Firstly, to explain how and why space-based ballistic missile defence came to
be a national priority in the United States. Secondly, to explore and extend a model of the
weapons development process based mainly on the work of Mary Kaldor, Donald
MacKenzie and Graham Spinardi, and Langdon Winner.
I trace the evolution and progress of the 'space-weapons lobby', paying particular
attention to the ideology of the different groups, the interests which they brought to bear
on the problem of ballistic missile defence, and the way in which the ideology and
interests of the different groups influenced the technologies which they were advocating
for ballistic missile defence. I also consider the way in which the groups comprising the
'space-weapons lobby' attempted to sell the idea of space-based ballistic missile defence
to the Reagan Administration, and the way in which the Army and the Air Force reacted to
the proposals which they were putting forward.
An interesting feature of this case study is that all of the groups which comprised the
'space-weapons lobby' shared a common ideology which led them to advocate ballistic
missile defence. This ideology was just that of the Committee on the Present Danger,
which formed in the mid-1970's and set as its mission the revival of concem about the
Soviet threat, and the reassertion of US military superiority. Although the different
groups shared a common ideology, they were all pushing for essentially different
technologies to implement this BMD system. The reason for this seems to have been the
interests that these groups brought to bear on the problem. Thus, while the broad nature
of the BMD system was largely shaped by the ideology of the groups, the components of
the system were largely shaped by the interests. The final 'shape' of the ballistic missile
defence system that the different groups advocated reflected an interplay between the
ideology and the interests.
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CH. 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 THE 'STAR WARS' SPEECH

What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest
upon the threat of instant U.S. retaliation to deter a Soviet attack; that we could
intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or
that of our allies?
I call upon the scientific community who gave us nuclear weapons to turn their great
talents to the cause of mankind and world peace; to give us the means of rendering
these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.
A world free of the threat of nuclear annihilation. Such was the vision that was offered by
President Reagan in his "Address to the Nation" on the evening of March 23,1983. This
vision has since become the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), a multi-billion dollar
research and development programme to develop an ensemble of land-based and spacebased, conventional and exotic ballistic missile defence weapons in an attempt to erect a
'nuclear umbrella' over the United States. The SDI or 'Star Wars', has become the focus
of a national, and indeed international, debate which has concentrated on the technical
merits of such a system, on the economic implications of such a massive research and
development project, and on the strategic implications of space-based ballistic missile
defence.
There has been much less debate on how and why the Strategic Defense Initiative came
about. Many of Reagan's advisers seem to have been unaware that the President was
going to make the speech. John Gardner, Director of Defensive Systems at the Pentagon,
and Robert Cooper, Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, who
together supervised most of the United States' research on ballistic missile defence,
listened in surprise as the President elevated this research to a national priority. The
assumption that has been drawn is that the decision to implement this new policy was
largely taken by President Reagan. As Dr. George Keyworth, the President's Science
Adviser, has said: "This was not a speech that came up; it was a top-down speech ... a
speech that came from the President's heart".^
It is the questions of how and why space-based ballistic missile defence came to be a
national priority which will form one of the two main axes around which this thesis
revolves. The other main axis is how technology in general, and military technology in
1 R. Jeffrey Smith, "Reagan Plans New ABM Effort", Science, Vol. 220, 8
April, 1983, p. 170.
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the United States in particular, comes to be shaped. I start by developing in section 1.2 a
model of how the weapons development process in the United States operates, based
largely on the work of Mary Kaldor, Donald MacKenzie and Graham Spinardi, and
Langdon Winner. It is this model which is used to inform my analysis of the development
of space-based ballistic missile defence in the late 1970's and early 1980's, leading up to
President Reagan's March 23 speech. At the same time, I shall use the questions of how
and why space-based ballistic missile defence came to be a national priority as a case
study of the weapons development process, and thus to shed light on the model that has
been developed.
1.2 THE SOCIAL SHAPING OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY
Encapsulated within the term "arms race" is the notion that the weapons development
process is driven by intemational competition between two or more states, such as the
United States and the Soviet Union, through an action-reaction phenomenon. ^ However,
most of the recent writing on weapons development, particularly in the United States, has
come down strongly on the side of domestic influences as being the most important
determining factor, particularly in peacetime. Kaldor has noted that pressures for
increases in military expenditure in the United States do indeed coincide "with growing
fears about the Soviet Union, and with, perhaps, a wider sense of economic and social
insecurity". But the type of weapons produced, she argues, "can only be explained in the
terms of the structure of the military industrial institutions - the competitive dynamic of the
armourers combined with thé conservatism of the armed forces".^
In peacetime, the weapons that are developed do not have to respond to actual military
threats, and so do not undergo the "test of war". This is particularly so if we are
considering the development of nuclear weapons and their supporting systems. Domestic
influences tend to prevail in peacetime, Kaldor points out "because there are so many
different ways of assessing and responding to the circumstances in which armaments
might be used". In the absence of the "test of war" the quantity and nature of the weapons
^ Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNaiuara is one of the strongest
proponents of this view. In a speech in September 1 9 6 7 in which he
a n n o u n c e d the plan to deploy the Sentinal ABM system, McNamara
concisely stated this theory: "What is essential to understand here is
that the Soviet Union and the United States mutually influence one
another's
strategic
plans.
Whatever
their
intentions
or
our
intentions, actions - or even realistically potential actions - on
either side relating to the build-up of nuclear forces necessarily
trigger reactions on the other side. It is precisely this actionreaction phenomenon that fuels the arms race". (Lawrence Freedman, The
Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, MacMillon Press, London, 1 9 8 3 , p. 2 5 4 . )
2 Mary Kaldor, The Baroque Arsenal, Abacus, London, 1 9 8 3 , p. 1 6 6 .

the United States acquires is determined "as much by the environment in which we take
decisions as it is by the posture of a potential adversary".^
If domestic factors are taken to be the most important determinant influencing the
weapons development process, then weapons technology can be analysed in much the
same way as civilian technologies, albeit with different domestic institutions and social
factors shaping the development of the weapons technology. MacKenzie and Spinardi,
amongst others, have pointed out that discussions concerning the domestic influences on
the development of weapons are characterized by two extreme views. On the one hand
there is the 'hard' "technological determinist"^ viewpoint which holds that weapons are
out of control, that they are an independent variable which develop autonomously, driving
the arms race and determining military strategy.^ An alternative to this 'hard'
determinism, so-called 'soft' technological determinism, allows for slightly more human
agency, but essentially still sees the development of weapons as being out of control.
There are two slightly different forms of this 'soft' determinism. Firstly, the
"technologist-out-of-control" argument holds that it is the weapons designers and
developers (i.e. scientists and engineers) who, because of their expertise, take control of
weapons development, and "build up a personal and institutional momentum" around
various projects.^ Another form of 'soft' technological determinism has been called
"technology creep".^ This is where the "advance of science and technology on a broad
front will..quietly but inexorably change the strategic landscape". For example, Dietrich

1 Ibid., p. 4.
2 MacKenzie and Wajcman define "technological determinism" as the view
that firstly "technological change is in some sense
autonomouSf
'outside' of society, literally or metaphorically", and secondly that
"technological change causes social change". See 'Introduction' to
Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman(ed),
The Social
Shaping
of
Technology, Open Uni. Press, Milton Keynes, 1985, pp. 4-5.
^ Donald MacKenzie and Graham Spinardi, "Politics and Technology in the
Arms Race: A Case-Study in the History of Nuclear Weapons Systems",
University of Edinburgh, 1987, p. 3.
^ Ibid. MacKenzie and Wajcman point out that according to this view
these technologists are "indeed members of society, but their activity
is in an important sense independent of their membership of society.
In the most common version of technological determinism, these
technologies are seen as 'applying science', as working out the
practical implications of new scientific discoveries. ... Scientists
discover, technologists follow the logic of those discoveries in
turning them into new techniques and new devices, and these techniques
and devices are then introduced into society and have
(often
unpredicted) 'effects'". (D. MacKenzie & J. Wajcman, 1985, op. cit.,
p. 4.)
^ See Langdon Winner, Autonomous Technology, The MIT Press, Cambridge,
MA, 1985, pp. 88-100, for a discussion of this view.

Schroeer has claimed that the advance of computer technology has been the major driving
force behind the improvement of missile accuracy, calling forth new strategic doctrines.^
At the other extreme of the spectrum are the 'hard' social determinist arguments, or the
"politics-in-command" view in which technology is claimed to be merely a 'dependent
factor' in the arms race, the technology and the technologists being under the control of
the political leaders. According to this view, elite groups, such as the President and his
Executive or the Office of the Secretary of Defense, consciously shape technology to meet
their goals. 2
MacKenzie and Spinardi, in exploring the development of weapons in the US Navy's
ballistic missile programme, have concluded that the truth is much more complex than
either of these two extreme views would suggest, and that it lies somewhere between the
two: 2
Technological change appears to be the outcome of a complex, interactive, and
sometimes contradictory process. There is no single dominant determining factor
which can be distinguished. Indeed, the social and the technical are hard to
differentiate, and paths of influence are neither unidirectional nor stable in their
effects through time.
They have argued, in a general way, that the development of weapons is influenced by
both social and technological fac.tors. In the social realm, technical choices are influenced
by the 'macro politics' of US defence policy, by organizational politics of the different
armed services (Army, Navy, Air Force), and by the 'micro politics' of the technical
community.^ They point out that '"the social' does not simply operate at the level of
preferences between pre-defmed technical options. It also shapes the options that are
available, and may on occasion actually eliminate the possibility of explicit choice. The
social can enter into the definition of what is possible".^ Russell has made a similar point.
He argues that because the research and design processes are controlled by certain
interests this means that "a limited number of trajectories are accepted as progress, that
some criteria for 'improvement' are taken as given and others are ignored, that 'needs' are
interpreted, and thus that many options never surface for 'selection' in any conscious
sense". Such direction may take place, Russell claims, through institutional or financial
means, "or more subdy through the training and ideology of personnel".^

1 D. MacKenzie & G. Spinardi, "Politics and Technology
op. cit.,
p. 3.
2 Ibid., p. 4.
3 Ibid.r pp. 31-32.
4 Ibid., p. 12.
5 Ibid., p. 13.
^ Stewart Russell, "The Social Construction of Artefacts: A Response to
Pinch and Bijker", Social Studies of Science, Vol. 16, 1986, p. 334.

While 'hard' technological determinism, or even the 'soft' versions of this cannot be
sustained, MacKenzie and Spinardi argue that technology "is not simply a dependent
variable either, as a simplistic 'social shaping of technology' view might have it. Instead,
technology can sometimes be important as an enabling capability or a limiting
constraint".^ Similarly, Winner points out that the extreme social shaping view, while it
might provide an "antidote to naive technological determinism", has its own
shortcomings. Taken literally, Winner argues, "it suggests that technical things do not
matter at all".^
'Enabling' technologies, MacKenzie and Spinardi argue, provide possibilities for the
development of new weapons, but need not determine the actual course that is followed.
It is important to remember that these technologies have themselves been socially
shaped.^ Similarly, MacKenzie and Spinardi argue that technology can provide a limiting
constraint to the weapons development process. They give as an example the physical size
of submarine missile tubes, (which are related to the size of the submarine), which serve
to limit the size of missile possible. However, such technical constraints may also be
social.'^ They conclude that: "Technological development thus has the potential to follow a
number of different courses, rather than one single pathway. It provides capability and
sets some constraints, but is profoundly shaped by social factors".^
It is these domestic "social factors" which "profoundly shape" the weapons development
process which I seek to map out. MacKenzie and Spinardi have not set them out
explicidy, but point towards theories of 'bureaucratic politics' (albeit modified) as being
the way forward. There is a need now, I think, to move beyond the knocking down of the
"straw men" of 'technological determinism' and to a lesser extent that of 'social
determinism', and to move towards a more sophisticated theory of how the weapons
development process operates and how weapons are actually shaped, or at least to set out
a methodological framework through which the weapons development process can be
more sensibly analysed. Empirical studies would then serve to sharpen this model.
MacKenzie and Wajcman have argued that the 'bureaucratic politics' model has become
the best developed approach to the shaping of military technology. According to this
approach, countries are not seen as single actors, and weapons development is seen
largely as the outcome of a process of bargaining and competition between bureaucratic
1 D. MacKenzie & G. Spinardi^ op c i t , p.14.
2 Langdon Winner, "Do Artefacts Have Politics?",
Winter 1980, p. 122.
3 D. MacKenzie & G. Spinardi, o p c i t . , pp. 14-15.
4 Ibid.,
pp. 15-16.

5 Ibid.,

p. 17.
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organizations. While the individuals within these organizations may see their goal as
being the enhancement of national security, those with different 'institutional locations'
may approach this goal in quite different ways.^ Given that it is the 'bureaucratic politics'
model which is considered to be the best developed, one useful way to proceed is, I
think, to pick up on one of the more sophisticated theories of weapons development that
has been cast in the 'bureaucratic politics' mould and to move forward from this point.
One such model is the notion of the "baroque arsenal" which has been put forward by
Mary Kaldor.
I have chosen to adopt the 'bureaucratic politics' approach to the shaping of military
technology in preference to the so-called "new sociology of technology" approach for two
reasons^. Firstiy, I am interested in studying military technology at the systems level, in
this instance the development of a ballistic missile defence system, and the general
features of this system, such as the different types of weapons that are employed ground-based and space-based, conventional and exotic. 1 am not interested in how the
fine detail of these systems has been shaped. The "new sociology of technology"
approach which is oriented towards micro-sociology would seem to be more appropriate
to this latter endeavour. Secondly, I believe that it is important to study the shaping of
technology at the systems level because this provides a context for studying the shaping
of the components of the system,
MacKenzie and Spinardi point out that 'bureaucratic politics' is sometimes taken to mean
that only domestic considerations have an effect on the development of weapons, the
'Russian Threat' being only an "image conjured up by domestic forces - and conjured up
in a form that best suits domestic forces". This, they point out, may be partially tine, but
it is neither "theoretically logical or empirically supportable" to discount all 'external
factors'. "Empirically it seems beyond dispute that Soviet behaviour has made a
difference".3 Kaldor has resolved this conundrum by distinguishing between a systemic
aspect of the demand for weapons, that is, the "potential requirement for weapons as
defined by the international situation", and the institutional aspect of the demand for
1 "Introduction" to section on Military Technology, D. MacKenzie & J.
Wajcinan(ed) , 1985, op. cit, p. 227.
2 Examples of the literature on the "new sociology of technology" are:
M. Gallon, "The State and Technical Innovation: A Case Study of the
Electric Vehicle in France", Research Policy, Vol. 9, 1980, pp. 358376; T. Pinch & W. Bijker, "The Social Construction of Facts and
Artefacts: Or How the Sociology of Science and the Sociology of
Technology Might Benefit Each Other", Social Studies of Scie/ice, Vol.
14, 1984, pp. 399-441. For a critique of this literature see: S.
Russell, "The Social Construction of Artefacts: A Response to Pinch
and Bijker", Social Studies of Science, Vol. 16, 1986, pp. 331-346.
3 D. MacKenzie & G. Spinardi, "Politics of Technology ..", op cit, p.
27.

weapons, that is, the way in which the systemic aspect is "mediated by the perceptions of
the armed services, various bureaucratic departments and politicians".^
Mary Kaldor has applied a 'bureaucratic politics' approach to the weapons development
process in Western, industrialized, capitalist nations - in particular in the United States.
The starting point for Kaldor's argument is her notion of the 'weapons system', around
which the armed forces have become functionally organized.^ The 'weapons system' is
both a technology^, and a social organization. At the level of technology it consists of the
weapon delivery system, or delivery platform, and the weapon, combined with the means
of command and communication. In addition, the 'weapons system' includes the body of
"interrelated knowledge, and a set of linked techniques" needed to develop, produce and
operate the weapons hardware. At the level of social organization it consists of "people
and institutions who possess the knowledge and are responsible for the technology scientists, engineers, workers managers, soldiers, technicians, bureaucrats" and so on.
"They possess their knowledge as members of the social organization and not as
individuals"."^
Kaldor argues that the major weapons systems serve two functions. Firstly, they act to
differentiate the individual armed services as military units "through independent
strategies associated with particular weapons systems". Secondly, they serve to define the
lines of command within the different armed services.^ For example, the US Navy is
organized hierarchically into task forces. At the apex of each task force is the aircraft
carrier, which requires destroyers, submarines and aircraft for protection, and supply
ships of various kinds for replenishment. The bomber and the battle tank are held to play
a similar role in the Air Force and the Army.^
It is to these weapon systems - a technological system interlinked with a social
organization - that Kaldor applies the theories of bureaucratic politics. She points out that
bureaucratic politics models cannot, in themselves, explain technological change. They
point only to the "overwhelming conservatism of military institutions, armed services and
1 Mary Kaldor, "The Weapons Succession Process", World
Politics^
Vol.
38, No. 4, July 1986, p. 580.
2 M a r y Kaldor,
"The Armament
Process",
in D. MacKenzie & J.
Wajcman{eds), 1985, o p . c i t . , p. 264.
2 Kaldor uses 'technology' in the same way that it is defined by
M a c K e n z i e and Wajcman, to have three
'layers' of meaning:
(i)
hardware; (ii) technique, or how to use the hardware; and, (iii)
technical know how. (D. MacKenzie & J. Wajcman, o p c i t , pp. 3-4.)
4 M. Kaldor, "The Weapons Succession Process", op. cit., p. 579. See
also M. Kaldor, The Baroque
Arsenal,
op. c i t . , pp. 7-8.
5 M. Kaldor, The Baroque
Arsenal,
op. c i t . , pp. 8-9.

6 M. Kaldor, "The Armament Process", o p .

cit.,

p. 204.

bureaucratic departments"; all they can show is "that the future will look much like the
past".^ This conservatism, Kaldor argues, "can partly be explained by the uncertainties
that exist in the absence of the test of war", the military clinging to the technologies that
have been proven in past use. As each service, and military unit, is associated with a
certain military mission, and the capabilities required to undertake this mission have
become embedded in both the weapons and the social organization of that military unit,
any radically new technologies pose a risk for organizational survival, and so tend to be
resisted.2
What bureaucratic politics models can explain is how "bureaucratic politics mediates an
impetus for technological change". Such an impetus might come from the political
leadership (for reasons of demand) or from other domestic institutions, although
"evolutionary" technological change might occur in the absence of other pressures for
technological change. In the absence of wars Kaldor argues that "impulses for radical
technical change" must come from what she calls supply-side factors.^ Kaldor argues that
there are two types of supply-side institutions: "those associated with the invention stage
of the weapons succession process and those associated with the innovation stage".
Those associated with the invention stage are primarily government, university, or private
non-profit laboratories. From these institutions new military technologies emerge, "some
of which may be 'revolutionary' in the sense that they challenge existing doctrine and
organization".^,Kaldor argues that many of these "revolutionary" technologies emerge
from the defence laboratories, "and sometimes acquire maverick constituencies within the
armed forces".^ However, she does not go into detail as to how this process might
operate.
At the innovation stage, Kaldor argues that, in general, it is necessary to differentiate
between institutions for development and production. In the case of the US, she points
out, the so-called "prime contractors" generally undertake responsibility for both the
development and production of complete weapons systems.^ These prime contractors are
the manufacturers of weapons platforms, usually large aircraft, shipbuilding, automobile
1 M. Kaldor, "The Weapons Succession Process", op. cit.,
p. 579, 583.
For case studies which support this assertion see: Merritt Roe Smith
(Ed.), Military
Enterprise
and Technological
Change, The MIT Press,
Cambridge, MA, 1985, pp. 22-26; Elting Morison, Men, Machines and
Modern Times, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1966, Chapter 2; Susan
Douglass, "The Navy Adopts the Radio, 1899-1919", in Merritt Roe Smith
(Ed.), op. cit.,
pp. 117-174; James Fallows, "The American Army and
the M-16 Rifle", in D. MacKenzie & J. Wajcman (Ed.), op. cit.,
pp.
237-251.
2 M. Kaldor, "The Weapons Succession process", op. cit.,
pp. 581-582.
3 Ibid.,
p. 583.
^ Ibid.,
pp. 583-584.
5 Ibid.,
p. 584.

or engineering companies. The 'primes' assemble the complete weapon system, and
subcontract out the subsystems - like the weapons and the electronics - thereby creating an
interdependent network of big and small companies. They tend to specialize in particular
types of weapons systems. For example, Boeing, General Dynamics, and Rockwell make
bombers; Grumman and Vought make fighters for the Navy; McDonnell Douglas and
General Dynamics makefightersfor the Air Force. ^
The prime contractors and their related subcontractors tend to dominate particular regions,
and thus the economic impact of producing a particular weapons system may be very
great within these regions. Many thousands of people may work on a single defence
contract "And", Kaldor points out, "if we also take into account the fact that many small
firms which produce both military and civil goods are dependent on the military market to
ensure their survival, then it is evident that the defence industry is deeply embedded in the
economy as a whole". This means that large defence contracts and the large defence
contractors can build up a political constituency in these regions, which will act to
pressure Congress for the continuation of existing weapons programmes and the
development of new ones.^
The prime contractors expect their defence divisions to be profitable. They are thus
constantly seeking to maintain or increase profit margins and searching for new markets.
Kaldor points out that US defence contractors frequendy testify to the intensity of
competition over defence contracts.^ Although they are in some sense "commercial"
enterprises, the defence divisions of the prime contractors are also dependent on the
military - or, more specifically, on one branch of the armed services - for the bulk of their
contracts. Thus they must obtain continuous contracts to ensure capacity employment.^
The technical and management personnel who work on defence programs become geared
to the advanced military technology and complex equipment. The firms are not oriented
towards civilian technologies, and do not have a tme commercial orientation. "By the time
a firm has developed the personnel, facilities and equipment to handle large defence
programs, management must keep the company operating at or near full strength or risk
serious losses".^
1 M. Kaldor, "The Armament Process", o p . c i t . , p. 2 65; M. Kaldor,
The
Arsenal,
op. c i t . , pp. 10-11; Kaldor points out that there are
"literally thousands of subcontractors, some of whom are very large
and
are
prime
contractors
themselves.
In
addition
to
the
subcontractors there are also many suppliers. {Ibid.,
p. 11)
2 Ibid.,
pp. 11-12.
3 M. Kaldor, "The Armament Process", o p . c i t . , pp. 265-266.
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This, according to Kaldor, is "particularly important with respect to research and
development", as "in practice, production capacity fluctuates substantially". On the other
hand, research and development makes use of more specialized equipment and more
highly skilled workers than does production. The defence contractors, who depend on
their technological capabilities in order to obtain contracts, cannot afford to disband
design teams. "Hence", Kaldor argues, "whereas military units may be preoccupied with
continued operation, the main supply enterprises are concerned with continuous
development and, to a lesser extent, production''. ^ That this is so, Kaldor argues, "is
suggested by the fact that the useful life of weapons systems tends to correspond to the
manufacturing cycle. As development ends on one weapons system, development begins
on another, and as production ends on one system, it begins on another".2
In order for the prime defence contractors to ensure the continuous development that they
require, they must obtain new orders "as soon as development of a particular weapons
system is completed". Because the contractors are dependent on the military, the new
orders are for new weapons systems. This process Kaldor has called the follow-on
imperative.3 As part of tiiis process, the defence contractors "all" have planning groups
who attempt to "predict what a particular branch of the armed services might require when
current projects come to an end; and the various ways the corporation might meet that
requirement". These planning groups work closely with similar groups in the military,
and, Kaldor claims, "Because of the relationship with the armed forces, particularly
during the so-called concept-definition phase, the prediction tends to become a selffulfilling prophecy".^ It is this effort to obtain follow-on orders which generates the
intense competition between the contractors which has akeady been alluded to. The
competition between the defence contractors takes on a technological rather than a price
form and, Kaldor argues, is directed toward product rather than toward process
improvement. "That is why the companies compete by offering technological
improvements that will appeal to their customers, the armed forces".^
Kaldor points outtiiatthe "shape" of the follow-on system is "severely constrained by the
organizational rigidities of the armed forces". The new technologies will "only get
through the innovation and integration stages if they conform to the requirements" of the
particular branch of the service they are being developed for. It is acceptable for these
technologies to be quite radical in themselves, but they mustfitwithin the framework that
1 M. Kaldor, "The Weapons Succession Process",
2 M. Kaldor, The Baroque
Arsenal^
op. c i t . , p.
3 M. Kaldor, "The Weapons Succession Process",
4 M. Kaldor, The Baroque
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op. c i t . ,
Armament Process", o p . c i t . , p. 267.
5 M. Kaldor, "The Weapons Succession Process",

op. c i t . ,
50.

p. 266.

op. c i t . . ,

p. 585.
p. 267; M. Kaldor,
op.

cit.,
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has been established by the weapons system. The designers themselves are the products
of their military-industrial environment. Although it is the competition between the prime
contractors which tends to drive the weapons development process, "this technological
dynamism is confined within certain limits - limits that are defined by the stability of
military and industrial institution, and stability which is guaranteed by the planning
system". The result is an entirely introverted form of technological change; Kaldor has
termed this "contradictory conservative but dynamic" form of technological change
"baroque".!
MacKenzie and Spinardi, while arguing that the 'bureaucratic politics' model "captures
much of the complexity of organizational interactions which result in the formulation of
policy, and the production of technology" level a number of criticisms at the theory as it
has been formulated so far, and point to a number of factors which "need to be woven
into the 'bureaucratic politics' framework to provide a satisfactory explanation of
technological change".^
Firstly, they argue that neither the Executive Branch nor Congress have been iirelevant to
the weapons development process, as a simplistic reading of 'bureaucratic politics' might
imply.3 Kaldor, to a certain extent seems to fall into this trap, concentrating mainly on the
relationship between the military and the defence contractors. The importance of Congress
has been studied most closely by Gordon Adams. Adams argues that the arms race is
driven by an 'iron triangle', that is, "a political relationship that brings together key
participants in a clearly delineated area of policy making". The three sides of this triangle
are the "Defense Department (plus NASA and the nuclear weapons branch of the
Department of Energy); the House and Senate Armed Services Committee and Defense
Appropriations Subcommittee, as well as Congressional members from defense-related
districts and states; and the firms, labs, research institutes, trade associations and trade
unions in the industry itself'.^ Adams seems to underrate the importance of the President
and the Executive Branch. MacKenzie and Wajcman argue that the President and the
Office of the Secretary of Defense are also "key actors" in the weapons development
process, and are in some sense 'above' the other organizational actors. However, the
armed services are not under the direct political control of their political superiors, but
lobby actively for their goals. The relationship between the President and the Office of the
Secretary of Defense and the armed services "is more appropriately described as
! Ibid., p. 585; M. Kaldor, The Baroque Arsenal, op. cit., p. 49.
2 D. MacKenzie and G. Spinardi, "Politics of Technology
op. cit.,
p. 26.
3 Ibid.
4 Gordon Adams, The Politics of Defense Contracting: The Iron Triangle,
Transaction Books, New Brunswick, US- 198 6, p. 24.

'bargaining' than as political command", MacKenzie and Wajcman argue.^ Other "actors"
which perhaps should have a place in the 'bureaucratic politics' model of weapons
development are the State Department, and organizations within this such as the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency.
Schurmann has argued that the office of the President of the United States is of prime
importance in the policy making process, particularly in the area of foreign policy and
defence. This is so, Schurmann argues, partly because of the President's constitutional
powers, but also because it is the American public's "sense of security" which is
important in determining the level of support which can be obtained for a change in
defence policy. The President is "in the most decisive position to influence the public's
sense of security" according to Schurmann.2 Further, the President occupies a special
position at the apex of all the federal government bureaucracies. He is therefore in a
position to arbitrate in disputes and competition between the armed services and other
bureaucracies, and to impose a decision upon them.^
The bureaucratic politics model is further complicated, MacKenzie and Spinardi claim, by
the need to consider the different levels at which the organizational actors operate. They
delineate three such levels for the weapons development process in the United States: (i)
rivaky between the different armed services; (ii) intra-servicerivalrybetween the various
military units within the one service; and, (iii) bureaucratic disputes which occur between
groups within a certain military unit. These latter arise, they claim, because a complex
weapons system is usually divided into subsystems which are worked on by small
groups.^
Secondly, they point out that in addition to focusing on the organizations directly involved
in weapons development the 'bureaucratic politics' model must take into account the
wider political context. Any analysis of the weapons development process needs to take
into consideration the fact that during the 1970's and 1980's there was a shift away from
the liberal 'dovish' stance - typically supportive of arms control and the doctrine of mutual
assured destruction - towards more conservative 'hawkish' stance which is opposed to
arms control and favours the development of offensive weapons as part of a war-fighting
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strategy. 1 To this could be added the need to set the weapons development process in the
international context as well.
Thirdly, MacKenzie and Spinardi argue that 'bureaucratic politics' as ordinarily
understood tends to underestimate the significance of the production

of military

technology. They argue that issues of producibility and reliability have an influence on the
technical choices that are made in the weapons development process.^
Although Kaldor's concept of 'baroque' technology extended to handle the criticisms put
forward by MacKenzie and Spinardi goes a long way to explain the type of technology
that is developed by the United States and the reasons for this, it does not take into
account the fact that the weapons may serve a function beyond their military or economic
role. That is, that the weapons may have an ideological content, and serve, in part, some
ideological mission. Merritt Roe Smith argues that it is important to emphasize "that
technologies necessarily reflect the values and aspirations of their makers. Such norms,
whether consciously espoused or not, pervade the entire spectrum of the development and
are particularly important in setting the subsequent course of new technologies."^
The notion that technologies might come contain the ideologies of those in control of the
development process has been expressed forcefully by Langdon Winner. Winner argues
that we need to "pay attention to the characteristics of technical objects and the meaning of
these characteristics".^ He identifies two ways in which "artifacts can contain political
properties". Firstly there are "instances in which the invention, design, or arrangement of
a specific technical device or system becomes a way of settling an issue in a particular
community". Secondly there are cases of what Winner calls 'inherently political
technologies', that is, "man-made systems that appear to require, or be strongly
compatible with particular kinds of political relationships". For our purposes, it is
Winner's first argument about the way in which technology has a political nature that is
important.^ Winner argues that the greatest latitude of choice exists "the very first time a
particular instrument, system, or technique is introduced. Because choices tend to become
strongly fixed in material equipment, economic investment, and social habit, the original
flexibility vanishes for all practical purposes once the initial commitments are made".^
1 D. MacKenzie & G. Spinardi, "Politics of Technology
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1.3 OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS
In this thesis I shall use the development of space-based ballistic missile defences in the
late 1970's and early 1980's, what eventually became President Reagan's Strategic
Defense Initiative, to explore, refine and extend the model of the weapons development
process that I have developed in section 1.2. With reference to this model, the case study
that has been chosen is somewhat limited because it does not deal with the whole
weapons development process - from conception through to development and deployment
- but only with the early formative stages, leading up to the decision, announced by
President Reagan on March 23,1983, to launch a research and development programme
to make nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete".
In studying the early development of space-based ballistic missile defence I will focus on
the factors that shaped the weapons development at this very early stage, and the factors
that drove the process along. According to the model, the main driving factors should be
the weapons laboratories and the prime defence contractors. I shall study four groups
which were providing the "impulse" for weapons development: the 'laser-lobby' which
was pushing for the development of space-based chemical lasers; High Frontier which
was pushing for the deployment of orbiting 'space-trucks' which fired 'conventional
missiles'; Edward Teller who was pushing for the development of space-based x-ray
lasers; and, a group of strategists from the Hudson Institute who were pushing for the
deployment of terminal defence systems to protect MX missiles. The first two of these
groups were linked to defence contractors, the third to the weapons laboratories, and the
final group to the military. These groups, which I have called collectively the 'spaceweapons lobby' are studied in Chapter 2.
Based on the model of the weapons development process that has been developed it
would be expected that the "impulse" provided by the 'space-weapons lobby' would be
mediated by the military bureaucracy. In Chapter 4 I investigate the way in which the
Army and the Air Force reacted to, and in fact opposed, the proposals that were being put
forward by the 'space-weapons lobby'. I also focus on the role that was played by the
Executive Branch and Congress in the early development of space-based ballistic missile
defence, and the way in which this role was influenced by the wider political context and
the public perception of the 'Russian threat'. This is dealt with mainly in Chapter 5, in
which I investigate that factors which led to President Reagan making his March 23
speech.

One theme which it is my intention to pursue specifically is Winner's notion that
technology comes to embody the ideology of the groups which have control over the
shaping process. Thus, one of the main aims of my study will be to map out the ideology
of these different groups. An interesting feature of the case study is that the different
groups which comprised the 'space-weapons lobby' all operated within a similar
ideological framework. This ideological framework was that of the Committee on the
Present Danger, a group which was influential in publicly selling the notion of a growing
Soviet threat throughout the second half of the 1970's, and which had close connections
with the Reagan Administration. The link betv/een the 'space-weapons lobby' and the
Committee on the Present Danger is explored in Chapter 3. Even though sharing the same
ideological framework, these groups were all pushing for different technological solutions
to the problem of ballistic missile defence - largely because of the different interests which
were represented within the groups - and so to a certain extent were in competition with
each other. Within each of these groups I shall seek to examine the interplay between their
ideology and interests, and the consequence that this has for the weapons development
process.

CH. 2: THE SPACE WEAPONS LOBBY
2.1 INTRODUCTION
A new push for the development of ballistic missile defences emerged in the United States
towards the end of the 1970's, partly in response to some of the new technologies that
were being developed in the weapons laboratories and by defence contractors, and partly
in response to a new perception of the Soviet threat that had been popularized by groups
such as the Committee on the Present Danger. In this chapter I concentrate on four main
groups that were involved in the new push for ballistic missile defences: the so-called
'laser lobby' led by Senator Malcolm Wallop and his aide Angelo Codevilla; Daniel
Graham and the High Frontier study group; Dr. Edward Teller and his colleagues from
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; and, a group of strategists from the Hudson
Institute, Colin Gray and Keith Payne in particular.
AU of these groups were advocating some form of ballistic missile defence, though based
on different technologies. The 'laser lobby' advocated laser battle stations in space; High
Frontier advocated orbiting 'space trucks' which fired missiles at ICBMs as they rose
above the atmosphere; Edward Teller advocated x-ray lasers based in space or popped up
from a patrolling submarine; and lastiy, Colin Gray and Keith Payne advocated the point
defence of MX missile silos using fairly conventional technologies that were being
developed by the Army, perhaps followed by space-based laser weapons at some stage in
the future. In this chapter an attempt is made to trace the evolution and progress of these
groups, noting in particular the ideologies and assumptions which inform their advocacy
of ballistic missile defence, and the form that such a defence should take. I also consider
the interests which these different lobby groups brought to bear on the problem of ballistic
missile defence, and the way in which these interests helped to shape the technical form of
the system that was proposed. Finally, I consider the links which the différents groups
had with the Reagan Administration, which in 1983 initiated a national research and
development programme incorporating all of the different technologies that the space
weapons lobby was proposing.
2.2 THE LASER LOBBY
On Hallowe'en 1977 Dr. Maxwell Hunter, an executive of Lockheed Missiles and Space
Company, in Sunnyvale, California, wrote a paper entitled "Strategic Dynamics and
Space-Laser Weaponry", which outlined his views on the international balance of
power. 1 Hunter, who was familiar with Lockheed's secret research on space-lasers, had
1 Maxwell W. Hunter, "Strategic Dynamics and Space-Laser Weaponry",
Lockheed Missiles and Space Co. Inc., Sunnyvale, California, 31
October 1977. Reprinted in Jerry Pournelle & Dean Ing, Mutual Assured

become captivated by their "revolutionary potential", and when classification rules
allowed, wrote his paper and sent it to a few key defence planners and federal officials.
Hunter's paper apparentiy created a small sensation at this time, but it was not to be until a
year and a half later that his ideas would be actively pushed by what came to be known as
the 'laser lobby'.^ The central idea in Hunter's paper was that new technologies,
particularly laser-weapons, held the promise of being able to shoot down Soviet ballistic
missiles in flight, thus ending the reign of MAD and its concomitant "balance of terror".^
"It would be a terrible thing", said Hunter, "to condemn the human race to live forever in
a grotesque world of Mumal Assured Destruction, if in fact, the advance of technology
had given us the means to create more human alternatives''.^
Hunter was concemed that under the doctrine of MAD, ballistic missiles with nuclear
warheads had come to be considered the "ultimate weapon", against which defence was
well nigh impossible. It had become dogma, argued Hunter, "that there was no way to
stop ballistic missiles after their launch", this having the unfortunate consequence of
preventing the United States^ from launching its weapons through fear of retaliation.^ He
argued that through the advance of technology, the time had come to implement a new
strategic posture. Space transportation would be used to place high energy lasers in space,
so that an effective defence against "massive ballistic missile exchanges" and high altitude
bombers would soon be possible. Further, this system would have the added advantage
that it "would utilize no weapons of mass destruction. Instead, a small but very adequate
amount of energy would be placed very precisely at great ranges upon the necessarily
flimsy vehicles which deliver the weapons of mass destmction".^

Survival,
Baen Books, 1984. Hunter, then 61 years of age, was an
aeronautical engineer with a long association with the defence
industry. He had started at Douglas Aircraft Co. where he had worked
on missiles, including the first anti-missile and anti-satellite
programmes. Hunter began working for Lockheed in 1965, where he had
helped design the fore-runners of the space shuttle. He had spent two
years on the National Space Council advising Presidents Kennedy and
Johnson.
("Maxwell Hunter: The Force Behind Reagan's Star Wars
Strategy", Business
Week, June 20, 1983, p. 40.)
^ "Maxwell Hunter: The Force ...", op. cit.; Jerry Pournelle & Dean
Ing, op. clt.r
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It was in January 1967 Maxwell Hunter first realized that lasers in space presented a
"spectacular new strategic option". He was familiar with studies that had been conducted
in the 1960's which considered the use of rockets launched from orbiting satellites to
intercept missiles in their boost-phase, but he considered that such a scheme would
require "vast quantities of interceptors for effective defense coverage", and that it was
both economically and technically unfeasible.^ However, with the emergence of the
Space Shuttle, and its potential for greatly reducing space transportation costs, and of
high energy lasers^ which could deliver their destmctive energy with precision and at the
speed of light. Hunter thought that it would be possible to overcome the shortcomings of
the conventional technologies.^ According to Hunter's calculations for laser weapons in
polar orbits, it would require 406 orbiting battle stations if the lasers had a range of
1,000km, 21 if the range could be extended to 5,000km and only 9 if the range could be
extended even further to 10,000km.^ To Hunter, these laser battle stations represented a
revolution in weapons development:^
The ability to concentrate beams of energy moving at the velocity of light so
narrowly that they overwhelmingly exceed nuclear bomb energy density delivery
capability should be recognized as a weapons achievement with implications every
bit as shattering as the development of the monstrous but uncontrolled energy
release of the nuclear bombs themselves. This is interception par excellence.
Laser weapons in space had the added advantage of being weapons of discrete
destruction, rather than of mass destruction, which, argued Hunter, "is crucial for the
human decision process".^
Hunter did not have purely defensive applications in mind for his orbiting laser weapons.
As well as their potential to circumvent MAD, he argued that laser weapons in space could
be used to gain tactical advantages, by beaming down from above to destroy airplanes,
helicopters and tanks, and other such targets that one would want to destroy with pin
1 Ibid., pp. 228, 232-233.
2 Hunter thought that it would also be possible to generate directed
energy beams using electrons or larger particles, but he considered
only the use of lasers as these were likely to be the most effective
directed energy weapon. {Ibid., p. 234.)
3 Ibid., pp. 234-235.
^ Ibid., p. 239.
^ Ibid.,
p. 235. By placing laser weapons in space, it would be
possible to intercept enemy missiles during their boost-phase when the
missiles were most vulnerable as (1) minimum energy was required to
destroy the missile as it was at maximum internal pressure and the
tank walls were at maximum temperature; (2) they generated massive
exhaust plumes which enhanced detection; (3) the destruction of the
missile would destroy all of the MIRVed warheads that it contained;
and
(4) kill assessment
w o u l d could be achieved reliably and
accurately by measuring a change in the missile's velocity.
(Ibid.,
pp. 236-237.)
6 Ibid., pp. 234-236.

point accuracy.^ Another motive seems to have been to lure wars away from earth and
out into space. "If one must fight", argued Hunter, "it would be desirable to fight decisive
strategic battles in an arena where no human lived. Space is that arena ... one where an
advanced strategic arsenal can be detonated in its entirety with no direct damage to the
earth or its peoples". Orbiting laser weapons would act as a magnet that attracted wars
into space, by "strongly upsetting the opposing earth-bound strategic force balance".^
The United States was, argued Hunter, the nation that was best placed to take advantage
of these new technologies, and would stand to benefit most from them, being the
strongest nation - both technologically and economically - but also running into diplomatic
and military problems maintaining its overseas forces and base structure.^ Hunter realized
that it would not be an easy matter to convince either the military or arms controllers of the
wisdom of his high-technology strategic vision, the military having a vested interest in a
"violent offensive capability", and the arms controllers arguing that all weapons
technology was bad. "Both parties would much rather hold all peoples, young and old, as
hostages to the Balance of Terror."^ For Hunter, the position taken by the arms
controllers was most worrying. If his strategic vision was ignored and arms control
blindly pursued, he thought that it might place the United States in a disastrous position
with respect to the future. Laser weapons in space, on the other hand, had the potential to
place the US in a commanding position compared to its current situation.^ Lasers in space
could fight and win the "impossible battle", stopping a full-scale ballistic missile attack
with little cost to the defended area. However, once taken up, this strategic option
required permanent vigilance against the possibility that "such a space weapon force could
be defeated in space by a superior ... force of like composition. One would have to
maintain his space laser force second to none into the future in order to remove the
Balance of Terror permanendy from this land".^
Early in 1979 Maxwell Hunter visited Senator Malcolm Wallop (R - Wyoming)"', and,
reportedly, found him reading a copy of his 1977 paper. According to Hunter, Wallop
looked up and exclaimed: "By God we're going to do something to defend this country!"®
Wallop had been impressed by Hunter's paper so Wallop and his aide Angelo Codevilla
1
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urged Hunter to join with other proponents of laser weapons to take his proposal further.
By November 1979 Codevilla and Hunter had put together a group of experts from
private industry: Joseph Miller from TRW, which was building large chemical lasers,
Norbert Schnog of Perkin-Elmer, which was building large precision optics, and Gerald
Ouelette of Charles Stark Draper Laboratories, which was working on pointing, tracking
and fire control, who without their companies' blessings prepared a classified briefing on
how orbiting laser battle stations could be used to destroy missiles. Then, under Senator
Wallop's auspices. Hunter's team conducted a series of briefing sessions. Firstly, there
were two dry runs for 10 congressional aides, and then a group of four followed by
another group of eight senators from the Senate Intelligence and Armed Services
Committees.^
The members of the Hunter's team all came from companies which were working on
contracts for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's (DARPA) Space Laser
Triad, a programme to develop on the ground the subsystems that would be required for a
space-based chemical laser battle station. It was planned that these subsystems would be
tested in 1983-1985. This programme consisted of three elements. Alpha was a project to
develop a 5-megawatt hydrogen-fluoride chemical laser. There had originally been three
companies competing for the Alpha project, TRW, Rockwell's Rocketdyne Division and
Bell Aerospace Textron, but by 1980 Bell had been eliminated. Talon Gold was a project
to develop technologies to acquire targets in space and for the pointing and tracking of
space-based lasers. Two teams of contractors were competing on this project, one
comprised of Rockwell International and Hughes Aircraft as associate contractors, and the
other of Lockheed as the prime contractor with GTE Sylvania, Ford Aerospace and
Hughes Aircraft. Lode was the Large Optics Demonstration Experiment which aimed to
fabricate and control on the ground a 4-meter diameter mirror of the type required for a
space-based laser. Two teams of contractors were competing on this project, one
comprised of Hughes Aircraft with Perkin-Elmer, and the other of Lockheed Missiles and
Space Company with Itek.^
^ Ibid.:
Jerry Pournelle & Dean Ing, op. cit., p. 48; "Laser Weapons:
An Omen of Real-Life Star Wars", Business
Week, Dec. 11, 1979, p. 115;
Jeff Hecht, Beam Weapons:
The Next Arms Race, Plenum Press, New York,
1984, p. 220; Jack Manno, Arming
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Dodd, Mead & Co., New
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At the Senate briefings Maxwell Hunter provided information on the systems aspects of a
space-based laser and the engagement of Soviet missiles; Joseph Miller provided
information on chemical lasers; Gerald Oulette provided information on pointing and
tracking technology for space-based lasers; and, Norbet Schnog provided information on
the optical systems necessary for space-based lasers. The group claimed that an effective
ballistic missile defence of the United States could be provided by the mid to late 1980's
at a cost of US$10 billion, by placing 18 high-energy laser battle stations in polar orbits at
an altitude of 1750km. ^ Conservative senators were reported to have shown the most
interest, especially Senators Henry Jackson (D-Washington), Jake Gam (R-Utah), John
Tower (R-Texas), and Harrison Schmitt (R-New Mexico), although a number of liberals
too were supposed to be "flirting with the idea" of backing a space based laser defence on
the grounds that it might be cheaper than building more offensive weapons.^
As well as the congressional briefings. Hunter's so-called 'gang of four' conducted
briefings for Pentagon officials. Their proposals were reported to have been widely
denounced as being "premature and unrealistic". Officials from the Army and the Defense
Department charged that the group had not considered countermeasures, and that state-ofthe-art technology for the sensors and complex battle management required was not
available. They ran into further trouble when they conducted a briefing for two Army
generals who were in charge of conventional ballistic missile defence programs.^ The
generals were outraged by the civilian lobbyists who were advocating exotic technologies
in competition to their own, more conventional, programmes. The Defense Department
put pressure on the group's employers to keep the members of the briefing team out of
Washington. As the members of Hunter's team had no official standing, and as Hunter's
employer (Lockheed) was an Army BMD contractor^, the team soon disbanded. The
Senate forces were not so easily distracted. Led by Senator Wallop and his aide Angelo
Codevilla, they continued to lobby Congress and the Pentagon, arguing that the pursuit of
strategic defence based on laser weapons in space was a saner policy than MAD.^
1982, pp. 15-16. In 1980 DARPA selected Boeing for a follow-on effort
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Wallop's first lobbying effort in the Senate, an attempt in 1979 to pass a bill appropriating
money for laser development, apparently also ran into trouble when it was rebuffed by
Senator John Tower of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Air Force as being
premature. Frustrated, Wallop went public with his campaign in an attempt to muster
more support. ^ One example of this campaign was a paper under the authorship of
Malcolm Wallop that appeared in the Fall 1979 edition of Strategic Review. 2 The main
point that Wallop was trying to get across in this paper was that technology was making
the "balance of terror" obsolete, and now promised a "considerable measure of safety
from the threat of ballistic missiles".^
According to Wallop, between 1966 and 1979 America had been in the "iron grip" of the
doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction, and the possibility of a nuclear conflict was not
taken seriously. This meant that both strategy and weapons development aimed to inflict
damage on the Soviet Union, rather than limiting the Soviets' ability to inflict damage on
the United States. However, he argued, proponents of MAD, and especially of arms
control under the guise of SALT, had now been discredited. Not only were the Soviets
involved in a massive arms build up, but they were also working on antiballistic missile
defences with more verve than the US.^ Wallop reflected nostalgically on a period when
the US military possessed "unquestioned strategic nuclear superiority" over the Soviet
military, when "even with its then inaccurate missiles" it could have launched a
"disarming strike at Soviet missiles deployed in 'soft' launch pads, while retaining most
of its force in reserve". The strategy of MAD was the main vehicle through which this
situation had been reversed, so much so that "a small portion of the Soviet missile force
[was now] capable of destroying nearly all American land-based missiles in their silos,
thereby blunting the United States' capability to inflict retaliatory destruction upon Soviet
society".^
Wallop argued that through the SALT I treaty the US government had bargained away an
ABM system. Safeguard, which even though it possessed certain faults was,
nonetheless, superior to the Soviet ABM system. The Soviet military, argued Wallop, had
1 Kent D. Lee, Strategic Defense and Congress: The Role of Scientific
Advisers,
summa cum laude thesis. College of Liberal Arts, University
of Minnesota, Summer 1985, pp. 68-69.
2 Malcolm Wallop, "Opportunities and Imperatives of Ballistic Missile
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Herken, letter to Ian McNicol, 15 December, 1987.)
3 Malcolm Wallop, "Opportunities and Imperatives
op. cit., p. 13.
^ Ibid., pp. 13-14.
5 Ibid., p. 15.

no system comparable to Sprint (one of the components of the Safeguard system); their
phased array radars were primitive, and computers too slow to handle the data rates
required to track and discriminate incoming missiles.^ However, new technologies were
now being developed which promised to overcome the problems experienced by the early
ABM systems. But these were just technical possibilities, the reality of the situation being
that since the signing of the ABM Treaty in 1972 the US military had actually dismantled
its only ABM site and had not moved to capitalize upon the new technologies.^
In contrast, argued Wallop, "since SALT I the Soviet Union not only has sustained its
allotted ABM site, ... but it has constructed the foundation for a nationwide ABM
system". It was constructing four huge phased-array radars, and had continued to conduct
ABM research, bringing them to a level of technology comparable to that of the United
States at the start of the seventies. All that was now needed to install a nationwide ABM
system of the Safeguard type was to mass-produce the missiles and the small radar
involved. While such a system, in American hands, was not all that threatening. Wallop
argued that in Soviet hands it "looms as more significant", because of their contrasting
strategic posture: ^
If the Soviets, following the path inherent in their strategic deployment, were to aim
a disarming strike at the vulnerable land-based U.S. Minuteman force, they could
then concentrate their ABM's against the residual American force of submarinelaunched missiles. If by the late 1980s the United States were to go ahead with the
production and deployment of modernized MX land-based missiles, Soviet ABMs
could provide a respectable point defense of Soviet weapons against the MX.
The new technologies that Wallop thought looked promising for the defence against longrange ballistic missiles were directed energy weapons, in particular laser weapons,
because it was "far from clear" that particle beam weapons could ever "figure
conclusively" in ballistic missile defence. Further, these laser weapons would be required
to be based in space where they could attack the missiles in their boost-phase (where they
were slower, more detectable and softer, and the multiple warheads had not been
deployed), thus rendering a "radical improvement" in performance over the conventional
ABM systems. Stationed in space. Wallop argued, "each of these weapons may project its

1 Ibid. The Safeguard system was claimed by Wallop to be "potent but
obviously limited" because its radars and computers could handle only
a limited number of incoming missiles and could be easily overwhelmed;
the cost of the defence required to shoot down an extra missile was
greater than the cost of the extra missile; and, it would not provide
a perfect defence, some warheads always getting through. (Jjbid., pp.
15-16)
2 ibid.r p. 17.
3 Ibid,

energy for thousands of miles, only a few dozen of these weapons could conceivably
destroy a whole fleet of ballistic missiles".^
The ABM system that Wallop advocated was comprised of several dozen laser weapons
systems deployed in space, a system he argued which would "revolutionize the strategic
equation as we have known it for nearly two decades - above all by decisively tipping the
balance of modem warfare in favor of the defense and radically mitigating the potential
destructive effects of war". There were two possible lasers that could be used as the active
element of such a system: chemical lasers which produced an infrared beam or Eximer
lasers which produced an ultraviolet beam. Wallop felt that the chemical lasers should be
used, as they were "much closer to being ready for use in space because they require
relatively litde heavy equipment".2 Other elements of the system included a large main
mirror to focus the beam over long distances, an accurate tracking and pointing
mechanism to point the injfrared beam at a target missile some three to four thousand miles
away and to hold it there for the few seconds required to destmct the missile, and sensors
to detect that the missiles had been launched and a computer and communications system
to assign each target to the laser battle station that was in the best position to engage it.
Wallop argued that each of these technologies was now in place in the United States and
could be integrated into a potent ABM system and placed in orbit by the mid-1980's if the
political will to do so existed. ^
What was necessary, argued Wallop, was an all-out effort to build a space-based laser
ballistic missile defence system on the scale of the Manhatten Project. What stood in the
way of this were those in the scientific and technical community, and the Carter
Administration and its congressional allies, who were committed to the doctrine of Mutual

1 I b i d . , p. 17. Wallop argued that particle beams were peculiarly ill
suited to deployment in space as (i) they would require such an
enormous power source to drive them that deployment in space would be
impractical, and (ii) the beam would be bent by the earth's magnetic
field making accurate firing difficult. However, even though Wallop
thought them impractical he argued that "despite their limitations,
particle beam weapons could join the Soviet weapons inventory in the
mid-1980's". { I b i d . , P- 18.)
2 I b i d .
Chemical lasers produced an infrared beam by burning hydrogen
and fluorine. The products of this reaction needed to diffuse quickly
into an area of low pressure. The vacuum of space provided an ideal
working environment for such a weapon. Eximer lasers produced an
ultraviolet beam by exciting molecules of xenon and krypton with
electricity or nuclear radiation. They would thus require large power
sources.{Ibid.)
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Assured Destruction. What Wallop's project stood for was a new strategic doctrine. It
was not a weapon of mass destruction: "The laser does not loom as a weapon of mass
destruction", Wallop claimed, "it threatens nothing except weapons of mass
destruction".^ In light of the Soviet military's emerging offensive superiority vis-a-vis the
US military, "what responsible American official", asked Wallop, "could counsel
rationally that the U.S. forfeit the opportunity of effective defense? And, for that matter,
what sincere advocate of arms control could not bring himself to admit that 'Assured
Protection' would be preferable to 'Assured Destruction'?"^
Wallop and his allies kept the fight for space-based laser weapons alive in congress,
pushing the same line that Wallop had put forward in his paper, and arguing that such a
system "could dramatically boost defenses against land- and sub-launched missile
attacks".^ This fight, which pitted a "cadre of Senate Republican staffers plus their allies
in the aerospace industry against the Carter Administration Defense Department
establishment" was about how fast such weapons should be developed. In 1980 Wallop
was seeking a US$10 billion crash development programme over three to five years to
develop a space-based laser BMD. He introduced an amendment to add US$160 million
to the fiscal 1981 defence budget, and Jake Gam an amendment to add US$60 million for
space-based laser BMD. In early July 1980, the Senate group lost this skirmish by a vote
of 52-39, the Administration arguing that the weapons should not be brought into the
military inventory until the 1990's. However, a small group of aerospace analysts led by
Maxwell Hunter "did manage to persuade the Senate in top secret briefings to add
[US]$22 million to the defense appropriation for laser development" and to generate
support for the laser weapon concept as a way of redressing the "deteriorating balance of
power between the US and the Soviet Union".^
The "cadre of senate staffers" was otherwise known as the 'Madison Group', a
"particularly well-connected, powerful but discreet" group of "ultra-conservative"
congressional aides, who came together on January 4th 1980 in Room 607 at the Madison
Hotel at the initiative of Senator Jesse Helm's assistant, John Carbaugh, who, in 1979
had helped organize successfully the opposition to ratifying the proposed SALT n
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Treaty.^ The group consisted of about a dozen men, all present or former Congressional
staffers, and all hawks on foreign policy and defence issues. They met every other Friday
for lunch, to devise strategies to oppose arms control, increase military spending, and
provide assistance to anti-communist forces in South America.^ Besides John Carbaugh,
the group is reported to have included Angelo Codevilla, Tidal McCoy and Mark
Schneider (Senator Jake Gam), Sven Kraemer (Sen. John Tower), Richard Perle (exSen. Henry Jackson), William Schneider (Representative Jack Kemp), Quentin
Crommelin (Sen. Strom Thurmond), David Sullivan (Sen. Gordon Humphrey), Jack
Davis (Sen. Stone), Robert Andrews (Sen. Glenn), Margo Carlisle (Sen. McClure), and
Michel Pillsbury.^ Also, Charles Kupperman of the Committee on the Present Danger
was a member'^, as were Seymour Weiss and William Van Cleave^, and Maxwell Hunter
is reported to have been associated with the group®. Eugene Rostow claimed that the
'Madison Group' was a group of young neo-conservative ideologues who wanted no
arms control with the Soviets, were "neo-isolationist", and distrustful of all foreigners,
even America's allies. This was in contrast to what he called 'old-line conservatism'
espoused by himself and Paul Nitze.'' As well as having close links with the members of
the 'laser lobby', the 'Madison Group' was also well placed to influence the Reagan
Administration in the early 1980's, through membership of the President-elect's transition
team,®
Eugene Rostow considered Richard Perle to be the "intellectual leader" of the 'Madison
Group'. ^ Perle was both an ABM supporter and a hawk from way-back. In 1969 he was
hired as the chief research assistant for the Committee to Maintain a Prudent Defense
Policy, which had been set up by Albert Wohlsetter, Paul Nitze and Dean Acheson to
counter the anti-ABM campaign that was being waged at the time. After this he moved on
^ Rip Bulkeley & Graham Spinardi, Space
Weapons: Deterrence
or
Delusion? r Polity Press, Cambridge, 1986, p. 64; Gregg Herken,
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to work for Senator Henry Jackson and became notorious for his strong opposition to the
SALT treaties.!
The failure of the 'Madison Group' to win the Senate battle for immediate full scale
development funding for chemical laser weapons in 1980 reportedly made them more
determined than ever to succeed under the Reagan Administration. Their opposition to
arms control was redirected from SALT 11 to the ABM Treaty. After Reagan had been
elected, the Group continued to meet for its weekly lunches, despite being driven out of
the Madison Hotel for short time by the glare of unwanted publicity.^
The group known as the 'laser lobby' seems to have been a fairly loose coalition of
mainly Republican Senators - who supported space-based lasers for a variety of reasons linked through the membership of their aides in the 'Madison Group', and through a
shared world view, in which the Soviets were seen as a growing and ominous threat, and
space-based laser BMD the best way to curb this threat. The group was led by Senator
Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyoming) and also included Senators Harrison Schmitt (R-New
Mexico), Henry Jackson (D-Washington), Jake Gam (R-Utah), John Tower (R-Texas),
William Roth (R-Delware) and Representative Jack Kemp (R-New York). Jake Gam has
suggested that Senator Pete Domenici (R-New Mexico) was a member of this group
also. 3
Although the 'laser lobby' seems to have been a loose coalition, all members shared a
common ideology. They argued that SALT I was a bad and fundamentally flawed treaty,
and that SALT n was even worse. A typical view was that expressed by Jack Kemp, who
contended that SALT I had "done something worth doing - badly (limiting offensive
! Fred Kaplan, The Wizards
of Armageddon,
Touchstone, New York, 1983,
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have the capability to stage a "knock-out-blow" against US land-based
ICBMs. Perle blames this situation on arms control advocates who have
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have constantly underestimated the Soviet capabilities. Perle argues
that the situation that the US faces in the early eighties is
comparable to that of the British facing the Germans in the 1930's.
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weapons), while doing something not worth doing - too well (limiting ABM
deployment). It had not constrained the build-up of the Soviet military's offensive
power but had bargained away the US military's superior ballistic missile defence system.
Throughout the 1970's the Soviet government had outspent the US government and
indulged in a massive build up in offensive strategic weapons, while the US had stood
still, or even gone backwards, so much so that the Soviet military was considered to be
vastly superior, and the United States vulnerable to a first strike attack. If the SALT n
treaty were to be adhered to, this would only set this dangerous vulnerability in concrete.^
To make matters worse, not only were the SALT treaties bad treaties, but the Soviets
were held to cheat on them, especially the 1972 ABM Treaty. Three main supposed
violations were frequently cited: (1) the Soviet military had constructed a number of large
phased-array radars; (2) they had deployed a semi-mobile ABM radar, the ABM-X-3 comprised of the Flat Twin radar and SH-04 and SH-08 missiles - at a site on the
Kamchatka Peninsula; and, (3) they had conducted more than fifty tests of the SA-2 and
SA-5 SAM air defence interceptors in the ABM mode.^ Much of this world view was
based on publications put out by the Committee on the Present Danger, and by writers
such as Paul Nitze and Richard Pipes who were prominent in this committee. The answer
to the problem of the Soviet threat was seen to lie in the deployment of space-based laser
ABM defenses, and possibly also more conventional systems such as LoADS being
developed by the Army.
Jake Gam provides an interesting example of the diverse reasons that brought the various
senators to align themselves with the 'laser lobby'. In Gam's case, although he
undoubtedly shared the world view of the other members, it seems to have been largely in
response to the strong opposition which arose in his state to the basing of the MX missile
in the so-called race-track mode, the mode preferred by the Air Force.'' The Air Force's
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own environmental impact statements showed that the project would place a severe strain
on already scarce water supplies, lead to a permanent increase in air pollution, destroy
vast areas of vegetation, and encourage the spread of the noxious weed halogeton which
was poisonous to sheep and cattle, and could contaminate the soil for up to 50 years. In
addition the project was to be built on land considered sacred by the Duckwater Shoshone
Indian tribe. Not surprisingly, this particular MX basing mode met strong opposition
from local activist groups - environmental groups, the Shoshone Indians, and groups of
cattlemen and ranchers - and national environmental groups, especially in Utah, which
was also feeling the effects of a huge energy project to extract oil from tar sands and oil
shale, and to mine coal and uranium.^
The opposition of the environmental movement was joined on 5th May 1981 by a strong
moral sanction from the Mormon Church. Church President Spencer Kimball came out
strongly against the MX missile, arguing that it was a "denial of the very essence" of the
church's gospel of "peace to the peoples of the earth". They argued not only to keep the
missiles out of Utah and Nevada, but to find and altemative plan altogether: "With the
most serious concern over the pressing moral question of possible nuclear conflict", the
church elders said, "we plead with our national leaders to marshal the genius of the nation
to find viable alternatives which will secure ... protection from possible enemy
aggression, which is our common concern". The message was wired to the Utah and
Nevada Congressional delegations and to President Reagan whose Administration was, at
the time, reviewing options on how to deploy the MX.2
The public impact of the statement by the Mormon leader was significant. In a survey
commissioned in Salt Lake City in June 1981, shortly after the release of the statement,
76% of those questioned were opposed to the basing of the MX in Utah, whereas only a
few months earlier it had been about 50%.^ Initially the Congressional delegation in Utah,
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all of whom were Republicans and active Mormons, reacted cautiously to the statement.
Likewise the Nevada delegation. All supported the MX programme, but withheld
judgement on the basing mode. Eventually, the weight of public opinion became too
much, and Senators Jake Gam of Utah and Paul Laxalt of Nevada, both hawks with
direct access to the White House, came out strongly against the MX deployment plan.^
On June 25th, 1981, Gam and Laxalt publicly rejected the Air Force's MX plan and
presented an altemative plan to Deputy Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci, who passed it
on to the President. Prominent in their list of several altemative basing modes was a plan
to deploy 200 MX missiles in existing Minuteman silos and protect them with BMD, and
to accelerate ABM research so that a full-scale ABM system could be deployed by the mid
1980's.2 This proposal seems to have been in accord with the Reagan Administration's
own thinking at the time.^
Senator Harrison Schmitt, a former astronaut, and Senator William Roth (R-Delware)
were attracted to the notion of BMD for economic reasons. In June 1981, they came out
strongly against the MX race-track basing mode, arguing that it was an "ill-considered
scheme of monstrous economic and societal proportions and of questionable economic
and technical validity". What was required was a strategic defence system that would
"make weapons of mass destmction obsolete". Allocating US$40 to $50 billion to the
race-track scheme would be a waste of money, they argued, and would direct funds away
from the development of ballistic missile defence.'^ Senator Pete Domenici, a member of
the 'laser lobby' who seems to have become active in early 1982, took a very much
similar position to Schmitt and Roth. By this time, the Reagan Administration had
abandoned the race-track basing mode, and had identified three altemative basing modes
for the MX missile: (1) stationing them in deep underground silos; (2) basing them on
continuous airbome patrol; and, (3) protecting them with ballistic missile defences.
Domenici was Chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, and was an advocate of BMD
1 Paul Laxalt was considered to be President Reagan's closest friend
and adviser in the Senate.
2 Laxalt and Garn, amongst other Senators had introduced an amendment
to the 1981 Defense Department authorization bill guaranteeing that
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"Moinnon Church Opposes Placing MX Missiles in Utah and Nevada", o p .
c i t . ; William E. Schmidt, "Public Mood
op.
c i t . ; "Not in My
State", The Nation,
June 1, 1981, p. 15; Henry S. Bradsher, "Laxalt,
Garn Reject MX in Home States", Washington
Star, June 26, 1981, p. 3.
3 When first in office, members of Reagan's Defense Transition Team
were reported to be concerned that the Utah-Nevada basing plan would
take so long to complete that most US land-based ICBM's would remain
vulnerable until the 1990's. They favoured a plan in which more
underground silos were built and the missiles shuffled between these.
(Walter S. Mossberg, "MX Missile Plan ...", o p .
cit.)
4 Harrison H. Schmitt & William V. Roth, "A Better Way to Defend
ourselves", Washington
Star, June 18, 1981, p. 15.

as it promised to be the most cost-effective way to protect the MX missile against the
threat of Soviet attack.^ In 1980 Domenici had requested the Los Alamos National
Laboratory to conduct a study of the advances that had been made in BMD technology
since the signing of the ABM Treaty in 1972. The study concluded that the "future of
ballistic missile defense is dominated by the potential for directed-energy weapons to
intercept ballistic missiles in the boost phase".^
Even though they suffered set-backs, the 'laser lobby' led by Wallop and backed up by
groups such as the 'Madison Group' kept pushing their concept, with some success.
They argued that it may be possible to create a "laser umbrella" much more cheaply that
previously imagined^, some supporters such as Senator Harrison Schmitt going so far as
to claim that "a really fool proof system, possibly using satellite-borne laser weapons,
would end the nuclear-arms race once and for all".^ The 'laser lobby' now had much
more support, as a dozen of the senators who had voted against Wallop's 1980 proposal
had now been replaced.^ In 1981, Wallop's group proposed that an extra US$250 million
be spent on laser weapon research in 1982, in addition to the US$136 million the
Administration was proposing. In early May 1981, Wallop sent a "dear colleague" letter
to other senators indicating that he would introduce an amendment to the Armed Services
Authorization Bill to add US$152.5 Million to DARPA's budget for its laser triad
programme and US$97.5 million to the Air Force budget to "expedite the building of a
space laser weapon". According to Wallop: "Laser battie stations [were] not something
out of 'Star Wars'", but that "Actual physical pieces of the system exist". Only the money
and the political will to build them was missing. Wallop estimated that such a system
could be developed by 1985 and in orbit the following year, for a cost of US$2-3
billion.^
When introduced. Wallop's amendment was supported by about 10 other Senators, and
the chances of the bill passing looked quite promising.'' But the 'laser lobby' ran into
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problems with the Pentagon. A briefing on space-based lasers prepared by DARPA was
held up in the Pentagon, which seems to have stopped the White House adding its
approval to the amendment, and a report by the Defense Science Board (DSB) was not
favourable on the near-term prospects of space-based lasers. The DSB report did
recommend that US$50 milHon be added to the budget for research in this area. Wallop's
original proposal was rejected in favour of a US$50 million add on - US$20 million for
DARPA and US$30 million for the Air Force - for laser system integration and the
establishment of a space-laser program office within the Air Force, passing in the Senate
by a margin of 91 to 3. This compromise amendment was put by Harrison Schmitt and
Malcolm Wallop. ^
The following year the group ran into major problems in its quest to promote space-based
chemical lasers, the so-called 'laser-wars' erupting on Capitol Hill. The 'laser-wars' took
place between factions in the Senate and House Armed Services Committees who were
advocating lasers of different wavelengths for use in space-based BMD. The House
committee fired the first shot when it said that the Administration's US$156 million
programme for fiscal 1983 for the development of space-based lasers might well result in
a technical fiasco. The report on the Defense Authorization Act from the House committee
released in April 1982 argued that "emphasis is being focussed on the wrong laser
technology", as short wavelength lasers were more lethal.^ They were joined in their
opposition to chemical lasers by the Defense Science Board. The laser programme that the
House was objecting to was DARPA's Space Laser Triad based on a 5-megawatt infrared
chemical laser. They argued that the shorter the wavelength of the laser, the more lethal
the beam would be as the beam would be more concentrated and could deliver more
energy to the missile. Chemical infrared lasers would be easy to defeat by using ablative
coatings on the missile, or by polishing the surface of the missile to reflect the beam, it
was argued. 2
In its April report the House Armed Services Committee called for a cut of US$121
million from the Administration's request, including the termination of the Alpha and
Lode projects and US$41 million that had been allocated to the Air Force for research on
California), and Daniel lonouye (D-Hawaii). (Partick Tyler, "How
Edward Teller learned
op. cit.)
1 Gregg Herken, "The earthly origins of Star Wars", Bulletin of the
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March 12 1982, p. 1372; Clarence Robinson, "Beam Weapons Technology
Expanding", op. cit., p. 42.
2 William J. Broad, "Laser Wars on Capitol Hill", Science, Vol 216,
June 4, 1982, pp. 1082-1083.
3 Ibid.

space-based laser weapons. In place of these the committee called for a US$50 million
programme to explore short wavelength lasers, in particular free-electron lasers, and the
addition of US$2 million to the Advanced Test Accelerator at Lawrence Livermore
laboratory, so that it could be modified for free-electron laser experiments. Malcolm
Wallop, who was now advocating a 10-megawatt laser with a 10 meter mirror, and who
had managed to insert an amendment in the original Senate legislation calling for the
testing of DARPA's space laser triad in space, led the fight against the House. Wallop
asked from the Senate floor whether we should we wait "to build the infra-red lasers we
know how to build, and instead put our money on the short wavelength lasers we do not
yet know how to build? ... We are faced with two sharply contrasting sets of claims in
this field. The bureaucracy's claims which are reflected in the [House] Armed Services
Committee's report, and my claims, backed by the only source of facts in the field: the
aerospace industry".^ DARPA Director Robert Cooper told the Senate Defense
Appropriations Subcommittee that the House action would end the deployment of spacebased laser weaponry for the time being and would push deployment back to the mid to
late 1990's. Eventually a compromise was reached between the two committees whereby
the funding for the Alpha and Lode projects was restored, but US$40 million for the Air
Force and US$2 million for the Advanced Test Accelerator was left out of the budget.
These funds were divided between a US$20 million study of laser "vulnerability and
lethality" and a US$20 million addition to short wavelength laser research by DARPA.
The joint committee also deleted language inserted by Senator Wallop which directed
DARPA to test the Alpha, Lode and Talon Gold projects in space rather than on land.^
Members of the Senate claimed that the joint Senate-House meeting was called in the
wake of lobbying efforts by George Keyworth, the President's Science Adviser, and
Robert Cooper, both of whom were said to be in favour of increasing development of
short-wavelength lasers at the expense of chemical lasers.^
Once the Reagan Administration was in power, the arguments of the 'laser lobby' no
longer fell on deaf and unsympathetic ears. The administration was reported as early as
1981 to be studying the potential of ballistic missile defence as a way of making
"weapons of mass destruction practically obsolete by neutralizing them".^ Both Senators
John Tower and Harrison Schmitt discussed the possibilities of the new defensive
1
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technologies with President Reagan early in hisfirstterm.^ Schmitt met with Reagan on
12 December 1980, and after the meeting said that Reagan had voiced concern that the
policy of MAD held "tens of millions of people hostage to annihilation in order to
maintain a deterrent". He had, according to Schmitt asked about the technological
possibility of altering that policy towards one of protection rather than mutually assured
destruction. Schmitt told the then president-elect that alternative weapons could indeed be
developed if it became national policy.^ According to Schmitt, Reagan "expressed a
strong interest in the possibility of developing a laser defense against ballistic missile
attack". The president-elect's Defense Transition Team was reported to have told key
congressional Republicans that one of its top priorities was to increase spending on a laser
weapon to shoot down ballistic missiles in their boost phase.^ Schmitt is also reported to
have discussed with Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger the need for space-based
ballistic missile defence.'^
Malcolm Wallop and his aide Angelo Codevilla also lobbied the President and his advisers
on the need for a space-based ballistic missile defence. In late 1980, Wallop spoke of the
"vigorous attempts" that had been made to gain the support of Reagan, then Presidentelect. Wallop was keenly aware that Congress would "support an Executive Branch
decision to move into this new area, but without presidential support, it will be difficult to
get support in Congress".^ In mid 1981 Wallop discussed with Weinberger the prospects
for space-based laser systems, and Weinberger was reported to be "open-minded", but
not so sure that it could be accomplished within the next decade and was worried about
the cost.^
In October 1981, Dr. George Keyworth, the President's Science Adviser, told an
audience of two hundred aerospace executives that he had spent most of his time trying to
head off the public pressure for building space weapons. In mid-November 1981,
Wallop and Codevilla sent a letter to White House Chief of Staff James Baker urging that
Keyworth be reprimanded for opposing space-based lasers and for professing to be
1 Ibid.;
Rip Bulkeley & Graham Spinardi, op. c i t . , p. 69.
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^ Thomas 0'Toole, "Reagan Interested in Speeding Development of SpaceBased Laser", Washington
Post,
December 26, 1980, p. 3; Senator
Malcolm Wallop, "Space Lasers", Human Events,
January 17, 1981, p. 23.
^ C. Robinson, "Beam Weapons Technology Expanding", o p . c i t . , p. 43.
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"fundamentally frightened" at the idea of developing laser ballistic missile defenses. The
duo also urged the administration to make clear its position on strategic defense.^
Wallop and Codevilla met with Weinberger again in early September 1982. Also present
at the meeting were Richard DeLauer, Undersecretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering, Fred Ikle, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, and Alan Pike, the Acting
Director of DARPA's Directed Energy Office. After the meeting Wallop said that he was
impressed with Weinberger's position on strategic defence. It was claimed that
Weinberger had endorsed a US space-based ballistic missile defence system and that he
had directed the Defense Department to pursue this technology as rapidly as possible.^
2.3 HIGH FRONTIER AND THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION
Lt. General Daniel Graham, US Army (Ret.), was one of the earliest, and remains one of
the strongest proponents of strategic defence. Graham's interest in the need for strategic
defence arose while he was Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), where he
began to be concerned that the strategy of Mutual Assured Destmction (MAD) was not
working because the Soviets were taking advantage of the United States, particularly in
respect of the ABM Treaty. In a study undertaken by Graham shortly before he left the
DIA in 1976 he argued that:^
... everything I can see with regard to Soviet activities in the strategic defense field
indicates that they are preparing to break out of the ABM Treaty. I indicated that I
couldn't make the case for whether they think we are going to give up on the idea of
no defense or whether the Soviets themselves will simply break out of the treaty ...
that was not evident to me. But it was evident from their defense activities which
already violated the ABM treaty, particularly using SAM radar sets against ballistic
missiles that the Soviets didn't believe that the ABM treaty ... was going to hold up.
Graham pursued this theme in a number of books he wrote after retiring from the army,
the first called New Strategy for the West written for the right-wing Heritage
Foundation, and the second, in 1979, Shall America Be Defended? In this latter book
Graham did not make a case for any specific type of strategic defence, but argued that "the
strategy of deterrence based strictly on offensive forces was wrong, and that strategic
defenses were required".^
1 Gregg Herken, "The earthly origins
op. ext., pp. 20-21.
2 Clarence Robinson, "Defense Dept. Backs Space-Based Missile Defense",
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3 Transcript of interview with Lt. General Daniel 0. Graham by Lt. Col.
Baucom, 7 July 1987, pp. 1-2. (Interview supplied by the High Frontier
organization.)
^ Ibid., p. 2. Graham, in the interview with Baucom, claims that Shall
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In 1979 General Graham began to focus more on the possibility of space-based defence
systems, setting up, with Brigadier General Robert Richardson, USAF (Ret), a small
group to look at the space aspects of strategic defence. This group also included the Hon.
John Morse, who had been Assistant Secretary in ISA during the Nixon Administration,
and later expanded to include Dr. Peter Glaser of Arthur D. Little Company, Arnold
Kramish, who had been a physicist on the Manhattan Project, and Fred "Bud" Redding
Jr. of Stanford Research Institute (SRI) Intemational.^ Bud Redding, who was interested
in pushing the concept of a small space vehicle, was to play an important part in the early
shaping of what was to become the High Frontier project. "It was from his work", said
Graham, "that the idea for these litde space "garages" that housed the litde rockets that
would serve as kinetic kill vehicles [came]".^
By the end of 1979 this informal discussion group of six had reached two conclusions,
one technical and the other political. Firstiy, they concluded that a combination of groundand space-based systems would provide an adequate approach to missile defence;
secondly, that "the MAD strategy could be changed", and further, that "the technology to
make this change was not way off in the future, but relatively close in".^ It was this
initial study group that eventually led to the setting up of the High Frontier study group,
which arose out of a disagreement between members of President Reagan's Transition
Team after his 1980 election.^
Daniel Graham was one of the first to make contact with Ronald Reagan to discuss his
ideas about strategic defence. Shortly after retiringfromthe Army, Graham received a call
from Edwin Meese asking him to be an adviser on military matters in Reagan's 1976
aim of the book was to "lay to rest the widespread notion that no
defense is possible against nuclear weapons". This was "possible
because technology has given our[US] superior economy the wherewithal
to do it", and was desirable "because unless we can plan to come out
of a war less damaged than the Soviet Union, we will not be able to
escape
such a war - except by surrender". This would be
an
inconceivable horror, according to Graham: "The ordeals of slavery and
slow death that have been visited upon Russia, China, Vietnam ... by
conquering communists are not figments of anyone's imagination", he
claimed. At this stage, the form of BMD that Graham was advocating was
the LOADS and homing overlay systems being developed by the US Army.
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campaign to win the Republican nomination. Graham claims that even at this time Reagan
had doubts about the efficacy of MAD: "He said it didn't make any sense to him. It was
like two men with cocked pistols pointed at each others head; if either man even flinched,
then you blew each other's brains out".^ In the lead up to Ronald Reagan's 1980
Presidential campaign Graham was again asked to be an adviser.^ It was during this time,
in February 1980 in Nashua, New Hampshire, that Graham first briefed Reagan on the
ideas about space-based strategic defence that had been developed by his informal study
group. Before a debate between Reagan and George Bush, Graham broached the idea of
strategic defence with the future President. Reagan was, according to Graham, very
interested, taking out his cards and writing notes to himself on the subject.^
Although Reagan may have been interested in Graham's ideas about strategic defence,
other members of Reagan's advisory team were quite hostile. Early in the campaign
Graham was among those arguing that the only viable approach to cope with growing
Soviet superiority was to implement a basic change in US strategy and make a
"technological end-run on the Soviets". According to Graham, all of Reagan's advisers
agreed with this initially, "in principle" at least. But as time passed they began to
concentrate on the amounts of money needed to resurrect old and revitalize on-going
Pentagon programs, and on the "quick fixes" necessary if the United States were to hold
its own within the doctrine of MAD. New offensive weapons programs were
recommended to "plug as quickly as possible the strategic gaps between the U.S. and
Soviet capabilities which [were] known collectively as 'the window of vulnerability'.'"^
According to Graham, a certain level of coolness developed in the Reagan camp between
his school and the one led by Paul Nitze and William Van Cleave. Graham's school was
advocating the use of space based strategic defence as a vehicle to implement a change of
strategy away from MAD, whereas the other school was advocating a more conventional
strategy, the strengthening of deterrence through a massive build-up in conventional and
nuclear weapons. Both schools saw their strategies as ways of regaining American
military superiority.^ Graham argued that this latter strategy would just lead to
bankruptcy, and would not be supported in Congress. Further, it was futile, accelerating
1 Transcript of Graham interview, 7 July 1987, op. cit., pp. 2-3.
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an arms race in offensive weapons that the US could not win "because the Soviets [were]
already producing weaponry like sausages".^
Throughout the campaign, and in the transition period after Reagan's election, Daniel
Graham continued to press his case, an endeavour that would place him outside the circle
of Reagan's close advisers. Graham, in a letter to General Edward Meyer, Chief of Staff,
US Army, tells Meyer that he "continued to insist that such an end-run was both vital and
feasible and got myself and others who agreed with me cut out of the pattem" in about
mid-1980.2 After this, in early 1981, Graham discussed his ideas with Representative
Newt Gingrich (R-Georgia), who shared Graham's conviction that large increases in the
military budget would not negate the Soviet threat and would not receive public support,
and who was working in conjunction with Representative Ken Kramer (R-Colorado) to
establish a Consolidated Space Command within the Air Force. They argued for a new
strategic approach and a technological end-run on the Soviets to meet the President's
commitment to a "margin of safety".^
After the Reagan campaign was over, Graham was determined to "flesh out" the idea of
space-based strategic defence by bringing together some scientists and engineers who
knew more about the subject than his initial 'gang-of-six'. Graham attended a meeting at
the White House with President Reagan and his advisers in February 1981 and told the
President that he thought he had found an answer to the issue of strategic defence, and
sought a meeting with Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger to brief him on this. The
meeting was arranged by James Baker, and according to Graham Weinberger's response
was:"That is very interesting and I would like to hear more about it as you develop the
concept".^
Even in these early stages, before the High Frontier study proper was set up, Graham and
his colleagues seem to have had the proposal fairly well fleshed out, although the exact
technologies that would be used was still in some doubt. Graham, in 1981, then CoChairman of the hawkish Coalition for Peace Through Strength, was arguing that if
pursued vigorously the United States could "create space-bome capabilities which would
neutralize the Soviet strategic nuclear threat" by the mid-1980's. This was part of a "Peace
Through Strength" strategy, which required that Mutual Assured Destruction be rejected.
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strategic defence reemphasized, the notion of strategic balance be deemed unacceptable,
and a technological end-run be launched on the Soviet Union.^ According to Graham
superiority was a perfectly reasonable objective for the United States to pursue. "One
day", he said, "one nation or ... a consortium on nations is going to establish the same
kind of domination out there that the British once had over the high seas".2
In terms of technology, Graham was advocating a fleet of unmanned space vehicles
("cruisers") which would destroy large numbers of Soviet missiles in their boost phase.
Early in 1981, Graham thought that these would use high-energy laser weapons to
destroy ICBMs^, but by mid-1981 he thought that they would use heat-seeking missiles
or missiles that fired a cloud of ball bearings, and then change over to laser weapons
when these became available. Such a system would require a fleet of some 200 to 300
orbiting space cruisers as well as a manned space vehicle to control and maintain them.'^
As well as these space-based battie stations Graham thought that it would be prudent to
deploy, as quickly as possible, some of the least expensive ground-based BMDs being
developed by the Army, and also had notions of placing large solar power panels in
space, using them to sell power to third-world countries in return for their "raw materials
and their good behaviour, for that matter".^ He thought that the American public would
find this proposal most attractive: "Some public support would be based on a wellfounded displeasure with a business-as-usual approach to defense and an understanding
of the technological possibilities. But much would be based on the general interest in
space and a partly romantic inclination enhanced by enormously popular fictional space
adventure stories such as Star Trek, Star Wars, etc."^
Shortly after the meeting with Weinberger, Graham made a speech at Frank Bamett's
National Strategy Information Center. In the Audience was Karl Bendetsen, Chairman of
the Board of Champion International Corporation. Bendetsen was impressed, and praised
1 Lt. Gen Daniel O. Graham, "bold strokes...", op. ext., pp. 57-58.
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Graham after the speech, telling him that it was a marvellous idea that really had to be
pushed. Graham told Bendetsen that he needed to raise money, so that he could bring in
specialists to develop his concept further, and Bendetsen agreed to help.^ However, even
with Bendetsen's help Graham seemed to be having trouble getting his study group off
the ground. He approached Edwin Meese to give him a hand to collect money, and also
tried to set the project up under the auspices of the American Security Council. In the
latter case, Graham ran into trouble and was eventually taken off the ASC pay-roll by
John Fisher who "wasn't very keen on this idea". Finally, the Heritage Foundation came
to the rescue: Ed Feulner, the Heritage Foundation's President, agreed to let Graham have
the cheques for the study made out to the Heritage Foundation so that donors could
receive a tax deduction, and also provided office space. On September 1, 1981 the study
which would eventually be published as High Frontier in March 1982, got underway.^
By the summer of 1981 Graham began to contact technical people to become involved in
his study.3 The team that Graham was able to assemble with the help of Karl Bendetsen
included some hangovers from his previous study group: Brigadier General Robert
Richardson, formerly of the Air Force Systems Command, who advised on the problems
of acquisition; Dr. Arnold Kramish, who was chief scientist for the study; Bud Redding
of SRI, who was advocating the orbiting space trucks and space cruiser; and. Dr. Peter
Glaser of Arthur D. Litde, who was the architect of the solar powered satellite system and
was High Frontier's expert on civil space systems. Other members of the technical study
group included Dr. Edward Teller, (and possibly Dr. Lowell Wood), from Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory; Major General Stewart Meyer, formerly commander of
the Army's Ballistic Missile Defense Command in Huntsville, Alabama, and High
Frontier's expert on point defence; Cresson Kearney, a civil defence consultant who was
High Frontier's expert on civil defence; Dr. Mose Harvey, editor of The Soviet World
Outlook, who was High Frontier's analyst on the Soviet reaction; and, Dr. Jim
Daugherty of the University of Virginia who predicted the probable European reaction to
the High Frontier proposal. ^
^ Transcript of Graham interview, July 1, 1987, op. cit., p. 7. Karl
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to the cause, but the largest donation came from Gus Bunder, a St.
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As well as gathering together technical experts for his study, a "panel of people with
political clout" was gathered together, Karl Bendetsen volunteering to do this job. This
panel was set up to take a look at what Graham's experts were coming up with a piece at a
time. It included, as well as Bendetsen and Graham: Joseph Coors the beer brewing
executive, William Wilson a rancher and oilman, Jacqueline Hume an industrialist and a
former Under-Secretary of the Army^, Ed Fuelner of the Heritage Foundation, Frank
Bamett from the National Security Information Center^, and possibly also Justin Dart, a
wealthy businessman.^
No sooner had the study started, than it began to run into trouble. At the centre of this
was a difference between Daniel Graham and Edward Teller over the form that a spacebased BMD should take on, a difference that would remain a running sore, eventually
causing the group to split into two. Graham had been wary of Teller right from the start,
and would rather have not had him on the study team, as he though that Teller's interest
was not so much in strategic defence, as in promoting his x-ray laser. Graham's
objections notwithstanding, Teller stayed on the study team, attending the meetings held
about every three weeks or so during the six months that the study was in progress. He
became a growing source of tension.'^
Political Science, University of California, Davis, also worked on the
possible European reaction to the High Frontier proposal. (Letter to
Arnold Kramish from Robert Squire, 23 Feb., 1982.); Others mentioned
as contributing to the report are: Dr. Jeffery Barlow, John Bosma,
phillip Clarke, John Coakley, Dr. Miles Costick, Dr. Jacquelin Davis,
Col. Sam Dickens USAF(Ret), William Gill, Lawrence Hafstad, Frank
Hoeber, Brig. Gen. Albion Knight USA(Ret), Cleaveland Lane, Ed
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Early in the study it was Teller's idea that a strategic defence system should be based on
an x-ray laser weapon aboard a satellite. This, according to Graham: "we sort of
laughingly called ... the space borne sea urchin because of all the rods that would be
moving around to get a bead on the warheads". Graham argued that even if the x-ray laser
was technically feasible, it did not make military sense because it was a defensive satellite
"that would have to destroy itself to protect itself if it were attacked". If just one
interceptor missile were fired at the satellite it would need to decide whether to selfdestruct, or hang on just in case the missile missed.^ Responding to Graham's criticisms,
at the next meeting Edward Teller and Lowell Wood suggested that instead of the x-ray
lasers being based on an orbiting satellite that they be based on the ground, and poppedup into space in the event of an attack. Graham found fault with this proposal too: "they
had to admit that the aiming problem, which was severe enough for an orbiting system,
was even more severe in the case of a pop-up system, since you now had two accelerating
bodies ~ the pop-up system and the approaching warhead ~ instead of one. This system
would probably be able to make only one intercept for each pop-up device".2
Graham had, as well, a number of political objections to the x-ray laser proposal. Firstly,
because this proposal was based on relatively immature technologies and would have to
be extensively researched before being deployed, he was worried that the High Frontier
study would become "just another bunch of words and just placed on the shelf to gather
dust with a bunch of other dry strategic studies". The way to get around this, he felt, was
to base the proposal on off-the-shelf technologies that could be deployed now; that is,
based on the more conventional kinetic energy technology. According to Graham: "This is
where Ed Teller and I split company because every time we put non-nuclear in a draft, he
would scratch it out".^ Graham's main objection was the political problems that would be
posed by placing nuclear weapons in space: "Obviously a non-nuclear defensive system
would have much more appeal to the public". Graham thought that you would have to be
"politically naive not to understand that non-nuclear systems in space would have a lot
more support than nuclear systems in s p a c e " . G r a h a m ' s disagreements with Teller
eventually led to a falling-out with both Teller and Bendetsen, and the splitting up of the
High-Frontier study into two groups, one led by Graham, and the other led by Karl

s e n i o r r e s e a r c h e r . (E.P. T h o m p s o n & B e n T h o m p s o n , ( 1 9 8 5 ) , o p . c i t . , p .
8.)
1 T r a n s c r i p t of G r a h a m i n t e r v i e w , 7 J u l y 1 9 8 7 , op. cit.,
p . 8.
2 Ibid.,
pp. 9-10.
^ Ibid.,
p . 10. Graham argued that his proposal could be deployed
a l m o s t i m m e d i a t e l y , a n d t h a t it n e e d e d o n l y e n g i n e e r s , n o t t h e o r e t i c a l
p h y s i c i s t s "to s t a r t b e n d i n g t i n " . (Gregg H e r k e n , "The e a r t h l y o r i g i n s
...,
op. cit.,
p. 21).
4 T r a n s c r i p t o f G r a h a m i n t e r v i e w , J u l y 7 , 1 9 8 7 , op. cit.,
p . 10.

Bendetsen and Edward Teller, and including William Wilson and Joseph Coors. This
group dismissed the idea of killer battle stations in space as being impractical, even
"nonsense", that could be easily countered.^
Although the technical differences were a source of tension, the final split seems to have
been precipitated by a meeting that Karl Bendetsen arranged for his group with the
President, but excluding Daniel Graham, and not informing him about it until some time
later. Bendetsen, Edward Teller, William Wilson, and Joseph Coors met with President
Reagan in the Roosevelt Room after a cabinet meeting on January 8, 1982. At this
meeting, they recommended that Reagan instigate a new Manhattan Project to develop
high technology weapons able to neutralize Soviet ballistic missiles.^ When he learned
about this meeting, Graham was most upset:^
The main reason I was upset was that I found out later that they had about an hour
with the President, but they spent about twenty-five minutes just describing how
awful the threat was and another twenty-five minutes about how to reorganize
government and only about ten minutes on what the solution to the threat was. The
actual results of our study were covered only very briefly.
Graham was also upset because Karl Bendetsen had told him that the White House did
not want the study group to go public with their ideas about strategic defence. Graham
disagreed: "I told him that I had already gone public", he said, "the document was going
to be on the streets".^ Graham, based on his years of experience in the military and
civilian bureaucracies, thought that if he did not go public the idea would be killed off by
the bureaucracy. It was, argued Graham, "an idea involving too many distressing changes
for a bureaucracy to accept since it would require a fundamental shift of strategy. Unless
there is outside pressure, no such change can be accomplished". The project would cause
mistrust among project managers all over the Pentagon, argued Graham, "from R&D all
the way up through the missile builders or 'hole diggers'. I knew that it ran smack in the
face of MX Dense Pack and MX Race Track. These ideas would be on a collision course
with any strategic defense system. There was no way that this concept, turned over to the
bureaucracy would survive. So, I insisted on going public".^
And so public Graham finally went, releasing his High Frontier study on March 4 1982,
and claiming that it led away from the "bankrupt and basically immoral" strategy of
1 Gregg Herken, "The earthly origins
op. cit., pp. 21-22.
2 Ibid., p. 21.
3 Graham claimed that Bendetsen didn't include him because "he said it
was going to be just the President, a couple of people, and ex"kitchen cabinet" folk ... In fact, this small group turned out to be
thirty or forty people in a room ... all sorts of aides etc".
Transcript of Graham interview, July 7, 1987, op. cit., pp. 10, 14.
^ According to Graham: "He did insist that I not go public, but I said
no, no, I am going public", {Ibid., pp. 10-11.)
5 Ibid., pp. 10-12.

Mutual Assured Destruction. ^ In military terms, the High Frontier proposal contained five
main elements, most of which could be met with off-the-shelf technology it was claimed:
(1) a point defence for US ICBM silos which would be deployed within two or three
years; (2) a first generation space-based BMD system, deployed within 5 or 6 years and
comprising orbiting satellites which fired conventional missiles at ICBMs in their boostphase; (3) a second generation space-based BMD, which would be deployed within 10 to
12 years, and which would be capable of attacking ICBMs in their boost and mid-course
phases using laser weapons; (4) a manned military space control vehicle, which would be
deployed within 6 to 8 years at a cost of less than US$500 million, and would be capable
of inspection, in-orbit maintenance and space tug missions; and, (5) a civil defence
program. 2 In addition to these military programmes, the High Frontier proposal contained
a civilian element, making it, in Graham's eyes, a true "national strategy". The centrepiece of this civilian effort was the deployment in space of high power solar energy
collectors, which could be used to power industrial activities in space and to beam back
electrical energy to any spot on earth. ^ The total cost of the system would be around
US$24 billion over the next 5 or 6 years, stretching to about US$40 billion through to
1990.4

The point defence system that was preferred by High Frontier was known as "swarmjet".
It consisted of three elements: (1) a set of two radars located at 10,000 feet and 20,000
feet in front of a missile silo to detect, track and calculate the intercept point for the
incoming warhead; (2) a blast-hardened launcher system which could aim and launch a
"swarm" of small rockets at the intercept point; and, (3) a swarm of about 10,000 ballistic
1 Michael Getler, "Use of Weapons on Space Satellites To Kill Incoming
Missiles Suggested", Washington Post, March 5, 1982, p. 8.
2 The civil defence programme was based on programme "D" developed
d u r i n g the C a r t e r A d m i n i s t r a t i o n to implement the policies of
P r e s i d e n t i a l Decision 41. The civil defence section of the High
Frontier report seems to have been written largely by Cresson Kearney.
(Cresson Kearney, letter to Daniel Graham, October 2, 1981; Cresson
Kearney, "Creating A Strategically Significant American Civil Defense
System, A Fuller Exposition, Citing References".)
3 Daniel Graham, The Non-Nuclear
Defense of Cities, op. cit., p. 7.
This proposal was due to Dr. Peter Glaser, Vice-President of Arthur D.
Little Inc, who seemed to have been obsessed with the potential of
space. Glaser believed that "space, by enabling [the US] to tap not
only the present information resources ... [i.e. satellites] ... but
in addition, ... will be able to find new ways to process materials.
We also certainly believe it is feasible to consider, once and for
all, taking care of energy problems which, although they are presently
somewhat subdued will come back to haunt us in a few years". Glaser
argued that "energy from space for use on earth is one of our major
options to supply the world with energy for as long as civilization
exists". (David S. Coker, "'High Frontier': Bold New Strategy ...",
op. cit., p. 15.)
4 Ibid., p. 9.

rockets which would fly to the intercept point at around 5,000 feet per second and kill the
incoming warhead by impact. A partially tested system was supposed to already exist. ^
The first generation space-borne defence was known as the Global Ballistic Missile
Defense (GBMD) system, and was exactly the proposal put forward by Bud Redding of
SRL2 The system comprised a network of 432 satellites in orbits inclined at 65 degrees
with the equator at an altitude of 300 nautical miles. These "space trucks" would contain
40-50 self-propelled carrier vehicles which could travel at a velocity of 3,000 feet per
second with respect to the satellite and propel a miniature vehicle into the missile for a
kinetic kill. The interceptors were to be similar to those planned for the Air Force's
antisatellite miniature homing vehicle, and the Army's homing intercept programmes. It
could be built, argued the High Frontier report, with off-the-shelf-technology, and could
be fully deployed within five or six years at a cost of some US$10-15 billion.^
The second generation space based defence (GBMD H) was to be a product improvement
upon GBMD 1. With the addition of advanced infrared sensors the first generation system
would be able to attack warheads in their midcourse as well as boost-phase. It might even
be possible, argued the report, to use laser weapons on the orbiting space trucks, or pop
them up from installations on the ground. The GBMD II system could be ready for
deployment in 1990 at a cost of around US$5 billion on top of the GBMD I's cost, and
advanced laser defenses would require the expenditure of about US$100 milHon per year,
for research and development. ^
Underlying the High Frontier study was an ideology that was very much similar to that
espoused by the members of the 'laser lobby'. Graham and his colleagues who prepared
the study were opposed to both detente and the SALT arms treaties, arguing that the
Soviets played the game of Mutual Assured Destruction differently than the United States
and had a different regard for human life. "The Communist elite couldn't care less about
losing 50 million people in war", argued Gregory Possédai, a member of the High
^ Ibid.,
pp. 7-8; Daniel Graham & Gregory Fossedal, A Defense
That
Defends, op. cit., pp. 48-51.
2 See Capt. Melanson/SASC/50547/ch/16 Oct. 81, "Point Paper on Global
g^llistic Missile Defense"; "Memorandum For the Record - Comments on
Global Ballistic Missile Defense", SASC 23 Sept. 1981; F. W. Redding,
"Global Ballistic Missile Defense", Concept Paper - partial draft, 5
October, 1981. These documents give a summary of Redding/SRI's GBMD
proposal. The satellites would be in 24 orbital planes with 18 trucks
per plane. Each satellite would contain 50 carrier vehicles(CV) and
each CV had a miniature vehicle(MV).
3 Daniel Graham, Non-Nuclear
Defense of Cities, op. cit., pp. 8, 101108; Daniel Graham & Gregory Fossedal, A Defense that Defends,
op.
cit., pp. 51-56.
4 Daniel Graham, Non-Nuclear Defense of Cities, op. cit., p. 8.

Frontier staff, valuing only their factories and military installations, and their own lives.^
The Americans were supposed to play fairly under MAD, laying their own homeland
vulnerable to an attack by the Soviets, and seeking to negotiate limits on offensive
weapons. However, the Soviets viewed arms negotiations as a way of limiting the United
States' offensive weapons while they engaged in a massive build-up, and did not consider
that vulnerability should be mutual, pouring "more resources into strategic defenses,
active and civil" than the United States had invested in its offensive weapons.^
Under the SALT treaties, the Soviets were held to have built a massive offensive force of
their own, between the signing of SALT I and 1978 having tripled their own counterforce
and throw weight capacity, while the United States had stood still, or even unilaterally
disarmed, canceling or slowing down many weapons programmes, hoping that through
SALT, detente, and diplomacy the Soviets could be persuaded to halt their developments
at the "parity" level as required by MAD.^ The Soviets had now surpassed the strategic
capability of the US by a substantial margin and there was no evidence that they were
about to stop. Because the Soviet military had most of their strategic nuclear weapons
based on land, and the US military held only about one third of its strategic nuclear
arsenal as land-based ICBMs, Graham argued that the Soviet military were deploying a
first strike arsenal, while the US military only had a second-strike one. Thus, the Soviets
had a "dangerous advantage" in pre-emptive first strike capability, and the United States
faced a "window of vulnerability". Graham argued that so long as the Soviet leaders
thought that they could take advantage of this situation, without too much risk for
themselves, then there was a strong possibility that they would do so.'^
To get around this problem of the "window of vulnerability", Graham saw that there were
two fundamentally different approaches, one the "incremental approach" and the other ,
the one he advocated, the "bold approach", both aimed at reasserting the superiority of the
United States. Under the "incremental approach" MAD would remain the cornerstone of
US nuclear strategy and force structure, but an attempt would be made to increase and
modify the offensive nuclear forces to attain strategic superiority; strategic and civil
defences would not be pursued; arms control would still be on the agenda, but the US
would get tougher with the Soviets at the bargaining table; and finally, the concept of
"parity" would be retained, the US spending billions of dollars to close the gaps between
the United States and Soviet nuclear arsenals. Graham's "bold strategy" on the other hand
1 Gregory Fossedal, quoted in Harpers Forum, Harpers,
June 1985, p. 40.
2 Daniel Graham, Non-Nuclear
Defense of Cities,
op. c i t . , pp. 86-87.
3 I b i d . , p. 92; Daniel Graham & Gregory Fossedal, A Defense
that
Defends,
op. c i t , pp. 34-35.
^ Daniel Graham, Non-Nuclear
Defense of Cities,
op. c i t . , pp. 65,69,92.

would replace MAD with mutually assured survival through the deployment of spacebased BMD and the setting up of a civil defence programme. The problem with the
incremental approach was that by entering an arms race with the Soviets in current
technology, the US was doomed to lose because the "Soviets [were] already producing
these items at a very high rate, far surpassing current production rates of the US and its
allies". Further, such a programme could not rely on public support indefinitely. It might,
create "the grave danger of a severe backlash against current proponents of increased
defense expenditures if four years hence there is no perceptible favorable change in the
U.S.-Soviet military balance".^
Time was of the essence in the commitment to Graham's High Frontier project. If the
United States could not reverse the adverse trends in the military balance quickly, it might
be too late. High Frontier, argued Graham, held out the promise of closing the 'window
of vulnerability' in two or three years and of negating the "brooding menace" of Mutual
Assured Destruction in five or six years.^
That Graham did not opt for the exotic beam weapon technologies advocated by the 'laser
lobby' or the x-ray laser advocated by Teller had much to do with this perceived need for
rapid deployment. Graham argued that while these two technologies had demonstrated
significant capabilities in the laboratory and may have become a reality in the future, "their
deployment in global defensive systems is too far in the future to meet the urgencies of the
High Frontier study". The 'window of vulnerability' couldn't be left open for this long.^
According to Graham and Fossedal, it was hard to over-stress this point. A viable
strategic defence system need not wait for these exotic technologies, they argued, and
indeed it would not be prudent to base the security of the United States on the prospect
that such weapons would become available in the near future.^ There were as well
technical objections to these beam weapons. They all required massive amounts of energy
to power them and such energy sources had not yet been obtained on the ground. Particle
beams in particular would require huge energy sources. Laser beams were vulnerable to
both inclement weather and dust.^ With respect to x-ray lasers, Graham's main objection
1
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5 Ibid., p. 58; Daniel Graham, Non-Nuclear Defense of Cities, op. cit.,
pp. 1 1 3 , 1 1 9 . Angelo Codevilla, of 'laser lobby' fame, thought that
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with Graham's time frame for deployment. Codevilla thought that the
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(Angelo Codevilla, review of "High Frontier: A New National Strategy",
Strategic Review, Summer, 1982, p. 6 0 . ) .

was that such a laser would have to destroy itself to defend against a single missile. Even
if it was possible to design an x-ray laser that could generate multiple beams, Graham
argued that this would require years of engineering development, and would not be ready
for near term deployment. ^
Graham's High Frontier proposal met a mixed reaction when released. There were some
supporters for the proposal, from companies such as Boeing, Rockwell, Tracor, LTV,
Vought, Northrop, and McDonnell Douglas, companies who stood to benefit from
contracts if such a proposal went ahead; also there was some congressional support,
Graham citing Senators William Armstrong, Jesse Helms, Steven Symms and William
Roth, and a group known as the Congressional Space Caucus.^ The proposal ran into
stiff opposition from the Pentagon, and the arms-controllers, but Graham expected this.
Graham was fully aware of the problems that he would run into trying to sell his proposal
to the Pentagon. For a start, because his proposal put the future of strategic defence in
space. High Frontier "was causing a real problem for the United States Army ... which
has since the end of the war been charged with ballistic missile defense. Because the
Army would not have the responsibility for running a space-based [BMD] they don't
want to give up that mission." What made it even worse was that the Air Force, the
service that would be charged with the responsibility for the space-based defence mission,
had "never been very much interested in strategic defense", and looked at High Frontier
as a competitor to the offensive systems that they would prefer, quite rightly as far as
Graham was concerned. ^ To get around this, Graham realized that to override the
objections of these turf-protecting defence bureaucrats it would be necessary to have the
presidential sanction. "If the President said 'do it', and make sure the technology works,
it would succeed", contended Graham.'^
To get around the arms controllers, Graham thought, might not actually be all that
difficult, as the High Frontier proposal, with a little clever foot work, could be sold as
being the ultimate arms control measure. One of the underlying aims of the High Frontier
proposal seems to have been as a cleyer way to circumvent the freeze movement, and
herein lay some if its appeal for the hawks, and Graham hoped, the Reagan
Administration. As Gregory Fossedal, one of the consultants to High Frontier, put it, it
1 Daniel Graham, Non-Nuclear Defense of Cities, op. cit., p. 118.
2 "High Frontier: Defense Strategy to Save the US", interview with
Daniel Graham by Joseph W. DeBolt, Human Events, January 29, 1982 p.
174; "Selling the High Frontier Defense Strategy", op. cit., p. 175.
3 "'High Frontier': Defense Strategy to Save the US", op. cit., p. 10.
4 "Selling the High Frontier Strategy", op. cit., p. 174.

would provide "an opportunity ... to fast-thaw the nuclear freeze movement".^ No
attempt is made to hide this same theme in the High Frontier report itself:^
The High Frontier concept would even convert or confuse some of the conventional
opponents of defense efforts. ... It is harder to oppose non-nuclear defensive
systems than nuclear offensive systems. It is impossible to argue effectively for a
perpetual balance of terror if it can be negated by new policies. It is hard to make
environmentalist cases against space systems.
Even those "naysayers" who wanted disarmament, would be hard pressed to make a case
against High Frontier. As well as countering the peace movement at home, it could be
used to provide a strong counter-effect to the "highly disruptive", "anti-nuclear", or
"peace" movements in Europe, and to boost the morale of pro-US elements.^
The potential for High Frontier to undercut the freeze movement was used as one of its
strongest selling points to the Reagan Administration, as is evidenced by an endless
stream of letters that Daniel Graham sent to Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger^, and
was welcomed by right-wingers for this reason. For example, David Coker, writing in
Human Events, argued that the non-nuclear defence was important in political terms
because it "undercut the argument of leftist nuclear freeze proponents who claim it is
impossible for the United States ... to protect itself in the event of a nuclear war".^
A discussion paper written in April 1984 by John Bosma for High Frontier, considering
ways in which ballistic missile defence could be sold politically, addressed this problem
^ Gregory Fossedal, quoted in Rip Bulkeley & Graham Spinardi, op. cit.,
p. 72.
2 Daniel Graham, Non-Nuclear Defense of Cities, op. cit., p. 10.
^ Ibid., p. 11. See also Daniel Graham & Gregory Fossedal, A Defense
That Defends, op. cit., p. 11. In response to a question as to whether
High Frontier was the answer to the Catholic Bishops and the freeze
proponents, Graham replied: "I certainly think so, because instead of
arguing about getting rid of nuclear weapons and so forth, and about
the morality of the punitive nature of our deterrent, they can support
a purely defensive option." It provided an option between the "false
d i l e m m a " of freeze and burn, which had been created by the freeze
movement, which was "essentially led by unilateral spokesmen". ("High
Frontier: Defense Strategy to Save the U.S.", op. cit., p. 10.)
^ Daniel Graham to Casper Weinberger, March 17, 1982: "The fact that
our m i l i t a r y systems require no nuclear weapons makes it at least
conceivable that the anti-nuclear crowd would seize on High Frontier
as a vehicle for their purposes"; Graham to Weinberger, March 31,
1982: "In light of the current country-wide press for "nuclear
freeze", I wish to bring to your attention the value of the High
Frontier concept as an effective counter. High Frontier would also
d a m p e n the urge to add nuclear weapons, but unlike the "nuclear
freeze" notion would not require highly improbable Soviet cooperation
and good faith".; Graham to Weinberger, April 13, 1982:"These concepts
constitute the best available riposte to the new surge toward "nuclear
freeze" and related proposals".
5 David S. Coker, "High Frontier: Bold New Strategy", op. cit., p. 117.

explicitly. The primary objective, was to make it politically risky for proponents of arms
control to argue against BMD. Bosma argued that:^
In fact, the project should unambiguously seek to recapture the term "arms control"
and all the idealistic images and language attached to it. This can be done by
showing that BMD is very supportive of classical and contemporary arms control
objectives (eg. limits on war, protection of civilians, "just war" conduct, ... etc),
and that early BMD deployment on a major scale are critical to the realization of
such highly lauded initiatives as a nuclear freeze, a nuclear build down, and
permanent disarmament. To the extent that it is possible, BMD proponents should
stress nuclear disarmament as their new goal..."
Bosma argued that proponents of BMD systems such as High Frontier, should seek to
argue that SALT and other arms control regimes that fit within the doctrine of MAD "are
built around war-crimes strategies", and thus "war crimes behaviours and intentions"
could be imputed to the signatories of treaties such as the 1972 ABM treaty. BMD on the
other hand could be sold as a way of getting away from these war-crimes strategies. ^
Because Graham realized that he would run into problems trying to sell the High Frontier
concept to the armed services, his efforts were aimed at trying to seU it to President
Reagan, or at least those close to the President. As we have seen Graham met with
Reagan twice - in February 1980 and February 1981 - before losing his direct access to
the President. In addition to these meetings with Reagan, Graham also met with senior
officials in the Administration - Caspar Weinberger, Edwin Meese, Richard Allen (the
President's National Security Adviser), George Keyworth (the President's Science
Adviser), and Martin Anderson. Graham and his offsider Robert Richardson also sent
letters to General Edward Meyer, the Army Chief of Staff, and General Charles Gabriel,
the Air Force Chief of Staff. Graham claims to have personally delivered a copy of the
High Frontier report to General John Vessey shortly before he became Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and said that Vessey was "pretty positive" about the proposal.^

1 J o h n Bosma,
"A P r o p o s e d Plan for Project
on BMD and
Arms
C o n t r o l ( F i n a l ) N S R #46 High Frontier, Heritage Foundation, Section
1.1; Parts of this also reprinted in "The Selling of Star Wars",
Harpers, Vol. 270, No. 1621, June 1985, pp. 22-24.
2 Ibid., Section 1.2.1; In another part of the Report Bosma summarizes
his strategy thus: "a radical approach that seeks to disarm BMD
opponents either by stealing their language and cause(arms control),
or by p u t t i n g them into a tough political corner through their
explicit or de jfacto advocacy of classical anti-population
war
crimes", {Ibid., Section 2.0); Bosma later parted company with Graham
and High Frontier, as he "became quite concerned about his[Graham's]
o r i e n t a t i o n with the crazy right". Bosma charged that Graham had
received early funding for the High Frontier project from Rev. Sun
M y u n g Moon's Unification Church, an allegation that Graham denies.
(John J. Fiolka, "Combative General Is A Political Godfather of 'Star
Wars' Plan", Wall Street Journal, December 11, 1985.)
3 Transcript of Graham interview, 7 July, 1987, op. cit., pp. 7, 18;
Letter, Daniel Graham to Gen. Edward Meyer, July 14, 1981; Letter,

2.4 EDWARD TELLER AND THE X-RAY LASER
Edward Teller, the father of the hydrogen bomb, had been a long time space-hawk. He
had testified before Congress in favour of building a military base on the moon; had been
an energetic opponent of every arms control agreement between the United States and the
Soviet Union, including the 1963 Test Ban Treaty and the 1967 Outer Space Treaty,
which banned nuclear weapons in earth orbit; and, had with General Bernard Schriever
(USAF), served on the 1960 panel on the Air Force's future in space, that recommended
the development of "the Dyna-Soar as an aerospace bomber, anti-satellite weapons, a
manned military space station, a reusable shuttle, and a space-based ABM system".^
As well as favouring the militarization of space. Teller had also been a long-time advocate
of strategic defence: "It would be wonderful", he wrote in his 1962 book The Legacy of
Hiroshima f "if we could shoot down approaching missiles before they could destroy a
target in the United States". Teller argued that although US technology was not up to the
task at this time, that the United States should work on such technologies to stay ahead of
the Russians, because if they gained the lead, they would use it to achieve world
domination: "If the Communists should become certain that their defenses are reliable and
at the same time know that ours are insufficient", he wrote, "Soviet conquest of the world
would be inevitable".2
Two decades later, encouraged by the development of an x-ray laser at Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory, Teller began publicly promoting the same theme. In a
1980 article, Teller argued that:^
It is strongly recommended that the United States place emphasis on this type of
active defense [ABM systems]... pro^ams along these lines would be crucial. The
strength of our electronics industry raises the hope that ABM's could become truly
effective. A vigorous research program on ABM's would not be too cosdy, since
research is generally cheap compared to deployment.
The reason that Teller was again pushing ballistic missile defence was that the Soviets
were now ahead of the United States "quantitatively", and had, according to Teller, "won
Robert Richardson to Gen. Charles Gabriel, 30 June,
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the arms race". If they were now to develop a "good and practical ballistic missile
defense", it was, in Teller's opinion, "a foregone conclusion that they would use it". He
urged that the United States pursue the "military secret technology" that was being
developed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and the application of electronics
to defence, as this was the one industrial field in which the US had "not yet lost
leadership to the Russians".^
By 1982, Teller was arguing that the "Balance of terror is not a nice idea", but that it had
become the "keystone of our defense policy for two decades", and, he suspected, was
"one of the strong but not obvious reasons behind the nuclear-freeze movement". To get
out of this 'MAD-trap', one which had allowed the Soviets to attain nuclear superiority
whilst the US in effect disarmed, Teller argued that an ABM system based on nuclear
weapons was needed: "The answer is true defense in the most literal sense of the word.
We need weapons - not against people, not against industries, not even against missiles in
their silos to be fired, but against explosives that have been fired and that, within minutes
would reach their targets and kill. The sword has been invented; now we must work on
the shield". Teller, at this time, could only give very general details about this shield. The
possibility of a very effective defence came, he said, from the prospect of using small
nuclear explosions to disable missiles, so small that they would not effect civilians on the
ground. But, he warned, "The 'salvation' offered by the freeze advocates will prevent the
development and deployment of such protective defense systems".^

1 Clarence Robinson, "Ballistic Missile Emphasis Urged", AWST, October
13, 1980, pp. 18-19.
2 Edward Teller, "Teller: Defensive Weapons a Must", Pitsburgh
Press,
13 October, 1982, p. B4. Teller expounded a similar theme in a number
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of the Livermore Labs in September 1982, Teller spoke against the
F r e e z e Movement, and in favour of the construction of a third
generation of nuclear weapons, which he described as "the kind of bomb
that uses the nuclear explosion only as a starting point to accomplish
something else". He went on: "what this laboratory can accomplish now
is more important than what we ever have accomplished before. The
third-generation efforts give us every expectation of an effective
nuclear defense. ... And if defense by nuclear weapons is possible, we
must have it." (Teller, quoted in Robert Scheer, "Flaws Peril Pivotal
'Star Wars' Laser", Los Angeles Times, September 23, 1985.) In a 1982
article in Reader's
Digest,
Teller argued: "Furthermore, extremely
important research is being conducted on systems to defend against
incoming nuclear missiles. For example, exploding a very small nuclear
b o m b n e a r an attack m i s s i l e as it enters the
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incoming missile without detonating it. Such a system, used to protect
v u l n e r a b l e m i s s i l e silos, could be an important first step in
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p o l i c y t o w a r d s defense".
(Edward Teller, "Dangerous Myths About
Nuclear Arms", Reader's Digest, November, 1982, p. 140.)

What Teller was alluding to in his speeches was the x-ray laser which was being
developed at Lawrence National Livermore Laboratory. The x-ray laser project, dubbed
"Excalibur" was conceived at Livermore in the 1960's^. The search had picked up in the
1970's, when two young researchers Lowell Wood and George Chapline teamed up to
pursue it. Chapline, in particular, had a vision of building an x-ray laser which could be
pumped with a very powerful energy source - a nuclear bomb - and in 1977 he devised a
novel way to build such a nuclear-pumped x-ray laser. Chapline's idea so impressed
officials at the laboratory, that an experiment to test his concept was "piggybacked" onto
an underground test at the Nevada Test Site being run by the Defense Nuclear Agency to
study the effects of nuclear radiation on the MX missile warhead. The test, code-named
'Diablo Hawk', took place on September 13,1978, but due to a failure of the sensors to
measure the output of the x-ray laser, it was impossible to tell whether the test had been a
success.2
Soon after the Diablo Hawk test, Chapline obtained funding for a dedicated test of his
concept, the test being scheduled for 1980. In the lead up to the test a series of meetings
were held at the lab at which those interested in the nuclear-pumped x-ray laser would
gather to discuss the coming test. At a meeting held in the summer of 1979, one of the
young physicists present, Peter Hagelstein, suggested a new way that an x-ray laser could
be made. Lowell Wood, who had also been present at the meeting, pushed Hagelstein's
idea, and in the end it was decided that the test of Chapline's nuclear x-ray laser should be
modified to include Hagelstein's idea as well, one bomb being used to pump the two
competing sets of hardware, to see which one worked best. The underground test in
question, code-named 'Dauphin', occurred at the Nevada test site on November 14,
1980. The test was a success for both x-ray lasers, and it was the one proposed by
Hagelstein for which the test results were superior.^ News of the test was leaked in
Aviation Week and Space Technology in February 1981. The article claimed that the
supposedly secret tests at Nevada had led to a breakthrough that "has the potential to blunt
a Soviet nuclear weapons attack". A projected application was a nuclear warhead
surrounded by a ring of fifty or so laser rods, each of which could be pointed at a target
missile and the bomb detonated. Such a device, it was claimed, could easily be carried
aloft by the space shuttle. It was claimed that 20 or 30 x-ray laser battie station in space
1 Work had also been undertaken at Livermore on rare-gas halide lasers
pumped by nuclear explosions. It was reported in 1980 that Roderick
Hyde had designed a "nuclear explosive-driven orbital laser ballistic
defense system" based on these lasers. In this design 50 such lasers
would be driven by the one source. ("Technology Eyed to Defend ICBMs,
Spacecraft", o p . c i t . , p. 34; "High-Intensity Electron Beams Pushed",
August 4, 1980, pp. 67-68.)
2 William J. Broad,
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could handle a ballistic missile attack on the United States.^ Hagelstein's x-ray laser
became known as "Excaliber", and a separate bureaucracy known as R Program was set
up around it at the Livermore labs. Depending on whether or not a test was about to be
conducted, the size of the R Program staff could swell into the hundreds.^
The allure of the x-ray laser, and indeed all of the so-called third generation nuclear
weapons for the researchers at Livermore, seems to have been that these weapons
represented the scientific and technical challenge of the future. The second generation
nuclear weapons no longer represented a challenge for these scientists. ^ As Lowell Wood
told William Broad, "Frankly, the offensive game, in addition to its somewhat dubious
intent, is awfully easy. There just isn't much challenge there. Success consists of
shrinking off an inch here and a pound there or moving the center of gravity half an inch
forward. It's distincdy an engineering problem". On the other hand, the "intriguing thing
about defensive weapons is that they have a real, semifundamental challenge to them - to
making them work, work effectively, robustly, and to work at very high cost efficiency, a
high cost-exchange ratio against the offence".^
Underlying Teller's belief in the need for strategic defences was a worid view which saw
the Soviets as being hell-bent on world domination. According to Teller, the US was now
the inferior partner of the two superpowers, the Soviets having gained superiority in the
"throw weight" with which they could rain down nuclear destruction upon the United
States. Between 1966 and 1981, argued Teller, "the total megatonnage of the American
nuclear arsenal was reduced to less than one-half of its former size". The Soviet arsenal,
on the other hand, "has rapidly increased in yield, accuracy and diversity during the same
period and currently includes a total nuclear explosive power in excess of what the United
States ever had". Teller argued that the throw weight of the Soviet military was five times
that of the US, and warned that "the ration could increase to tenfold without our noticing
it".5
To make matters worse, not only was it the case that the strength of the Soviet nuclear
forces were being underestimated, but the Soviets were playing a completely different
nuclear ball-game, pursuing a strategy that would allow them to initiate and win a nuclear
Ibid.,
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war, whilst the US clung doggedly to the doctrine of MAD, naively laying its population
bare to nuclear annihilation by the Soviets. According to Teller, official Soviet policy
claimed that they would win a nuclear exchange with the US, the Soviets never having
agreed to the ideas upon which MAD is based. This was evidenced by the fact that the
Soviets placed great emphasis on civil defence - the evacuation of cities and the building
of fallout shelters and food storage - instead of laying their population bare to destruction,
as was required by the MAD doctrine.^ As well as their civil defence program, Teller
argued that the Soviets had forged ahead on strategic defences against ballistic missiles.
Although the United States had begun to deploy such a system in the early 1970's, under
the SALT I treaty the US had been limited to two, subsequently one ABM site, which it
had abandoned, as well as research on more effective, and less expensive technologies for
ballistic missile defence. The Soviet Union on the other hand had maintained the ABM
system that it was allowed under SALT I, and pressed ahead with research on more
effective technologies.^
Because of these civil and ABM defences. Teller argued that the Soviets might be able to
simply blackmail the US into submission. "Our country may find itself in the situation".
Teller claimed, "where it has to give in to Russian demands or face the end of the United
States".3 Teller argued that the Soviets "could land an attack feeling secure against
ravages from retaliatory bombings". The United States on the other hand had done
virtually nothing towards protecting its population.^ This civil defence program may well
allow them to lose fewer people in a nuclear war than the 20 million or so casualties that
the Soviet Union suffered during Worid War 11.^
The advent of the freeze movement, totally misguided in Teller's eyes, meant that the
Soviets might get away with their evil ploy: "Do the advocates of thefreezeknow that in
the last 16 years the explosive power of nuclear bombs in the US arsenal has decreased to
half its earlier value? Do they know that today the Soviet arsenal is more than three times
ours in destructive power?" Teller asked. ^ According to Teller the freeze movement
1 Edward Teller, "Technology: The Imbalance of Power", op. cit.,
Edward Teller, "Dangerous Myths ..", op. cit., p. 140.
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4 E d w a r d Teller, "Technology: The Imbalance of Power", op. ext., p.
512; Edward Teller, "Dangerous Myths ...", op. cit., p. 140.
5 T e l l e r p o i n t e d to tests u n d e r t a k e n at the Oak Ridge N a t i o n a l
Laboratory, which he claimed showed that, under optimum conditions,
the Soviet civil defence programme would allow them to protect all but
5 to 10 percent of their population in the event of a full retaliatory
s t r i k e . (Edward Teller, "Dangerous Myths
op. cit., pp. 140,
143.)
6 Edward Teller, "Teller:Defensive Weapons a Must", op. cit., p. B4.

granted acceptability to the Soviets' "extraordinarily destructive" weapons, when they
should actually be opposing them. Also it would end further work in the United States on
what could well be the best defence systems. Teller's third-generation nuclear weapons.
"The Soviets have akeady deployed an anti-ballistic missile system around Moscow",
Teller claimed. "We have the right to deploy a similar system but have not done so".^
According to Teller, the "balance of terror" no longer worked, MAD was bankrupt and
detente was self delusion.2 But the freeze was not the answer. The answer was to build a
nuclear defence system based on the x-ray laser.
Apart from his public stance on the need for a ballistic missile defence based on nuclear
weapons, Edward Teller was actively lobbying the Reagan administration and Congress.
As early as February 1981, days after Reagan was installed as president. Teller and his
colleague at Livermore, Lowell Wood, are reported to have begun briefing leaders of the
House and the Senate on the promise of, and need for, third generation nuclear weapons
for ballistic missile defence.^ In October 1981 Teller sent a classified letter to Congress
that reportedly recommended the stepping up of x-ray laser research.^ Teller had known
Reagan for quite some time, their first meeting taking place in 1967, shortly after Reagan
had been elected Governor of California. Reagan was the first Governor to visit the
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, in Livermore, California, with Teller acting as
his guide. Here Reagan learned first-hand some of the new ideas for defence against a
missile attack from Teller.^ Teller recounted this visit in an interview with Michael
Charlton: "He listened carefully; not to a highly technical presentation, but to one that
must have contained a host of completely novel ideas. He asked maybe ten or twelve
questions which clearly showed that he followed - that he comprehended".^
Teller also became involved in the High Frontier study through his long time friend Karl
Bendetsen, but soon broke away form Daniel Graham's group to join up with Bendetsen
and a group of his colleagues, including Joseph Coors, William Wilson, and Jacqueline
Hume. All were influential supporters of Reagan - often being referred to as Reagan's
'kitchen cabinet' - and also of Stanford University's Hoover Institution on War,
1 Edward Teller, "Dangerous Myths . . . o p . cit., p. 140.
2 Edward Teller, "Teller: Defensive Weapons a Must", op. cit., p. B4.
3 Gregg Herken, "The earthly origins...", op. cit., p. p. 22.
4 Jeff Hecht, Beam Weapons^ op. cit., pp. 132, 236.
5 Gregg Herken, "The earthly origins...", op. cit., p. 20; William J.
Broad, "Reagan's 'Star Wars' bid...", op. cit., p. Al; Patrick E.
Tyler
"How Edward Teller learned to love the nuclear pumped x-ray
laser", Washington
Post, 3 April, 1983, p. Dl; Michael Charlton, The
Star Wars History, BBC Publications, London, 198 6, p. 95.
6 Michael Charlton, op. cit.

Revolution and Peace, one of America's premier conservative think tanks.^ Teller was
also one of the Hoover Institution's senior scholars. In 1981 Teller is reported to have
approached George Keyworth, the President's Science Adviser, who also seems to have
been involved in Bendetsen's group, and said that he "wanted to offer his technical
expertise to the President's well-meaning friends".^
Guided by Teller, Bendetsen and the other members of President Reagan's so-called
'kitchen cabinet' eventually split from Daniel Graham and the High Frontier. It was,
reportedly, Teller's vision of the new generation of "speed-of-light" nuclear weapons that
captured tiie attention of Bendetsen's group. Briefed by Teller, they became convinced
that the third-generation nuclear weapons could revolutionize "the art of defense as much
as the atomic bomb had revolutionized the art of war".^ They dismissed the idea of
General Graham's killer battie stations in space, and the 'laser lobby's' idea of chemicallaser battle stations as impractical and unrealistic. "Edward was of the opinion that that
type of approach could be too easily countered", said one of his colleagues.'^
Bendetsen and Teller's group had some five or so meetings with President Reagan to
discuss the subject of strategic defence - according to William Broad, three meetings
before and two meetings after the so-call 'Star Wars' speech^ - the first occurring on
January 8, 1982. In addition to this Teller met with Reagan once alone. At the January 8
1 Frank Greve, "Reagan's plan caught many administration insiders by
surprise",
San
Jose
Mercury
News,
Nov. 17, 1985. The Hoover
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President Herbert Hoover. The Charter of the Institution reads as
follows: "..to demonstrate the evils of the doctrines of Karl Marx whether communism, socialism, economic materialism, or atheism - thus
to protect the American way of life from such ideologies, their
conspiracies, and to reaffirm the validity of the American system".
According to Australian journalist Robert Milliken, although things
had changed since 1919, "the overriding mood of the Hoover Institution
research is still one of profound pessimism about America's chances of
survival in a show-down with the Communist World". It had, moreover,
come to assert "an increasingly dominant influence over Reagan and the
Right Wing of the Republican Party". After his failed presidential bid
in 197 6, Reagan began attending seminars at the Hoover Institution,
and was such a hit that they made him an honorary fellow of the
Institution. According to Milliken, Reagan's close affiliation with
the Hoover Institution is reflected in his speeches. (Robert Milliken,
"Reagan's Brain Trust", Norfolk
Virginian-Pilot
and Ledger-Star,
3
Aug., 1980, p. C2.)
2 Frank Greve, "Reagan's plan caught many administration insiders by
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4 Ibid., p. 22.
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meeting, Teller, Bendetsen, Coors and Wilson discussed with Reagan the technological
advances which made a defence against ballistic missiles a real possibility.^ The meeting,
scheduled to last only 15 minutes, went for an hour. According to sources present at the
meeting, there was much talk of lasers, which might be used to destroy aircraft as well as
missiles. However, they pointed out that such lasers "might have only a limited capacity
because their wavelength was too long". The shorter the wavelength of the laser, the more
destructive its beam would be. The shortest wavelength could be obtained using an x-ray
laser. Rather than trying to create a ballistic missile defence using "off-the-shelf"
technologies, Bendetsen's group argued for a stepped up program of research on
advanced technologies. ^
Reagan is reported to have shown "great interest" in the idea^, though he wondered
whether such a system should be designed to protect missile silos only, or the whole
population. Karl Bendetsen argued that the system his group was proposing could,
eventually, do both, however that to protect the whole population would be much more
expensive and take longer. Whatever the case, argued Bendetsen, he thought that they
should start now. He wanted Reagan to announce the start of a national quest, similar in
scope to the 1942 Manhattan Project, to develop an ABM system based on directed
energy weapons. Reagan is reported to have agreed.^ The question of how to deal with
the ABM Treaty and other treaties that were relevant to outer space was also raised by the
President. Bendetsen is reported to have told him to let others worry about this. The
message was get on with it.^ Not only was ballistic missile defence a real possibility but
in the opinion of Bendetsen's group, one that the public would definitely welcome.^
Anotiier meeting with the President occurred on September 14, 1982, this time Edward
Teller being alone. Teller had repeatedly appealed for a private meeting with the President
to discuss his ideas, but had been repeatedly rebuffed by Reagan's aides. It was not until
Teller appeared on national television - the "Firing Line" programme hosted by William
Buckley (seen by Reagan at his Santa Barbara ranch) - and complained that he had been
denied Presidential access, that he was given a meeting. "May I tell you a little secret
which is not classified?", Teller asked on the programme. "From the time that President
Reagan has been nominated I had not a single occasion to talk to him". Teller had some
new and promising ideas about defence which he wished to discuss with the President.
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An invitation was duly issued to Teller for a meeting at the Oval Office on September 14,
1982, the meeting scheduled to last for half an hour. At this meeting, Teller is reported to
have warned the President that the Soviet Union was developing an x-ray laser weapon
similar to "Excaliber" which was being developed at Livermore, and that the Soviets
would soon be in a position to blackmail the United States. He appealed to Reagan to
dramatically increase funding for his "Excaliber" project. Before he could progress too far
with his wild claims however, the meeting was cut short by Reagan's aides, and ended in
disappointment for Teller.^
Leading up to Reagan's 'Star Wars' speech, Edward Teller, and Bendetsen's group
continued to press their case. Starting in October 1982 and continuing through to the
following January, Teller met repeatedly with members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
senior civilian officials in the Defense Department to brief them on Livermore's progress
toward the development of x-ray lasers.^ Bendetsen's group, including Teller met with
the President again in the early months of 1983.^
2.5 THE HUDSON INSTITUTE AND STAR WARS
At the level of strategy, one of the strongest advocates of ballistic missile defence,
particularly in conjunction with the MX missile has been a group of strategists at the
Hudson Institute. This group includes Herm^ Kahn, Research Director at the Hudson
Institute until his death in the early 1980's, Donnald Brennan who was active in the
'ABM Debate' at the end of the 1960's and Director of national security studies at the
Institute in the late 1970's, and most recently Colin Gray and Keith Payne both members
of the professional staff of the Institute concemed with national security studies.^ As far
back as the early 1960's, Kahn had emphasized the relationship between the capability to
minimize damage to the United States in a nuclear war and the capability to extend
deterrent coverage to distant allies. According to Kahn, in his 1961 book On
Thermonuclear
War^ the Soviets did not take the American deterrent seriously, because
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the US "had made negligible preparations to ward off, survive, and recover from even a
"small" Soviet retaliatory strike".^ A 1972 Hudson Institute study in which both Kahn
and Brennan were involved, argued that the effective deterrence of the Soviet Union by
the United States required that the US secure an advantage in 'relative war outcomes' by
adopting a damage-limitation strategy which could be provided by either offensive
counterforce weapons, or by antiballistic missile defences. Brennan in the late 1970's had
argued that even a fairly ineffective ABM system could be useful, as it would create a
measure of uncertainty, while more effective systems were being developed.^
Gray and Payne speak with fairly much the one voice, often collaborating on papers as
joint authors, or if writing papers under their own names drawing heavily on the other's
advice. In their writmgs on ballistic missile defence they seem to have been the intellectual
heirs of Herman Kahn and Donnald Brennan. Gray and Payne were strong critics of the
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks that had taken place during the late 1960's and the
1970's, and of the SALT I and SALT n treaties and the ABM Treaty which resulted from
these talks. Colin Gray, in particular had been a long term critic of both the SALT I and n
treaties:^
It is important to recognize that SALT I and prospectively SALT II were (and are)
poor agreements that reflect both a near-parody of "how a nation should negotiate"
and the absence of a credible bargaining chip on the U.S. side. The problems of
clearly predictable impending inferiority and instabilities cannot be solved through
SALT diplomacy - one point, at least, on which all shades of opinion would seem
to be agreed.
Gray charged, in 1976, that what had then been six years of arms negotiations with the
Soviets had, on the one hand, led to the termination of work on active missile defences
(one of the more promising approaches to maintaining the invulnerability of ICBM silos),
while on the other hand allowing the Soviets to indulge in a massive nuclear arms buildup, leaving the threat to the ICBM silos unconstrained. Thus, the double-headed monster
of SALT was progressively increasing the vulnerability of United State's strategic nuclear
weapons.^
SALT I had been signed by the US, Gray claimed, for two main reasons: on the political
level it was largely to secure the reelection of Richard Nixon by acting as a symbol for
superpower detente; and secondly, on the strategic level it was supposed to be an
arrangement whereby the US surrendered a "greatly superior" ABM system for the
1 Keith B. Payne, "Deterrence, Arms Control & US Strategic Doctrine",
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defence of ICBM silos, for the "severe arresting of the Soviet threat" to these ICBM silos.
Unfortunately, this was illusion. The Soviets had only agreed to the ABM treaty to
"maintain unimpeded targeting access to U.S. ICBMs and NCA facilities and to counter
the U.S. BMD technological advantage". Furthermore, although the agreement might
have frozen the construction of ICBM launchers, it did nothing to constrain qualitative
improvements. And, if this wasn't bad enough, the Soviets cheated. Gray citing fifteen or
so possible cases of violation. ^
So much so did the Soviets cheat, argued Gray, that it called into question "the very
notion that the superpowers retain enough common interest in arms control to warrant
continuing negotiations".^ Of particular concem was that the Soviets were cheating on
the ABM Treaty and were in the process of constructing a nationwide ballistic missile
defence system, giving them a "superior breakout potential" from this treaty. Gray
claimed that the Soviets had tested air defence radars in the ABM mode, had modified
their air defence system so that late model SA-10 and SA-X-12 interceptor missiles would
have some ABM capability, and were constmcting radar infrastructure, including phasedarray radars capable of predicting impact points and handling targets for ABM battle
management which, "when linked will represent a firm foundation for a nationwide
ballistic missile defense". Although this still might not provide the Soviets with a
comprehensive defence, it would complicate US retaliatory planning.^
The prospects for the future looked even more bleak, SALT II only adding insult to
injury, representing yet another sell-out on the part of the United States. As a
consequence of the SALT I and 11 and the ABM treaties, Gray argued that a 'window of
vulnerability' would open on the United States in the early to mid 1980's. In 1976, Gray
argued that the window was just beginning to open: "the U.S. in the 1980's will be on the
unhealthy end of a hard target counterforce gap that could well endure for four or five
years''.^ In 1978 he argued that: "By the early to mid 1980's, the United States will be
unable to [retain] confidence in the ability of all save a small fraction of its silo-housed
^ Ibid.,
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missile force to ride out a Soviet first nuclear strike.... An entire leg [land based ICBMs]
of this triad is approaching mass obsolescence - as currendy deployed in fixed hardened
sites''.^ By 1981 it had become a reality: "Everyone, so it seems, accepts the proposition
that a 'window' of Western military vulnerability has opened, and that it will likely endure
until perhaps 1987-88".2 The Soviets were now ahead on megatons, "equivalent
megatonnage", missile throw weight and the numbers of strategic launch vehicles, and
were catching up rapidly on missile accuracy and numbers of nuclear warheads. Gray
claimed. This meant that they could forcibly disarm the land-based leg of the US strategic
triad and, while doing so, hold their own casualties down to less than that suffered during
the second world war, "even if the United States should proceed all the way up the
escalation ladder".^
That the 'window of vulnerability' was now open did not mean that a Russian first strike
attack was imminent argued Gray. What it did mean was that the USSR would be likely
to seek to coerce the United States while the 'window' remained open. While in fact the
United States was likely to emerge unscathed from the window of military vulnerability.
Gray argued that it would not be prudent to rely on such hope, that US defence planners
should plan for the worse. "As with Germany in the 1929 case". Gray warned, "the
Soviet Union in the 1980's may well not recognize a firm Westem line when it appears.
Each side will expect the other to back down, but neither will do so. The result will be
war by miscalculation".^
Underlying their analysis of the 'window of vulnerability' and the Soviet threat, was a
particular strategic viewpoint, which entailed a critique of the doctrine of MAD, a theory
about how the Soviets viewed the doctrine of MAD, and a belief in the idea of a strategic
posture which Gray and Payne called 'denial of victory', 'extended deterrence', or
'credible deterrence'. From this perspective nuclear weapons were not so much about
fighting nuclear wars, as they were an element of day-to-day foreign policy, the strategic
nuclear balance playing a central role in maintaining US dominance in the world,
especially its freedom to act outside its borders. According to Gray: "American's
perceptions of their country's relative standing, perceptions by others, and the American
1 Colin S. Gray, "The Strategic Forces Triad...", op. cit., p. 771.
2 Colin S. Gray, "Thinking About the Unthinkable War", Washington Star,
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sense of what risks are involved in particular possible enterprises - all rest, in part, though
in ways that are incalculable upon assessments of the state of the strategic balance".^
With the declining strategic balance, the United States might well conciliate in the event
of a crisis, rather than engage in competitive escalation with a stronger and more
determined foe.^ The Soviets, who now held the upper hand in the strategic nuclear
balance were however not constrained by domestic opinion, and they were expansionist,
"not accepting the political status quo in regions vital to the West". They might therefore
be willing to use military force to obtain a favourable outcome for themselves.^
The United States must be perceived to be willing to engage in the escalation of a nuclear
conflict, rather than suffer a defeat in one of its areas of interest, they argued. Such
willingness would not exist however, if there was an expectation that the United States
could not survive a central nuclear war if a conflict escalated to this level. Mutual
deterrence, the policy of MAD, was unacceptable as the focus of US strategic doctrine,
they argued. Only if the US was in a position to "wage and survive a central war" was it
plausible that it would prefer a policy of strategic use to regional defeat.^ Such a "denial
of victory" deterrent strategy, would signal to the Soviet leadership that they could not
gain a military advantage by launching a first strike, or a political advantage by threatening
such a strike, and would, in effect, be bringing about "Soviet disarmament without
military benefit". This is because the United States would be likely to be more willing "to
turn an impending theatre defeat into a central war than conciliate, and capable of denying
the Soviet Union victory at whatever level of escalation that war attained".^ Whilst the
doctrine of MAD might provide a logical basis for the deterrence of a very large scale
attack on the American homeland, the threat of US retaliation in this instance being
credible, it would not act as a hedge against Soviet expansionism (of political influence or
territory), even in times of political calm.^ The doctrine of'extended deterrence' would
require that the Soviet leaders considered "that it was not incredible that the United States
would take the strategic initiative on behalf of distant allies"."^
1 Colin S. Gray, "The Strategic Forces Triad...", o p . c i t . , p. 775;
Colin S. Gray & Keith B. Payne, "Victory is Possible", Foreign
Policy^
Vol. 39, Suinmer 1980, p. 20.
2 Keith B. Payne, "Deterrence, Arms Control and US Strategic Doctrine",
op. cit., p. 750. As examples of this, Payne cites Soviet actions in
Angola, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan in the 1970's.
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, pp. 768-769; Colin S. Gray & Keith B. Payne, "Victory is
Possible", op. cit., pp. 16-17. Similarly, Gray argued that area BMD
was required because: (i) it would "usefully reduce American selfdeterrence and so enhance the credibility of the extended deterrent";
(ii) it might discourage the Soviets from pressing ahead with the
development of new offensive systems. Also, the Soviets did not adhere

This would require a serious commitment to strategic defence (civil defence, air defence
and ballistic missile defence (BMD)), and strategic force survivability, (perhaps BMD,
mobility, and/or concealment), and a policy of offensive counterforce targeting. Strategic
defence was particularly important, because even if the US was confident in the disarming
potential of its offensive strategic forces, strategic defence would be necessary because
the United States could never be certain that it would be the side to strike first, or that the
Soviet Union would not launch "on warning" in the event of a first strike attack by the
United States.^
Furthermore, the notion of parity between US and Soviet strategic arsenals was out,
especially in the area of strategic defence, as this would be "inconsistent with American
deterrence responsibilities".^ The strategic doctrine of the Soviet Union was at variance
with that of the United States, Gray claimed, in that the Soviets held that a good defence,
because it could limit damage in the event of war, was a good deterrent. Rather than
seeking to deter war, Soviet doctrine was about achieving war-fighting prowess.^ Not
only did the Soviets have a different strategic posture, but their leaders had a different
"hierarchy of values" to American leaders, who valued most the American people and
urban-industrial assets. The Soviet leaders valued most their "instmments of military and
political control and power"; they believed that Soviet society had value not in itself, but
rather as a vehicle for state purposes.^ Gray, for example argued that:^
Whereas a U.S. president would view the loss of 5 to 20 million Americans as a
national tragedy of unprecedented proportions, a Soviet leader would probably view
such a loss as a regrettable necessity to avoid defeat and ensure the possibility of
victory.

to M A D , providing defence for their population, and there was no
reason why the US should not also do this; (iii) a competition in
defensive weapons would take "roubles" away from offensive weapons;
(iv) in the event that
deterrence failed, population defences would
be vital; (v) defence had always been part of Soviet strategy (Colin
S. Gray, "A New Debate on Ballistic Missile Defence", op. cit., pp.
67-68)
1 Keith B. Payne, "Deterrence, Arms Control and US Strategic Doctrine",
op. cit.r pp. 755-757, 766.
2 Ibid., p. 759.
3 Colin S. Gray, "SALT: Time to Quit", op. cit., p. 17; Colin S. Gray,
"A New Debate on Ballistic Missile Defence", Survival,
March/April
1981, p. 64.
^ Keith B. Payne, "Strategic Defense and Stability", op. cit., p. 221;
Colin S. Gray, "Making Sense of the Nuclear-Freeze Debate", op. cit.,
p. 148.
^ Colin S. Gray, "Making Sense of the Nuclear-Freeze Debate", op. cit.,
p. 148.
(Gray's arguments were based on the analysis of Soviet
intentions conducted by Richard Pipes)

These Soviet assets were more easily defended that those which the US leaders valued
most, so consequently, "an equivalent level of imperfect defense capability could provide
protection of the highest Soviet values, but not the highest American values". Therefore,
parity in offensive and defensive weapons could be extremely disadvantageous for the
United States because of these supposed differences in values between the two nations'
leaders. Thus, the United States must at least achieve a "functionally equivalent
capability" to protect its own highest values and to threaten the highest values of the
Soviet leadership - "recognizing that such a functional equality may well require superior
capabilities given the differences in the target sets to be threatened".^
The centre-piece of the 'extended deterrence' strategy was seen to be the MX missile
programme. It was the programme "which could right a strategic balance which would
otherwise tilt in favour of the Soviet Union to a politically and militarily significant
degree".2 Gray argued that the MX "should be thought of as a weapon program that is
essential for the support of forward-placed allies, in that supportive limited first-strike
options could be threatened credibly, secure in the knowledge that the United States had a
residual ICBM force that could deter attack upon itself. He went so far as to argue that
the MX should be welcomed by supporters of arms control, because it could be used to
provide leverage in the SALT negotiations, by showing the Soviets that a "hard-target
counterforce race cannot be won". It would however need to be deployed, and would
have to be survivable before the Soviets would be persuaded that the US was serious.^
To get around the problem of MX silo vulnerability, a number of different possibilities
were envisioned: the US could adopt a launch on warning policy; it could choose to phase
out the land-based ICBM leg of its strategic triad which had become vulnerable, and rely
instead on a dyad of SLBMs and manned bombers/cruise missiles; could seek to preserve
the strategic triad by means of mobile deployment; or, it could defend its silos. In 1978
Gray tiiought that BMD would not be the best solution to the MX silo vulnerability
problem, partiy because it had few advocates at that time. There were, moreover, many
technical problems to be solved, and the ABM Treaty of 1972 would have to be
abrogated. (Gray argued that if this was so, then the Soviets would be in a much better
position to deploy a BMD system.) Gray argued that if the United States were to put the
same resources into developing BMD as it was putting into the development of the MX,

1 Keith B. Payne, "Strategic Defense and Stability", op. cit., p. 221.
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then a limited system may be possible by the late 1980's and 1990's. Towards the end of
the century, even space-based lasers might be a possibility. ^
By 1981, Gray thought that because of certain technical advances the use of BMD to
make MX silos survivable was a definite option. The arguments dating from 1970 to the
effect that BMD did not work no longer applied to these new technologies, he argued. ^
The US now had a "low-risk BMD technology", in the form of the US Army's Low
Altitude Defense System (LoADs), which was designed to protect missile silos by
intercepting nuclear warheads within the atmosphere. Although Gray felt that at the
moment the deceptive basing mode for the Minuteman/MX was the most cost-effective
solution to the problem of ICBM survivability, he though that BMD would provide a
useful complement to this at some stage. The LoADS system had, after all, actually been
designed to defend a deceptively based ICBM system.^ The LoADS technology would
not suffer from the same shortcomings as the Safeguard system.^ It was, at that time,
scheduled for initial operational readiness by 1988. As LoADS comprised 'stare-of-theart' technology. Gray felt that there was no good reason why it could not be deployed
with the MX missile around 1985.^

1 Ibid.r P- 779-80; Colin S. Gray, "The MX Debate", op. cit., p. 109.
2 Colin S. Gray, "A New Debate on Ballistic Missile Defense", Survival,
March/April 1981, p. 60. In 1969-70 it was argued that the
Safeguard
BMD system would not work because" (i) The radar systems could be
"blacked out" by the nuclear explosion of an incoming missile or from
defensive missile; (ii) the computer systems were not sophisticated
enough to handle the volume of information, assessments and battle
management that was required. In addition it was argued that the
Spartan
ABM system would not work because the radars could^ not
identify and discriminate real targets from decoys and chaff precisely
enough to have confidence in the exoatmospheric intercept ability of
the system. It was also argued that the system could be easily
overcome if the Soviets chose to saturate the system, or to use such
offensive ploys as 'salvage-fusing'. Also, the system was criticized
because it would not be 100% effective. (Ibid.r p. 61-62.)
3 The M X basing mode being envisaged at the time involved 200 MX
m i s s i l e s deployed one to each "linear track" with 23 horizontal
shelters on each track. The missiles would be shuffled around between
the shelters so that the Soviets would never quite know where they
were
The LoADS system would complicate things even more. If just one
LOADS deployment were used per track, the soviets would have to send
twice the number of missiles to be certain of success, as it may have
been protecting any one of the 23 shelters. {Ibid., pp. 63-64; Keith
B. Payne, "Detente, Arms Control and US Strategic Doctrine", op. cit.,
p. 761.)
With the LOADS system the interceptor missile and radar would also be
d e c e p t i v e l y based, and was far smaller than the radar for the
Safeguard
system. Also, because it was a 'minimum altitude' intercept
system it would be difficult to use spoofing tactics. (Colin S. Gray,
"A New Debate on Ballistic Missile Defense",op. cit., p. 64)
5 Ibid., p. 64-65.

An even more advanced system was being developed by the US Army, an
exoatmospheric 'overlay' BMD system, designed to intercept nuclear warheads above the
atmosphere. Although based on a less mature technology than the LoADS system. Gray
argued that when fully developed, it would represent a qualitative advance over the
Spartan system through a revolution in optical discrimination. It would involve the
launching of 'probe' missiles into the "threat corridor" of an incoming threat cloud to
identify target warheads, from the decoys and chaff. This threat data would then be
'handed over' to the "warhead 'buses' of long-range interceptors, which would then in
turn 'handover' threat data to non-nuclear homing vehicles which could neutralize the
targets through impact or fragmentation".^ If this homing overlay system received
adequate funding, then, according to Gray, it could be operational by about 1990.
Combined with LoADS to form a two-tiered BMD system, a tmly effective BMD system
would be obtained.2
Furthermore, Gray and Payne argued, future developments may allow the addition of a
third layer to the BMD system based on exotic technologies which would be used to
intercept ballistic missiles in their boost-phase. "Space-based high-energy laser systems,
designed to destroy ICBM and SLBM in their boost phases, could easily mark a historical
change in the relationship between the offence and the defense in favour of the latter".
However, major practical problems remained to be solved.^ According to Gray: "Crises
and wars are deterred or waged with actual weapons, not with strategic promissory notes;
it is always possible to design a better weapon tomorrow than today. Space-based laser
weapons for BMD may or may not prove technically feasible and strategically attractive,
but their promise could deprive the U.S. of effective BMD weaponry to accomplish
modestly defined missions in the near term". Further, "extravagant-sounding strategic
vision deploys on paper weapons whose construction far exceeds the current state-of-theart and can damage the political prospects for more modest programs".^
Not surprisingly, both Gray and Payne strongly opposed the freeze movement. They
argued that the nuclear freeze supporters misunderstood strategy, and would in fact
produce results that were counter-productive in terms of promoting the objectives of arms
control. "To minimize the probability of war the U.S. needs to act now to reduce the high
degree of strategic force vulnerability that has resulted from the formidable build-up of
Ibid.,
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Soviet counterforce potential", Payne argued.^ For the nuclear strategists the nuclear
freeze was a nightmare which had them waking in an icy-cold sweat. It would only serve
to freeze the 'window of vulnerability' in place and deny the US the opportunity of
modernizing and building up its strategic weapons to regain the superiority which was
required for 'extended deterrence'; it would also deny the US the option of deploying the
MX ('Peacemaker'), and of modernizing the existing Minutemen ICBM force and
deploying it in a more survivable mode. Further, it would deny the US the option of
deploying BMD to protect its land-based ICBM force. "In short, the freeze would deny
the United States the means of addressing the problem of ICBM vulnerability".^
Furthermore, they argued that the doctrine of MAD, and thus the nuclear freeze which
attempted to preserve this, was immoral. "Instead of purposefully threatening Soviet
cities, the United States directs its deterrent primarily against Soviet nuclear weapons,
political-control facilities, and other military capabilities that threaten the United States and
its allies.... This type of deterrence policy and planning is morally more acceptable than
the "countercity" notions of freeze advocates, and is also based on a more effective
deterrent because it threatens that which the Soviet leadership values most highly".^ Even
worse that this, the nuclear freeze advocates were not paying due respect to tiie nuclear
strategists, and might even make them obsolete: "In a spirit of 'back to basics', a nuclear
freeze would sidesteptiierealm of strategic analysis and constimte an apparently effective
answer to what is allegedly a simple problem - to halt, or at least arrest the nuclear-arms
race before that race triggers a war that would be to the advantage of neither side"."^
Although Gray and Payne do not seem to have had direct access to the President they both
worked as consultants for the Pentagon, and Colin Gray was on the General Advisory
Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament, a body of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency.^ Gray, in particular, seems to have done quite a deal of work on
the MX missile for the Air Force, being granted a US$100,000 contract by the Air Force
in January 1980 to head a two-year study on "Strategic Force Posture and Arms
1 Keith B. Payne, "Laser Weapons in Space", o p . c i t . , p. 14.
2 Keith B. Payne, "Deterrence, Defence and the Freeze", o p . c i t . , p.
18 Other'undesirable effects of the freeze cited by Payne included:
(i) it would force the US to maintain its aging B-52s with only a
small number of ALCMs operationally deployed, (ii) deny the US the
opportunity of deploying a more survivable bomber such as the Bl-B or
stealth bomber; (iii) allow the soviets to improve their air defences;
(iv) allow the soviets to improve their anti-submarine capabilities
but ban further US development of modernized nuclear missile carrying
submarines. (Jjbid., pp. 26-28.)
3 Ibid.r
pp. 28-29.
4 Colin S. Gray, "Making Sense of the Nuclear Freeze Debate", op. c i t . ,
p. 149.
5 Colin S. Gray, "Moscow is Cheating", op. cit., p. 145.

Control".^ Shortly after Reagan entered office Gray and Payne had completed a
comprehensive study for James Wade, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense, on the
advantages of a new 'denial of victory' strategy. Strategic defences, as we have seen,
would be essential for this strategy, to back up US commitment to initiate a nuclear war
by limiting damage to the US home land. As Gray and Payne put it, "the U.S.... could
with relative confidence in its political integrity engage in a war that while perhaps
militarily unpromising in the short term, would envisage the eventual attainment of the
desired political objective".^
Not surprisingly, both Colin Gray and Keith Payne welcomed the announcement by
President Reagan of a programme to make nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete. ^
However, they argued for a BMD system that was much more limited in scope, in the
near term at least, and were sceptical of the claims that a "nuclear umbrella" could be
achieved, and of the claims of the advocates of exotic space-based weapons. Under their
theory of 'extended deterrence' such exotic weapons were not necessary. They
recognized however that "the promise of a comprehensive defense of cities by exotic
systems and the transcending of offensive-oriented deterrence is a goal that will capture
the imagination and support of the American people". For them the more limited defence
approach was not "inconsistent with a future exotic defense of cities" when this
technology was at an adequate stage of development. Indeed, these limited defences
would be required for a stable transition, they argued. Also, just because a defensive
shield was being constructed, did not mean that offensive weapons need be done away
with, as they too would be required to "safeguard stability during the initial phase of a
defensive transition".^
2.6 COMMON THREADS AND DIFFERENCES
All of the groups advocating the deployment of ballistic missile defences of some sort
shared a common ideology and world view. All were ferociously anti-communist and
held that the Soviets were bent on world domination, as they had always been. All were
opponents of detente and the SALT I and II and ABM treaties that were a by-product of
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this policy, and all argued that the Soviets played the game of Mutually Assured
Destruction differently. Whereas the United States was content with a notion of "parity"
and prepared to lay its homeland open to a Soviet nuclear attack (dismanding its only
ABM system in the mid-1970's), the Soviets were held to reject the notion of "mutual
vulnerability" as was evidenced by their large civil defence programme and their
development work on ABM systems. Also, the Soviets were held to be engaged in a
massive build-up of offensive nuclear weapons in an attempt to develop a war-winning
capability. They all argued that the SALT treaties had constrained (if not unilaterally
disarmed) the United States, but had allowed the Soviets to forge ahead unconstrained, so
much so that they had attained strategic superiority, and the United States was facing a
'window of vulnerability' in the first half of the 1980's through which the Soviets would
be tempted to launch a first-strike attack, or which they might use to coerce the US to
surrender without even launching an attack.
All of the proponents of BMD were arguing that in some way their system would help to
close this 'window of vulnerability', that is, to make US land-based missiles less
vulnerable to a Soviet first-strike attack. They rejected the doctrine of Mutual Assured
Destruction and argued that the deployment of ballistic missile defence would be a vehicle
through which a new strategic doctrine - Mutual Assured Survival (MAS) - could be
introduced. They argued that the doctrine of MAD was immoral as it meant laying the
population of the United States open to nuclear annihilation. The doctrine of MAS was
held to be morally superior, and it had the added advantage that it could be pursued in the
absence of arms control agreements with the Soviets. All were strongly opposed to the
freeze movement, arguing that it would freeze in place the 'window of vulnerability', and
that as it operated within the framework of MAD, it was immoral.
It was this common ideology which led the members of the 'space-weapons lobby' to be
attracted to ballistic missile defence. Given that the Soviet Union was supposed to have
attained strategic superiority over the United States and that it was futile negotiating arms
agreements with the Soviets, there were two main ways in which the United States
military could regain superiority. They could increase the quantity and improve the quality
of their offensive nuclear weapons, or they could deploy strategic defence systems - civil
defence and ballistic missile defence. A combination of offensive and defensive weapons
could also be employed. All of the members of the 'space-weapons lobby' favoured the
defensive option. They did so for several reasons. Firstiy, some thought that the Soviet
Union had akeady won the arms race in offensive nuclear weapons but that through the
United States' superiority in sophisticated technologies there was still a chance to win the
arms race in defensive weapons. A slight variation on this theme was that defensive

weapons could be used to open up a new area of the arms race as a form of economic
warfare against the Soviets. Because the United States held the advantage in this area of
technology it was felt that if the Soviets tried to compete their economy would collapse,
perhaps leading to the overthrow of the communist system. Finally, it was thought that
defensive weapons would be much easier to sell to the public than offensive weapons.
This last reason became increasingly important with the rise of the peace movement. It
would be much easier to justify an increase in expenditure on defensive weapons which
protected Americans but "did not kill Russians" than for offensive weapons of mass
destruction. Further, groups such as the 'laser lobby' and High Frontier emphasized the
importance of having a non-nuclear defence. Such a system had the potential to steal the
thunder of the peace movement.
The need for a space-based ballistic missile defence system was also related to public
appeal. Land-based ballistic missile defence systems had been discredited in the 'ABM
Debate' in the late 1960's as they either didn't provide a perfect nuclear umbrella, or they
were only there to protect missile silos and not people. Only a space-based ballistic
missile defence could attack ICBMs in their boost phase, when they were most vuhierable
and had not released their multiple warheads or decoys, and therefore held the potential to
provide the perfect nuclear umbrella. There was a symbolic element to this also, as
Graham fully realized. Not only were the space weapon technologies highly advanced and
exotic, but space had the potential to capture people's imagination. This symbolic element
was very important. For groups such as High Frontier and the 'laser lobby', the ballistic
missile defence systems that they were proposing were a vehicle through which a new
strategic doctrine - that of Mutual Assured Survival - could be implemented and publicly
proclaimed.
Although the different lobby groups shared a common view of the Soviet threat which led
them to advocate ballistic missile defence as the solution, they pushed essentially different
technologies to implement this ballistic missile defence system. This can be explained in
terms of different "interests" that these groups brought to bear on the problem. Thus,
while the broad nature of the BMD system was shaped by the ideology of the groups, the
components of the system was shaped by the interests. The final 'shape' of the ballistic
missile defence system that the different groups advocated reflected an interplay between
the ideology and the interests of the groups. In some groups it seems to have been the
ideology which was dominant in the shaping process, and in others the interests.
The 'laser lobby' brought together representatives of the defence contractors who were
working on the technologies for DARPA's space-laser triad, with a group of hawkish

Senators and their aides. DARPA's laser triad aimed to develop on the ground a 5megawatt chemical laser for future use in space. Thus, the laser lobby' advocated spacebased chemical lasers as the form of BMD to provide the nuclear umbrella. That they did
not opt for the shorter-wavelength lasers (which were supposed to be more effective) was
congruent with the interests which were represented in the 'laser lobby' but was justified
in terms of ideology. The lobby claimed that the need to deploy the system in the near
future to shut the 'window of vulnerability' necessitated the chemical lasers as these were
at a more advanced stage of development than the shorter-wavelength lasers. Even though
all of the senators who were members of the 'laser lobby' shared the a common ideology
and saw space-based laser battle stations as the answer to the problem of the Soviet threat,
they had slightly different reasons for actually supporting space-based BMD: some
because it would be a neat technical solution to a nightmarish MX basing plan that was
politically unpopular in their home states, and others because they thought it represented a
cheaper solution to the problem of MX basing. This shows how the shaping of a
particular weapons system can be linked to the development of another weapon system, in
this instance the MX, and how wider political and social factors can come into play.
The High Frontier study brought together a collection of defence industry and military
experts who were proposing an assortment of different BMD technologies, civil defence,
and also some civilian space projects, the final proposal focusing on technologies which
were supposedly 'off-the-shelf: the "swarmjet" system for the point defence of ICBM
sites, and the GBMD system which had been proposed by Bud Redding of SRI
International. In this case, although the interests which were represented in the High
Frontier study can be seen to have shaped the eventual outcome of the BMD system that
was proposed, these interests were, in the first place, enrolled into the project by Daniel
Graham and Karl Bendetsen. In the High Frontier group it seems to have been the
ideology which dominated over the interests, the High Frontier report emphasizing the
technologies which were most compatible with the group's ideology. High Frontief s
leader, Daniel Graham, was one of the most vocal supporters of the 'window of
vulnerability' thesis, and his group's advocacy of off-the-shelf technologies over the
more exotic beam weapon technologies had everything to do with his perception that it
was important to close this 'window of vulnerability' as soon as possible.
Edward Teller's group brought together some conservative industrialists with good access
to the President, with a group of scientists who were working on thu-d generation nuclear
weapons, including x-ray lasers. The advocacy of x-ray lasers by Teller's group seems to
have been dictated by the allure of the third generation of nuclear weapons to the scientists
at Livermore. Not only were the scientists at Livermore actively engaged in research

programmes on these weapons but to these scientists offensive nuclear weapons had
become mere engineering, no longer representing a challenge. Teller's group was pushing
for large increases in the funds being devoted to research on third generation nuclear
weapons, which were held to be more exciting and represent more of a challenge than the
second generation nuclear weapons. They were not so intent as the other groups on
actually deploying the system. It is in Teller's group which the interests seem to have
dominated the ideology, although the ideology still seems to have played an important
part.
Colin Gray and Keith Payne were nuclear strategists who eamed their keep devising ways
to deploy and employ offensive nuclear weapons. They had worked on contracts for the
Air Force on the MX missile, and had invested a significant amount of their intellectual
capital in devising ways to base the MX to ensure its survivability and on strategies for its
use. It was the centre-piece of their theory of 'credible deterrence'. To the problem of
ballistic missile defence Gray and Payne brought both their professional interest as
nuclear strategists, and the interests of the Air Force and Army. That the 'window of
vulnerability' be closed as quickly as possible to negate the Soviet threat was important to
them also. Thus, Gray and Payne were advocating the early deployment of the LoADS
and Homing Overlay systems that had been specifically designed for the defence of the
MX missile. They argued that the more exotic systems would not be able to be deployed
. early enough to solve the problem of MX vulnerability, and may well threaten the early
deployment of the more conventional systems. They argued that the deployment of more
accurate nuclear weapons and conventional ballistic missile defence was necessary to
make a stable transition to the more exotic forms of ballistic missile defence some time in
the distant future.
There is an interesting "clash of interests" between the different lobby groups, even
though they were all advocating BMD systems to solve the problem of the 'window of
vulnerability'. This debate focused on the technical merits of the different systems, and on
their timeframe for deployment. The most pressing need for all groups, except Teller's
group advocating the x-ray laser, was that of early deployment. Each group attempted to
show that their system was the most effective system that could be deployed by the
middle of the 1980's, just in time to close the 'window of vulnerability'. It was in this
debate that the interests which lay behind the different groups shine through most
strongly, each attempting to assert their dominance over the claims of the others. By
linking the technical claims made by the different groups to the ideology of the groups and
to the interests represented in the groups, more sense can be made of the debates. These
debates do not go into any great technical detail. Rather, the proponents of a particular

BMD system focus on a particular feature of the system and use this to try and assert their
claims. For example, shorter wavelength lasers were held to be more effective by
advocates of x-ray and eximer lasers.
Notwithstanding these clashes of interest between the groups there were a number of
common threads in the approaches they took in attempting to sell their systems and in the
response they received. Firstly, all of those groups who were proposing exotic BMD
systems were opposed by the Pentagon, especially the Army and the Air Force who had
their own, more conventional programmes. (Gray and Payne can be seen to be the
exception here, as their interests seem to have been aligned with those of the Air Force
and Army.) Interestingly enough, even those members of the lobby groups who came
from the defence contractors often ran into opposition within their own companies, as
their activities were putting at risk contracts that these firms currendy held with the Air
Force and Army. Daniel Graham and Malcolm Wallop had a keen sense of the problems
that they would run into from the Pentagon when pushing their schemes. This opposition
would be expected from the model of the weapons development process oudined in
section 1.2. The missions of the Army and the Air Force had become embodied in their
more conventional programmes. The technologies being proposed by the 'laser lobby'
were, in Kaldor's terms, 'revolutionary', and were destined to run into bureaucratic
opposition. This aspect of the development of space-based BMD is dealt with more fully
in Chapter 4.
Kaldor has argued that the type of 'revolutionary' technologies that the members of the
'space-weapons lobby' were advocating would have to be taken up by "maverick
constituencies" within the armed forces. In the case of space-based BMD weapons such a
maverick constituency does not seem to have existed, or at least was not powerful enough
to have much influence. This left two options for the members of the 'space weapons
lobby'. Firstly, they could try and work through Congress to pass legislation to impose
space-weapons on the armed services. This was the approach taken by the 'laser lobby'
but was fraught with problems. The armed services, particularly the Air Force, were a
powerful lobbying force on Capitol Hill and seem to have intervened on several occasions
to block the 'laser lobby'. The second option was to try and sell the programmes to the
President directiy, or indirectiy by working on the President's advisers. Because of the
opposition within the Pentagon, a^d within the defence contractors, the 'laser lobby'.
High Frontier, and Teller's group realized that they needed to follow this path. Only this
way could they override the bureaucratic opposition and turf guarding that was sure to
arise. Obtaining Presidential sanction meant that not only would it be easier to seU spacebased ballistic missile defence to the public and to Congress, but also the President was

the only one who could impose a decision on the armed services. This meant that those
groups with good access to the President had a greater chance of success. It should be
remembered that this access was also controlled by the President's close advisers.
The case study of space-based ballistic missile defence has, so far, given some support to
model of the weapons development process that has been developed, and also pointed to
some modifications which may be required. A number of groups that were pushing
different BMD systems have been identified, these groups providing the "impetus" for the
weapons development process. The process of bureaucratic politics can be seen in
operation, the proposals of the 'space-weapons lobby' running into opposition from the
armed services, who had a vested interest in more conventional programmes, and were
not yet ready for the exotic technologies being proposed. The importance of Congress,
and congressional committees such as the House and Senate Armed Services Committees,
is evident. Groups such as the 'laser lobby' operated out of the Senate and tried to pass
legislation to influence the development of space-based BMD. The lobbying efforts of the
armed services, the Department of Defense, and the Executive Branch were also important
in Congress. The armed services seem to have had various allies on Capitol Hill, and also
had influence through input to congressional hearings. The importance of the Executive
Branch, and in particular the President is evident. All of the groups pushing exotic spacebased weapons realized they would have to win over the President to get around the
opposition from the armed services. The importance of the wider political context is
evident. The fortunes of ballistic missile defence improved markedly when President
Reagan entered the White House. Unlike the Carter Administration, the Reagan
Administration was prepared to abrogate the ABM Treaty, and it was also looking for
solutions to the 'window of vulnerability'. Further, the 'laser lobby' provides an example
of how the issue of space-based BMD can come to be linked to wider political concerns.
Finally, the role played by ideology is also evident. All of the groups advocating spacebased BMD shared a common ideology, and it was this ideology which led them to be
attracted to BMD systems, and shaped the broad outlines of the system.
Where modification to the model seems necessary is in the area of the forces that are
driving the weapons development process. Kaldor has argued that the two main
institutions which drive the weapons development process are the weapons laboratories
and the defence contractors. This would seem to be too simplistic. Although two of the
groups in the 'space-weapons lobby' had links with defence contractors and one of the
groups had links with a weapons laboratory, the simation is more complex than this. For
a start, it is too simplistic to treat defence contractors and weapons laboratories as single
actors. There are different divisions and groups within the contractors working on

different development projects. While it may be the case that the defence contractors have
a need for follow-on programmes to remain profitable, it will not always be in the
contractor's interest to push all of its projects at any given time. As was the case with
Lockheed, they will not push projects which might lose them important contracts. A
similar situation could be seen to exist for the weapons laboratories and other research
instimtions. For example, there is some evidence to suggest that the laser wars' in 1982
was a result of a power play within DARPA between groups working on competing laser
projects. Thus, the different levels of bureaucratic complexity which have been applied to
the armed services must also be applied to the defence contractors and weapons
laboratories. A particular weapons systems must be placed within the institutional context
of the defence contractor or weapons laboratory in which it is being developed.
Secondly, it is too simplistic to attribute solely an economic interest to the defence
contractors and a scientific/technical interest to the weapons laboratories. The ideology of
the groups that are providing the impetus to the weapons development process is also an
important factor shaping the weapons system. It may even be that a group is pushing a
particular weapons system for almost entirely political resaons. A good examle of this
would be the High Frontier organization. It seems to have been largely die ideology of the
groups which comprised the 'space-weapons lobby' which has shaped the broad nature
of the form of BMD system that they were advocating, and largely the interests
represented in the groups which shaped the components of the system. The actual
weapons system that was being proposed resultedfroman interplay between the ideology
and the interests.

CH. 3: THE SPACE WEAPONS LOBBY AND
THE C.P.D.
3.1 INTRODUCTION
That the members of the 'space-weapons lobby' shared a common ideology and view of
the Soviet threat is not very surprising. This ideology was that of the Committee on the
Present Danger (CPD), which formed in the middle of the 1970's and set as its mission
the revival of concem about the Soviet threat, and the reassertion of American military
superiority. In this chapter I trace the development of the Committee on the Present
Danger, focusing on its major identities and the ideology that was espoused by this
group. Finally, I explore the links between the CPD and the 'space-weapons lobby', in an
attempt to explain the concurrence of their world views, and to provide a revealing
perspective on the meaning and purpose of ballistic missile defence.
3.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE CPD
One of the antecedents of the Committee on the Present Danger was a group known as the
Coalition For A Democratic Majority (CDM), a group of Democrats who had broken with
George McGovem in 1972. Eugene Rostow, a member of this group, and Chair of the
CDM's Foreign Policy Task Force, played a major role in the formation of the Committee
on the Present Danger. All up, thirteen members of the Rostow's eighteen member Task
Force became members of the CPD when it was formed. In the summer of 1974, the
Task Force released a report, "The Quest for Detente", a scathing attack on the concept of
detente, which, they argued, was a dangerous illusion which could lull the West into
thinking that the Cold War had come to an end. It had not, the Soviets could not be
trusted, and they were still bent on world domination.^ It was out of this Task Force
experience that Rostow became convinced that there was a need to put together a broadlybased committee to trumpet aloud the Soviet threat and to push for a return to
unquestioned American superiority. ^
In June 1974, Paul Nitze, the 'white-haired hawk'. Who had held a national security post
in every administration since Truman, resigned in disgust from the SALT delegation that
^Rostow,
former
Undersecretary
of
State
during
the
Johnson
Administration
is
described
by
Jerry
Sanders
as being
an
"unreconstructed hawk on Vietnam". Other members of the Task Force
were Richard Pipes, Midge Decter, Norman Podhoretz, Leon Keyserling,
Jeane Kirkpatrick, Max Kampelman, Richard Schifter and John Roach.
(Jerry Sanders, Peddlers of Crisis, p. 150; Richard J. Barnet, Real
Security, p. 42.)
2 Jerry Sanders, op. clt., p. 151.

was negotiating the SALT II Treaty, and went before the Senate Armed Services
Committee on June 20th telling them that Nixon and Kissinger were selling the "myth of
detente". Nitze had come to pretty much the same conclusion as Rostow, and in the first
year of the Ford Administration began to discuss with about half a dozen or so of his
colleagues, including Rostow, the possibility of forming a high-powered group to
continue his attack on detente and SALT, to awaken people to the Soviet threat, and to
push for big increases in military spending. Others involved in these discussions were
James Schlesinger, Nixon's hawkish Secretary of Defense, Charles Walker, former
Deputy Secretary of the Treasury in the Nixon Administration, David Packard, and Henry
Fowler. 1 Finally, in late November 1975, after downing a few Bloody Marys before
lunch, Rostow, according to his own recollection, decided that they had talked about it
enough and sat down and fired of a memo to Walker and Nitze. "I said we'd had
preliminary discussions long enough", Rostow recalled. "By God, why don't we just do
it?".2
In March 1976, over lunch at the Metropolitan Club in Washington, the Committee on the
Present Danger was formed, Charles Tyroler II, who had been invited to attend by Nitze,
becoming director. The name chosen for the committee was identical to that of a
committee set up in 1950 by James Conant, president of Harvard, Will Clayton, Robert
Lovett and other former national security officials with an identical purpose.^ Through
the spring of 1976, the committee members worked on defining themselves as an
organization, and devising strategies to communicate the Soviet threat, and it was not until
early November 1976, that the group went public.'^ Their founding statement Common
Sense and the Common Danger, expounded Cold War themes that were familiarfromthe
pages of NSC-68: "The principle threat to our nation, to World peace, and to the cause of
human freedom is the Soviet drive for dominance based upon an unparalleled military
build-up". Furthermore, "The Soviet Union has not altered its long-held goal of a world
dominated from a single center - Moscow".^
Ibid.,

cit.,
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pp. 151-152; Richard J. Barnett, op.
p. 51.
2 Robert Sherill, "Gene Rostow's Propaganda Club",
August
11-18, 1979, p. 109; Jerry Sanders, op. cit., p. 152.
3 Jerry Sanders has made a comparison of these two committees with the
identical name but separated in time by a quarter century. Some of
those involved with the first, were also involved with the second CPD.
Paul Nitze, who became a leading member of the 197 6 CPD, worked
informally with the earlier CPD as a member of the State Department.
And Charles Tyroler, director of the 197 6 CPD, as a young Pentagon
official.
^ Jerry Sanders, op. cit., pp. 153, 183.
5
p. 183. Paul Nitze was the author of NSC-68, otherwise known
as "The Report by the Secretaries of State and Defense on 'United
State's Objectives and Programs for National Security'", April 7,
1950. It reads: "... the Soviet Union, unlike previous aspirants to
hegemony, is animated by a new fanatic faith, antithetical to our own.

Ibid.,

Right from the start the CPD worked with other like-minded anti-Soviet groups. An
example of these links, and an indication of the direction in which the group was heading
is provided by correspondence between Frank Bamett, President of the National Strategy
Information Center (NSIC), and Eugene Rostow of the newly formed CPD. Bamett
wrote to Rostow on May 24, 1976, inviting him to join the Board of the NSIC, and
advising him that the NSIC had "been granted [US]$1 million to "crank up" an all-out
effort to meet the current and growing threat from the USSR - whether in military,
ideological or economic warfare terms". He continued: "You are fully aware, of course,
that in terms of the shifting military balance - and in our diplomatic credibility in much of
the world - the U.S. today is about where Britain was in 1938, with the shadow of
Hitier's Germany darkening all over Europe. The NSIC, to counter this threat was
going to open a "full-scale" Washington office to:^
a)interact with policy echelons in the White House and Pentagon (where we still
have many friends);
b)"tutor" Congressional Staffs, and brief members;
c)work with Trade Associations - with an interest in "defense" - which have
Washington offices;
d)generate more public information through friends in the Washington press corps
who write about military and foreign affairs.
Rostow, not surprisingly, replied to Bamett informing him that he would be "honoured to
accept the invitation" to join the Board of the NSIC and that he was delighted that the
NSIC would be conducting a "campaign of direct and large scale persuasion to Congress,
the Executive Branch, Trade Associations and the press corps". Rostow advised Bamett
that the CPD would be planning a somewhat more limited operation, but that he thought it
would be possible to coordinate the activities of the two organizations. Furthermore, he
fully agreed with Bamett's world outlook: "... with youi- estimate that we are living in a
pre-war and not a post-war world, and that our posture today is comparable to that of
Britain, France, and the United States during the Thirties. Whether we are at the
Rhineland or the Munich watershed remains to be seen."^
A two-tier strategy was developing, which according to Sanders was "designed to
squeeze an incoming president between a reassertion of hardline doctrine within the
and seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world.
Conflict has, therefore, become endemic ...". (Quoted in Richard J.
Barnett, o p . c i t . , p. 43.)
1 Letter from Frank R. Barnett to Dr. Eugene V. Rostow, May 24, 1976.
Reproduced in, Robert Sherill, op. cit., p. 107. See also Jerry
Sanders, o p . c i t . , pp. 196-197.

2 Ibid.

3 Letter from Eugene V. Rostow to Frank R. Barnett, June 1, 1976.
Reprinted in Robert Sherill, op. cit., pp. 107-108; See also Jerry
Sanders, o p . c i t . , pp. 196-197.

national security bureaucracy and from the outside by means of pressurefroman interestbacked Cold War ideology led by hawkish Congressmen and groups associated with the
military-industrial complex and the grass roots right wing''.^ Within four years of its
inception, the CPD had brought this strategy to bear in three major batties with the prodetente, pro-SALT forces, and helped to change dramatically the American perception of
the Soviet threat. The first of these was the Team B report, the second, the opposition to
Paul Wamke in his confirmation hearings, and the third, opposition to the ratifying of the
SALTnTreaty.2
3.3 TEAM B AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE SOVIET THREAT
High-ranking officials of the Central Intelligence Agency said their annual so-called
national estimate of Soviet Strategic objectives over the next ten years ... was more
sombre than any in more than a decade. A top level military intelligence officer who
has seen the estimate commented: "It was more than sombre - it was very grim. It flatly
states the judgement that the Soviet Union is seeking superiority over United States
forces. Theflatjudgement that that is the aim of the Soviet Union is a majority view in
the estimate. The questions begin on when they will achieve it.
[ David Binder, "New C.LA. Estimate Finds Soviet Seeks Superiority in Arms", New
York Times, Dec. 26, 1976. ] ^
This was something new. From the 1950's, up until 1976, the CIA believed that the
Soviet Union was only seeking parity with the United States, not superiority. Nor was it
believed that the Soviet leaders expected to survive and win a nuclear war with the United
States.^ Not all of those in the intelligence community viewed the Soviets in the same way
though. The CIA had, over a number of years, been coming under attack from the likes of
Air Force Major General George Keegan, and Army General Daniel Graham, as well as a
number of civilians outside of the intelligence community, such as Paul Nitze and Richard
Pipes, all of whom felt that the CIA were being soft on the Russians.^ General Graham,
who had had a number of years experience in the CIA's Office of National Estimates, and
had actually argued against the "missile gap" in the early 1960's, now argued that there
1 Jerry Sanders, o p . c i t . , p. 197.
2 Ibid.;
Richard J. Barnett, op. c i t . ,
3 Quoted in Robert Scheer, With Enough
p. 151.

4 Ibid.,
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Shovels,
Random House, NY, 1981,

p. 51.

5 Both Graham and Keegan had been influenced by the writings of Dr.
Albert Wohlstetter, then of the University of Chicago, who in his
"legends of the Arms Race", published in 1974, (see "Legends of the
Strategic Arms Race, Part 1: The Driving Engine", Strategic
Review,
Fall 1974), had examined the record of military estimates of Soviet
strategic weapons system and argued that the intelligence community
had, without exception, consistently underestimated the development
and' deployment of Soviet Strategic forces. (Daniel Graham, "The
Intelligence Mythology of Washington", Strategic
Review,
1976, p. 60;
"New Assessment Put on Soviet Threat", Aviation
Week and
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Technology,
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were "more liberals per square foot in the CIA than any other part of government", and
concluded that they were "anti-military".^
In 1974, George Keegan had dissented so strongly to the national intelligence estimates^
relating to the significance of the Soviet civil-defence programme and a new guided
missile, that he was called to make his case before the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board. Keegan was able to convince the Board's chairman Leo Cheme and the
Board of his case, and Cheme was able to persuade George Bush, then director of the
CIA, of the need for a team of outsiders to reevaluate the raw intelligence data. In the lead
up to the 1976 Presidential elections, Ronald Reagan had been making national security a
major issue in the Republican primaries, and so finally President Ford granted permission
to Bush to set up just this team, the so-called Team B, to appraise the CIA's estimates of
Soviet capabilities and intentions.^ In a break with the agency's standards of secrecy, and
without precedent, the Team B group was given access to the most sensitive intelligence
data on the Soviet Union.^
In June 1976 Bush appointed a panel of seven outsiders to go over the same classified
data that was available to the CIA and to develop their own judgement of Soviet
1 Jerry Sanders, op. cit., p. 198; In the early 1960's Daniel Graham,
then a Major, had been assigned to the Estimates Office of the
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army,
where it was his job to represent the Army intelligence in the process
of c o o r d i n a t i n g the national
intelligence estimates on
Soviet
strategic forces. Ironically, while the Air Force was advocating a
"missile gap" at this time, Graham was arguing that no such missile
gap existed. He now argued that the CIA analysts had a mind-set that
was "basically liberal, humanist, antinationalistic and antimilitary".
(Daniel Graham, "The Intelligence Mythology of Washington", op. cit.,
pp. 60-61, 64.)
2 The importance of the national intelligence estimates is that they
provide the guidance for the size and shape of the military budget,
and the strategic posture the US will assume. Keegan was convinced
that the Soviet Union had developed a massive civil defence programme
in preparation for fighting a nuclear war. In a recent interview he
claimed that photointerpreters working for him in the early 1970's had
discovered that every apartment built in the Soviet Union since 1955
had
a • large
civil
defence
shelter
underneath,
with
tunnels
interconnecting the shelters. "And in these tunnels, we found water,
electric power conduits, and a vast storage of medical supplies:
hospital-type facilities". Further, his team had found a ring of 75
underground command posts around Moscow, and similar shelters around
the other major cities. He claimed that these were 700 feet across,
covered with 100 feet of reinforced concrete, and cost US$500 billion
each to build! (William Burrows, Deep Black, Random House, New York,
1986, pp. 1-11.)
^ That the FIAB should suggest this is not very surprising. As Sanders
points out, six of the 16-member Board later became members of the
CPD; Robert Scheer, With
Enough
Shovels,
op. cit, p. 59; Jerry
Sanders, op. cit., p. 198.
^ Robert Scheer, With Enough Shovels, op. cit., p. 51.

capabilities and intentions. The group included Richard Pipes (as chairman), Paul Nitze,
Fay Kohler, and William Van Cleave, all of whom were members of the CPD, and Daniel
Graham who had just retired as Dkector of the DIA, Thomas Wolfe of the RAND
Corporation, and John Vogt Jr., a retired Air Force General. As well, there were a
number of analysts who held government positions at the time: Major General George
Keegan, Air Force Brigadier General Joseph Welch, Paul Wolfowitz of the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency, and Seymour Weiss from the State Department.^ Right from
the start die Team B exercise was far from impartial, the charge that the CIA was soft on
the Russians being taken as given even before they inspected the data. Paul Nitze and
William Van Cleave had been holding discussions for months with Eugene Rostow and
others about the need to form the CPD.2 Fred Kaplan argues that the Ford Administration
had "deliberately decided to bring in a collection of frankly right-wing Russo-phobes,
headed by Harvard historian Richard Pipes, an expert on pre-revolutionary Russia, just to
see if they could take CIA data and come to conclusions quite differentfromthose reached
by the in-house analysts".^ Pipes was unconcerned by this. As far as he was concerned
there was "no point in another, what you might call, optimistic view". While the
moderately optimistic view prevailed, the Soviet threat was being underestimated, and the
US imposing limits upon itself in the hope that the Russians would slow down. "They
haven't", argued Pipes.'®
Once the Team B members had started on their reassessment, insider reports told of
"absolutely bloody" discussions during which the Team B members accused the CIA
analysts of dealing in faulty assumptions, faulty analysis, and faulty use of intelligence.
The CIA analysts came under strong pressure to align their views with those of Team B.
Daniel Graham was reported to have told tiie CIA analysts at one point :"I don't want to
tell you guys you're going to lose your jobs if you don't get on board, but that's the way
it is".^ The two teams came together for a final meeting on December 2 and 3, 1976
before the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board to present their estimates. The
Team B members were pleased with the outcome, George Keegan reportedly saying that
he believed that the CIA analysts had shifted 180 degrees as a result of the Team B's
analysis.^
1 Jerry Sanders, op. cit., p. 199.
2 Ibid. Robert Scheer, With Enough Shovels, op. cit., pp. 56-57.
3 Fred Kaplan, Dubious Specter. A Skeptical Look at the Soviet Nuclear
Threat, Institute for Policy Studies, Washington DC, 1980, p. 13.
4 Jerry Sanders, op. cit., p. 199. In 1978, the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence reported that "The Composition of the B Team was so
structured that the outcome of the exercise was predetermined. ... The
intelligence agencies were cast inaccurately in the role of 'doves'.
(Richard Barnett, op. cit., p. 57.)
5 Ibid., pp. 199-200.
6 Ibid., pp. 200-201.

The Team B analysis was leaked to the press at the end of December. Shortly after this,
the now retired Major General George Keegan charged that the Soviet Union had already
achieved military superiority over the United States and was preparing to fight and win a
war with the United States. "I am unaware of a single important category in which the
Soviets have not established a significant lead over the United States", said Keegan. He
charged that this condition was brought about by "a failure over the last 15 years to adjust
American strategic thinking to Soviet strategy, and out of a failure of the leadership of the
American intelligence community to 'perceive the reality' of the Soviet military buildup This theme was reiterated by Graham and Van Cleave at a semmar for news
reporters from the major US news agencies held in January 1977. Van Cleave,
underscoring the Soviet superiority went on to claim that "I think it's getting to the point
that if we can make a trade with the Soviet Union of defense establishments, I'd be
heartily in favor of it". Graham backed Van Cleave up, deriding the lack of US strategy to
meet the Soviet threat, and making it clear that he would settle for nothing less that
American superiority. ^
George Keegan took this theme yet even further, by claiming that the Soviets were about
to deploy beam weapons in space. Keegan, was former head of Air Force intelligence, a
position he had resigned because the Pentagon had not accepted the assessment of his
Foreign Technology Division regarding Soviet beam weapon development.^ On March
28, 1977 Aviation Week and Space Technology reported a speech that Keegan had
made to a group of Washington newsmen under the auspices of the American Security
Council. Reiterating his claims that the intelligence community in the United States had
consistendy underestimated the Soviet threat, Keegan claimed that: "If there is a Watergate
in this country, and there has been, but ignored, it has been monumental incompetent
judgemental process in this government regarding the nature, character and growth of the
Soviet threat as it has evolved from year to year".^ One particular area about which
Keegan was concerned was the supposed development by the Soviets of technologies
which would "soon neutralize ballistic missile weapons as a threat to the Soviet Union".
According to Keegan, the Soviets, "on the basis of what I have examined, have every
expectation that well before 1980, if they don't blow themselves up - and they may - will
perceive that they have technically and scientifically solved the problem of the ballistic
missile threat".^
1 Ibid.,
2 Ibid.,
3

p. 201.
p. 202.

"Doubts

on

Soviet

Beam

Work

Dissolve",

Technology, July 28, 1980, p. 47.
4 "New Assessment Put on Soviet Threat",
5 Ibid., p. 48.

Aviation

Week and

op. cit., pp. 38-39.

Space

On May 2, again in Aviation Week, Keegan expanded upon this theme, outlining the
weapons which the Soviets were supposed to be developing for BMD. They had, Keegan
claimed, made a breakthrough in high-energy beam weapons which would soon give
them the capability to neutralize the entire US ballistic missile force.^ Administration
officials strongly disputed Keegan's claims. Carter's Defense Secretary Harold Brown
said that in his view, and that of all technically qualified people he knew it was "without
foundation, the evidence does not support the view that the Soviet's have made such a
breakthrough or indeed that they are very far along in such a direction".^ In reply to a
letter from Senator William Proxmire, Vice Admiral Bobby Inman, acting Director of the
DIA, responded that there was "no basis in available evidence to ascribe to the Soviet
Union success in development of such a weapon"; and that there was no evidence to
support the claim that "a space borne hydrogen fluoride laser, to be used as a satellite
killer, is under preparation for test".^ Unperturbed, Keegan continued to press his case,
in public appearances, numerous newspaper and magazine articles, and on December 17,
1978 in an appearance on the CBS television programme 60 Minutes. ^
The conclusions that Team B came up with were based on three assumptions: that the
Soviet Union was engaged in a massive military build up; that the Soviets had a
fundamentally different view of nuclear strategy to that of the United States; and, that the
Soviet civil defence programme was evidence of their intention to wage and win a nuclear
war.^ The assumption that the Soviets were engaged in a massive military build up was
based upon "new evidence", the CIA's revised estimate of Soviet defence spending,
which claimed to show that the Soviets had increased their military spending from 6-8
percent to 11-13 percent of GNP.^ The claims made by Team B regarding the Soviet civil
defence programme were a critical part of their argument. Daniel Graham, referring to
previous national intelligence efforts, claimed that "the largest factor that caused us to enwas putting U.S. concepts into Soviet Russian heads", especially the notion that the
Soviets rejected nuclear war as an option of policy. Team B argued that the Soviets
1 Morton Kondrake, "The General Goes Zap", The New RepubliCr
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2 Harold Brown, quoted in "Brown Comments on Beam Weapons",

Week and Space

Technology,

May 30, 1977, p. 12.
Due in Congress", Aviation

July

2,

Aviation

Weapon Hearings
Week and
Space
May 30, 1977, pp. 17-18.
4 Barry L. Thompson, "'Directed Energy' Weapons and the Strategic
Balance", Orbis,
Fall 1979, p. 703.
5 Robert Scheer, With Enough
Shovels,
op. c i t . , p. 57; Daniel Graham
concurs with this view. See Arthur Macey Cox, "Why the U.S, Since
1977, Has Been Misperceiving Soviet Military Strength", The New
York
Times, October 20, 1980, p. 19.
6 Robert Scheer, With Enough Shovels,
op. c i t . , p. 57.
3

"Beam

Technologyr

rejected the notion of mutual vulnerability, and were aiming for clear nuclear superiority
so that they could wage and win a nuclear war. According to Graham, the main reason for
the change in perception of Soviet intentions was, "the discovery of a very important
[Soviet] civil defense effort - very strong and unmistakable evidence that a big effort is on
to protect people, industry and to store food".^
The Team B interpretation of the data has not gone unchallenged. According to Arthur
Macy Cox, an ex-CIA analyst. Team B's conclusion was based on a "misinterpretation of
the facts". The notion that the Soviets had increased their defence spending was actually
wrong, he argued. The CIA's own explanation for the change in the estimates of Soviet
defence spending as a percentage of GNP was that: "The new estimate of the share of
defence in the Soviet [gross national product] is almost twice as high as the 6 to 8 percent
previously estimated. This does not mean that the impact of defense programs on the
Soviet economy has increased - only that our appreciation of this impact has changed. It
also implies that Soviet defense industries are far less efficient than formerly believed."^
Thus, there had actually been no doubling of the Soviet level of defence spending in
absolute terms, it was just that the Soviets were being credited with a higher level of
industrial efficiency than they actually possessed. A CIA report published in January
1980 concluded that during the period 1970 to 1979, the Soviet defence spending,
estimated in constant dollars, increased at an average annual rate of 3 percent, that is, at
about the same rate as the United States.^
3.4 THE FIGHT AGAINST WARNKE AND SALT II
Following on from the Team B report, the next main battie in which the CPD was
involved was a personal attack against Paul Wamke, who President Carter had nominated
to be Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and a SALT negotiator.
Wamke was charged with advocating unilateral disarmament for the United States.^ The
fight against Wamke's appointment was led by an ad hoc organization known as the
Emergency Coalition Against Unilateral Disarmament (ECAUD), which was chaired by
Daniel Graham. According to Sanders, this coalition "symbolized the growing alliance
among Cold Warriors like Nitze and Henry Jackson, CDM idealogues like Rostow and
Podhoretz, hardline dissenters in the intelligence community like Daniel Graham", and the
1 Ibid.,
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New Right. ^ With this "potent alliance" behind them, Henry Jackson and Paul Nitze
teamed up in the Senate Armed Services Committee against Wamke, the objective of their
campaign being, according to Jackson, to "weaken Wamke as an international negotiator
to the point of uselessness by holding the vote in his favor to sixty or less", the number of
votes required to ratify an arms treaty being sixty seven. The coalition's efforts were
successful, Wamke being confirmed as a SALT negotiator by a vote of onlyfifty-eightto
forty in the end.^
The third battle waged by the Committee on the Present Danger was the fight over the
signing and ratification of the SALT 11 Treaty, the CPD joining forces with the Coalition
for Peace Through Strength, an off-shoot of the American Security Council, to do so.
(The American Security Council has been referred to by some as the "heart if not the soul
of the military-industrial complex", being linked to some of the top defence contractors,
such as Honeywell Corporation, General Electric, Lockheed, and McDonnell Douglas.)
Together, they argued that the Soviets were already superior to the United States, that the
effect of SALT n would be to further tie the hands of the United States, and that the
SALT treaty represented a failure of nerve on the part of the ruling elite. In 1978, the
Coalition for Peace Through Strength launched a US$2 million effort to defeat the SALT
n Treaty. 3
The Coalition for Peace Through Strength was, according to Sanders, an ad hoc lobby
styled after the Emergency Coalition Against Unilateral Disarmament, which was not
surprising, as both originated in the American Security Council and the major arms of
both were headed by Daniel Graham. The Coalition for Peace Through Strength was
comprised of three different branches, the "congressional" and "private sector" branches,
and the "auxiliary arm" which carried out the day-to-day lobbying activities. The
congressional core included such New Right figures as Senator Jake Garn of Utah,
Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina, and neoconservatives such as Representative
Jack Kemp from New York. The "military-industrial" complex was represented by such
congressional figures such as Richard Ichord (D-Missouri), Samuel Stratton (R-New
York), and "the preponderance of Southem Rim congressmen who dominated the
Coalition as representatives of the defense-laden Sun Belt".^ The "auxiliary arm", headed
by Graham, with fellow Team B members George Keegan and William Van Cleave being
1 Organizations represented in the coalition included the American
Conservative Union, National Conservative Political Action Committee,
Conservative Caucus, Committee For Survival of a Free Congress, Young
Americans For Freedom, Young Republican National Federation and the
American Security Council. (Jerry Sanders, o p . c i t . , pp. 208-209.)
2
pp. 208-209; Richard Barnett, op. cit., pp. 50-61.
3 Richard Barnett, o p . c i t . , p. 60; Jerry Sanders, op. cit., p. 223.
4 Jerry Sanders, o p . c i t . , pp. 223, 226.
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Co-chairmen, also included fellow CPD members such as Karl Bendetsen, General L.
Lemnitzer, Clare Booth Luce, Edward Teller and Charles Burton Marshall, and New
Right figures such as Philip Crane, Phyllis Schlafly and Stefan Possony.^
The Committee on the Present Danger weighed into the fight as well, Paul Nitze, alleging
in November 1977 that the terms of the SALT II agreement, then still under negotiation,
would enable the Soviets to gain a decisive edge, and lock the United States into a
"position of inherent inferiority". In support of these claims Nitze released classified
information conceming the negotiations. Because of the prestigious membership of the
committee these arguments carried weight, getting wide media exposure and attracting
congressional attention. From early 1978 right through until the SALT 11 Treaty was
signed by Carter and Brezhnev in June 1979, the CPD kept up its campaign, churning out
a barrage of policy papers and press releases and individual members making speeches.
The message that they carried was that (i) the SALT negotiations and treaties had not
stopped Soviet expansionism, or altered their goal of world domination; (ii) the SALT
treaties had not stopped the Soviet drive for military superiority; (iii) as a consequence of
these first two, by the early to mid-1980's the United States would be unable to deter the
Soviet Union, as it would be vulnerable to a first strike attack.^
The resources that were poured into the campaign against the SALT n Treaty were
massive. At the CPD's annual meeting in December 1979, Eugene Rostow outlined the
group's activities in this campaign. This included appearances by CPD Executive and
Board members on 17 occasions during the hearings on SALT 11 held before the Senate
Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees - more than all of the other critics put
together; a series of comprehensive papers on SALT II written by Paul Nitze; the
participation of Executive and Board members in some 479 TV and radio programmes,
press conferences, public forums, briefing conferences of citizen leaders, and major
speeches; and the distribution of over 200,000 copies of the CPD's publications. The
committee is reported to have spent some US$750,000 on this campaign, even before the
treaty was signed.^
1 I b i d . r p. 22 6.
2 Ibid.r pp. 254-257.
3 The Coalition for Peace Through Strength is reported to have spent
about US$2.5 million in 1979, the American Security Council some US$3
million, the Conservative Caucus US$1 million and the American
Conservative Union around US$1.8 million to defeat SALT II. The ASC is
reported to have targeted 10 million people in its direct mail
operation, the Conservative Caucus 5 million, and the American
Conservative Union 500,000. The Coalition For Peace Through Strength,
the American Security Council, and the American Conservative Union
each produced anti-SALT films which received airplay on hundreds of TV
stations . (Jjbid., pp. 264-265.)

3.5 THE CPD WORLD VIEW
The world view espoused by most members of the CPD and the other organizations with
which the CPD was associated is based on several main premisses, starting from the
premiss that the Soviet Union is bent on world domination. It goes on: (ii) The Soviets who can't be trusted and only sign arms agreements if they act in their favour, and then
cheat on them anyway - were involved in a massive military build up under the SALT I
and II treaties, and had forged ahead of the United States, so much so that they were now
vastly superior, the United States being exposed to a "window of vulnerability", (iii) The
Soviets, being students of Clausewitz, adhere to a different strategic doctrine than the
United States, and do not espouse the theory of mutual vulnerability. This was evidenced
by the fact that the United States exposed its homeland to nuclear devastation, while the
Soviets had invested heavily in civil and ballistic missile defence, (iv) The United States,
facing the Soviet threat found itself in very much the same position as Britain, facing the
German threat at the end of the 1930's. Thus, to follow the course of the arms controllers
would be tantamount to appeasement and would be taken advantage of by the Soviet
menace. Instead, the US should move back to the policy of containment, by achieving
military superiority, and thus needed to embark on a massive military build up.
The CPD members remained firm in the conviction that the East and West were locked in
implacable conflict, the Cold War going on ad infinitum . Paul Nitze, when asked in an
interview how the world of the 1970's differed to that from the early years of the Cold
War replied that the "basic intentions of the Soviet Union - the drive for expansion and
global hegemony - remained unchanged".^ Richard Pipes had an explanation for this. He
claimed that it was because the Russian Revolution had removed from power the Russian
bourgeoisie and installed in their place the Russian peasant, or muzhik. "And", Pipes
claimed, "the muzhik had been taught by long historical experience that cunning and
coercion alone insured survival: one employed cunning when weak, coupled with
coercion when strong".^
Under the policy of detente, and the SALT treaties, it was claimed that the United States
had pretty much unilaterally disarmed, freezing its ICBM force at 1054 launchers and
abandoning civil defence, defence against enemy bombers, and ballistic missile defence,
and watching benignly as the Soviets moved first to parity and then to nuclear superiority
over the United States. In every category of military power the Soviet Union was claimed
1 Ibid., p. 161.
2 Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks it could Fight and Win
and Nuclear War", Commentary, p. 26; Jerry Sanders, op. cit., p. 166.

to have moved relentlessly forward, increasing both the quantity and quality of their
nuclear weapons each year. During the entire decade of the 1970's the Soviets were
claimed to have spent some three times as much as the US on defence. The SALT I treaty
had in no way constrained the Soviets, and the same could be said for SALT 11. On the
other hand, the SALT treaties had actually held the United States back. The readiness,
even eagerness on the part of the United States to accept this decline in military power
was due to the widespread acceptance of the doctrine of MAD, under which overly large
offensive forces and defences against ICBMs were held to be destabilizing. Thus, a
"window of vulnerability" had opened on the United States, through which the Soviets
may well launch an attack. ^
It was claimed by the CPD that the Soviets had a different strategic posture to that of the
United States. According to Nitze: "The Soviet leaders are careful students of Clausewitz
and his successors and pay much attention to questions of doctrine, strategy and tactics".
The Soviets were guided in their action by the "careful and continuously updated appraisal
of what they call the correlation of forces. When the correlation of forces has evolved
significandy in the Soviet's favor, their doctrine calls upon them to exploit that change to
nail down permanent gains for their side". This approach was fundamentally different to
that of the United States.^ According to Pipes, the Soviet approach held that even though
nuclear war would be extremely destructive for both parties, "its outcome would not be
mutual suicide: the country, better prepared for it and in possession of a superior strategy
could win and emerge a viable society".^ The Soviets did not want deterrence but victory,
not sufficiency in weapons but superiority, not retaliation but offensive action. Pipes
claimed.^
According to Pipes, nothing better illustrated the fundamental difference between the two
strategic doctrines than their attitudes to defence against nuclear attack. The US theory of
mutual deterrence mitigated against civil defence programmes, against ballistic missile
defences and against air defences. The Soviets, he claimed, had only agreed to limitations
on ABM after they were "unable to solve the technical problems involved and feared the
United States would forge ahead in this field". Basically it was to hold the United States
back while the Soviets carried on developments. They had developed anti-aircraft
defences, continued work on ABM systems, and were developing a serious program of
civil defence. Pipes claimed. However, the Soviet civil defence program was not
1 I b i d . , p. 36; Norman Podhoretz, "The Future Danger",
April 1981, pp. 29, 32-33.
2 Paul Nitze, "Strategy in the Decade of the 1980's". Foreign
Fall 1980, pp. 82-83.
3 Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union...", o p . c i t . , p. 21.
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exclusively for the protection of ordinary citizens, its chief function being to protect the
political and military leaders, industrial managers and skilled workers - those who could
reestablish the Soviet system after the successful prosecution of nuclear war.^
The situation that the United States faced in the late 1970's was reminiscent of that faced
by Britain in the 1930's, Rostow, and many of the other CPD members claimed. "The
pressure of Soviet policy is increasing steadily, but the perception of the threat in the West
has been diminishing. This strange psychological phenomenon is the heart of our foreign
policy problem today", Rostow said.2 According to Podhoretz an "unhealthy pacifism"
had entered the US since the Vietnam War, similar to that which characterized England of
the 1920's and 1930's, and there was a danger that the US might surrender to the Soviet
Union without a war even. (To think of Hitler with nuclear weapons, Podhoretz claimed,
one need only think of the Russians.) Podhoretz took this theme to the ridiculous by
arguing that the root cause of this erosion of will was homosexuality.^ Pipes argued that
when this kind of thinking becomes prevalent, "a nation loses the freedom to act in selfdefense: psychologically, the white flag of surrender is up and sending unmistakable
signals to the adversary". It would incite the Soviets to "keep on increasing their nuclear
preponderance, given that the greater their theoretical capability too destroy the United
States, the louder voices in the United States demanding that accommodation with the
Soviet Union be made the 'paramount' objective of national policy", he claimed.
Rather than surrender the members of the CPD counseled that the US should strive to
reassert military superiority and to reimpose the doctrine of containment militarism. Daniel
Graham, for one, reflected enthusiastically on the containment doctrine: "The containment
strategy was the first and last strategy to be devised by the United States or Nato as a
whole in the post-Worid War 11 period. It operated to the great advantage of the West until
the late 1960's when it was replaced by a concept which came to be called detente".^
Graham didn't agree that "military superiority is not important... if you want to make that
case, that it doesn't do any good then one has to make the case that it didn't do us any
good at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, and it certainly did us good. And I don't
think there are many analysts who would believe that if the Cuban missile crisis should
come off today that the end result would be the same, given today's strategic balance".^
1 Ibid.r
2 Ibid.,
3 Ihid.,
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The CPD called for military superiority at the conventional, tactical and strategic levels of
warfare. They called for an increase of some US$260 billion in the firstfiveyears of the
1980's to pay for the MX, the Trident 11 submarine, the B-1 Bomber, as well as
modernization and improvements in the Minuteman system. Nitze argued for: "curing the
inadequate survivability of our land-based ballistic missiles and enhancing the power of
those that can be expected to survive, proceeding with the modernization of the
submarine-based component of our strategic deterrent, replacing our aging B-52's,
rebasing our bombers at greater distances from the coasts, equipping them with high
performance cruise and self-defense missiles, and assuring the survivability and
endurance of our command, control, communication and intelligence".^
3.6 LINKS BETWEEN THE CPD AND THE SPACE WEAPONS LOBBY.
The ideology of the members of the 'space-weapons lobby' is just that of the Committee
on the Present Danger. This is not very surprising, as some of the leading members of the
'space-weapons lobby' were also leading members of the CPD and other closely aligned
organizations.
Several members of the 'laser lobby' at least were also members of the CPD or
organizations which had the same outlook. Both Jake Gam and Jack Kemp were
members of the Coalition For Peace Through Strength, and Henry Jackson of the
Emergency Coalition Against Unilateral Disarmament, both of which were set up under
the auspices of the American Security Council. A number of the members of the 'Madison
Group' were also members of the CPD: Seymour Weiss, who had been a Team B
member, Charles Kupperman, William Van Cleave and Richard Perie. Perhaps the
clearest example of links to the CPD is provided by the High Frontier organization. Daniel
Graham himself was almost 'Mr. CPD'. He was a member of Team B, was chairman of
the Emergency Coalition Against Unilateral Disarmament, and Co-Chairman of the
Coalition For Peace Through Strength, as well as being on the Board of Directors of the
CPD. Karl Bendetsen was also on the Board of Directors of the CPD, as were Frank
Barnett (President of the National Strategy Information Center), and Edward Teller.
Bendetsen and Teller were also members of the Coalition For Peace Through Strength.
From the Hudson Institute, both Donnald Brennan and Colin Gray were on the Board of
Directors of the CPD.2
1 I b i d . , pp. 279-280; Paul Nitze, "Strategy in the Decade
1980's", op.
clt.f
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2 Jerry Sanders, op.
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Not only was it the case that leading members of the 'space-weapons lobby' were closely
aligned with the Committee on the Present Danger, but the Reagan Administration was as
well, Reagan himself joining, and being appointed to its executive committee in January
1979. All up, during the presidential campaign and the transition process, forty six
members of the CPD served on Reagan's advisory task force. At the core of this task
force with responsibility for foreign and military policy were CPD members Richard
Allen, Jeane Kirkpatrick, William Van Cleave, Richard Pipes, Daniel Graham and
Seymour Weiss. After Reagan had been elected, the CPD maintained its influence, with
some 51 members of Reagan's Administration having served on the Board of Directors of
the CPD.i
Thus, it can be seen that the ideology of ballistic missile defense in space is that of the
Committee on the Present Danger, it is the ideology of American nuclear superiority, the
ideology of nuclear war fighting, of 'peace through strength' rather than that of peace
through nuclear disarmament and diplomacy. In 'peace through strength', 'strength' was
much more important than peace. In many ways, the 'space-weapons lobby' was the
result of a dispute within the Committee on the Present Danger over just how this military
superiority could be most effectively gained. On the one side were those like Rostow and
Nitze who argued that the United States needed to indulge in a massive build-up of
offensive nuclear weapons with counterforce capabilities. On the other side were the
members of the 'space-weapons lobby', who argued that the short cut to nuclear
superiority was to build a defensive shield to effectively disarm the Soviet Union, and to
harden American resolve to actually use the nuclear weapons that they had. They argued
that a massive build-up of offensive weapons would be too expensive and would
eventually lose public support.
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CH. 4: THE PENTAGON AND THE PUSH FOR
BMD

4.1 INTRODUCTION

According to the model of the way in which military technology is shaped in the United
States developed in section 1.2, it would be expected that, given that the proposals being
put forward by the 'space weapons lobby' were, in a sense revolutionary, the armed
services would tend to act as a conservative force and attempt to oppose the development
and deployment of exotic space-based ballistic missile defence systems, or at least to
integrate these systems within their own frameworks. Certainly both Daniel Graham of
High Frontier and Malcolm Wallop of the 'laser lobby' realized that they were likely to
run into stiff opposition from those in the armed services who were intent on protecting
their own turf.
Also, with the development of new technologies, there is the potential that interservice
rivalry will come into play, in this instance between the Army and the Air Force^ who had
fought a number of bureaucratic battles in the 1950's over the air defence and ballistic
missile defence missions. By the late 1970's the Army had a ballistic missile defence
system for the point defence of missile silos based on "conventional" technologies in the
advanced stage of development. Similarly, the Air Force was preparing to deploy an
antisatellite system based on 'conventional' technologies. Both the Army and the Air
Force were conducting research and development programmes on the more exotic beam
technologies. The technologies used for these two missions were similar and the area of
space-based defence against ballistic missiles was a potential area of conflict between the
Army and the Air Force.
In this chapter I shall consider the development of the antiballistic missile defence mission
by the Army and the antisatellite mission by the Air Force. Also, I will consider the more
exotic beam weapon programmes that were being conducted by both the Air Force and the
Army, to place the development of space-based weapons within their institutional and
historical context. I shall also consider a major point of overlap between the interests of
the Air Force and the Army - the basing of the MX intercontinental ballistic missile. As
we have already seen, the MX was considered by most in the 'space weapons lobby' and
most in the Committee on the Present Danger as being the key to American security. It
tums out that the fortunes of ballistic missile defence were intimately connected with the
1 The terms Army and Air Force are used here as a form of short hand.
It is not meant to imply that they are single actors. The position
that the Army say takes on a certain issue is the result of a
bureaucratic struggle between units within the Army.

basing mode that would eventually be chosen for the MX. Finally, I shall consider the
way in which the Army and the Air Force reacted to the proposals that were put forward
by the 'laser lobby' and by High Frontier.
4.2 THE ARMY AND THE BMD MISSION
The mission of ballistic missile defence (BMD) has belonged to the US Army from the
late-1950's, and was a carryover from its air defence mission. Not only has BMD come
to be considered peculiar to the Army, but it has also served to differentiate the Army
from the Air Force in the area of strategic nuclear weapons. By the late 1970's the Army
had established an organization that was responsible for the development of ballistic
missile defence systems, and had quite a long history of such development.
In 1945 the Army initiated Project Nike, awarding contracts to Bell Telephone
Laboratories and Western Electric to develop a system to defend the United States against
attack by enemy aircraft. This system involved a network of radars linked to computers
which would track and identify the incoming aircraft and fire surface-to-air missiles which
would detonate within a lethal radius of the aircraft. In the following decade, the Army
deployed two such air defence systems, the Nike-Ajax and Nike-Hercules.^ The Army
did not have the air defence mission all to itself at this stage though, as the other services
had also developed air defence systems - the Air Force the Bormac, and the Navy the
Talos systems. The Army did not take over all the air defence mission until November
1956, when it was given control of the Navy Talos system and other point defence
systems with ranges out to 100 nautical miles.^
In May 1946, a board of scientists recommended to the Army that it build an ABM
system.^ However, it was not until about a decade later that the Army acted upon this
advice. By 1953, the prospect of a Soviet missile force began to loom large and the Army
asked Bell Telephone Labs to investigate the feasibility of a defence against ICBMs. By
1956, Bell had concluded that a modified Nike-Hercules system would be able to perform
this task, and in 1957 the Army established the Nike-Zeus project. The Nike-Zeus BMD
system consisted of a battery of nuclear-armed interceptor missiles linked to a set of huge
radars which were used to track the incoming warheads and to guide the interceptors.
"From that time on", Allison and Morris argue, "the Army consistently advocated
1 Graham T. Allison & Frederick A. Morris, "Armaments and Arms Control:
Exploring the Determinants of Military Weapons", Daedalusf Vol. 10 4,
1975, p. 114.
2 Desmond Ball, "Strategic Defences: Concepts and Programs", Working
Paper No. 99, The Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Canberra,
March 1986, p. 23.
3 Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, Touchstone, 1983, p. 343.

deployment of a large ABM system to defend the population against a major Soviet
attack".!
The Army's determination to push its ABM mission was derived from several factors.
Firsdy, the ABM mission, embodied within the Nike-Zeus project, was a follow-on from
the Army's air defence mission which was embodied within Nike-Hercules.^ Secondly,
during the 1950's the Army had surrendered much of its share of the budget to the Air
Force and Navy, and had lost out in the competition for control of strategic nuclear
weapons, the Air Force and the Navy capturing the strategic offensive missions. In 1958,
the Air Force was given operational control of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency's
Jupiter-C intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM), the Army's hope for a piece of the
strategic-nuclear action. The Army was limited to only tactical nuclear missiles but
retained responsibility for ballistic missile defence, perhaps largely because the Air Force
was not interested in this mission. For the Army ballistic missile defence seemed to be its
last chance for a strategic nuclear role.^
Right from its early days the Army's BMD programme was plagued with trouble. In 1958
the Pentagon's Reentry Body Identification Group (RBIG), a panel of scientists and
engineers, concluded that Nike-Zeus simply would not work if confronted with a
dedicated nuclear attack. If the Soviets were to build a missile fitted with several warheads
then the ABM system would become "saturated" and would let a number of the warheads
through. Also, they concluded that it could be defeated with decoys, and that the large
radars were vulnerable to attack and could be blacked out by atmospheric nuclear blasts.
Even worse, because the system itself relied on nuclear warheads, it would black itself
out. These conclusions were reinforced in May 1959, when a panel appointed from
Eisenhower's Presidential Science Advisory Committee (PSAC), prepared a secret report
on the feasibility of ABM.^
The RBIG and the PSAC reports provided a setback to the Army, which was keen to
move the Nike-Zeus project into production. But it was limited to research and
! G. T. Allison & F. A. Morris, "Armaments and Arms Control
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development only. When John Kennedy became President the Army made a "big push"
for deployment of Nike-Zeus system consisting of seventy missile batteries (7,000
missiles), to defend twenty-seven areas in the U.S. and Canada. This system was initially
endorsed by Kennedy's Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, albeit on a smaller scale twelve batteries with 1,200 missiles defending six cities. It was thought that the system,
even though not perfect, would deter the Soviets from launching an attack, and might
protect the United States from an accidental nuclear attack by the Soviets, and from
attacks by small nuclear powers such as China. Kennedy, who had been briefed by his
Science adviser Jerome Wiesner, and by the Director of ARPA Jack Runia - respectively
the chair of PSAC's 1959 ABM panel and a member of RBIG - had decided, by
November 1961, against the deployment of Nike-Zeus.^
At the same time, the Army was working on a new ABM system called Nike-X, which
incorporated a "phased-array" radar, and a dual missile system - a long-range missile that
came to be called Spartan, which could intercept incoming warheads in space, and a
short-range missile called Sprint, which would intercept warheads once they entered the
atmosphere, thus making it easier to get around the decoy problem. However, the
scientists pointed out that the fundamental problems with the system still remained.^
Robert McNamara had come to change his mind about the wisdom of ABMs, but there
was still strong pressure from the Army, from the entire Joint Chiefs of Staff and from
their powerful allies on Capitol Hill, such as Senators Richard Russell, John Stennis and
Henry Jackson. Although McNamara found it politically impossible to kill the Nike-X
project outright, he tried to buy off its advocates by spending up to half a billion dollars a
year on research and development. By 1966, the Army had been given enough to develop
an ABM system geared for widespread deployment, and had kept the pressure up, placing
the President, now Lyndon Johnson in a political bind. Johnson was "torn between the
arguments of his Secretary of Defense and the judgement of the entire military
establishment". In mid-1967 he finally ordered McNamara to fund production of the
Nike-X system. McNamara announced the decision to deploy a limited ABM system now called Sentinal - on September 18, 1967, claiming that it was largely to protect
against the Chinese threat.^
McNamara's speech sparked a national debate over ABM, the first shot being fired by
Hans Bethe and Richard Garwin in an article in the May 1968 edition of Scientific
American. The article pointed to the problems which had been identified by the RBIG
1 Ibid.,
2
Ibid.
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and PSAC committees, and argued that the offence could counter the defence at lower
cost. By the summer of 1968, a group of Senators - including Edward Kennedy, William
Fullbright, Albert Gore, George McGovem, Frank Church, Mark Hatfield and Stuart
Symmington had teamed up with scientists such as Hans Bethe, Richard Garwin, George
Kistiakowsky, Jerome Wiesner, Sidney Drell, Wolfgang Panofsky, Jack Runia, and
George Rathjens (many of whom were members of the 1959 PSAC panel or of RBIG),
to oppose the Sentinal system, and the prospects for deployment began to look grim.^
When Richard Nixon became President, in early 1969, he refocused the ABM debate by
announcing that the Sentinal ABM system was scrapped, and that a new system called
Safeguard would be deployed, not to protect cities, but to defend Minuteman silos, a less
ambitious task. Safeguard was a two tiered layered defence system very much similar to
the Sentinal system, which would use Sprint and Spartan missiles to intercept the
incoming warheads.^ By 1971, the Nixon Administration was justifying the Safeguard
system to Congress mainly for its value as a 'bargaining chip' in the Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks that were then in progress with the Soviets. On May 24, 1972, the US
and the USSR concluded the SALT I Agreement and signed the ABM Treaty, limiting
each side to two ABM sites of no more than 100 missiles. In 1974 this was further limited
to one ABM site, and in 1975 the US dismantled its single site altogether,^
Even though the deployment of ballistic missile defences had been limited by the 1972
ABM Treaty, research and development continued throughout the 1970's, with an
estimated US$250 million being spent per year to develop new systems.'^ The two
systems which had gained prominence by the end of the 1970's were known as the Low
Altitude Defense System (LoADS) and the Homing Overlay system, both of which had
grown out of the Safeguard system that had been abandoned in the mid 1970's.
The starting point for the development of LoADS is the Site Defense system which was
designed primarily for the defence of Minuteman silos and was itself an improvement
upon the Safeguard system. It differed from Safeguard in that it used small 'multiple
netted' radars, high-capacity commercial computers, a low-cost version of the Sprint
endoatmospheric nuclear-armed interceptor, preferential defence firing doctrine and a
sophisticated discrimination capability. Site Defense was strictly a R&D programme, as it
was carried out largely after the signing of the ABM Treaty, and was oriented toward
1 Ibid.r pp. 349-350.
2 ibid.r p. 350.
3 Ibid.r p. 354.
^ Richard Burt, "After Almost a Decade, the ABM Dispute Resumes",
York Times, 30 August, 1980, p. 5.
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prototype demonstrations at the Kwajalein Missile Range until Congress terminated it in
1975.1 The Terminal Defense System (TDS), was, in turn, an outgrowth of the Site
Defense programme. It seems to have been very much similar to the Site Defense system,
employing a General Electric phased-array radar linked to a Control Data Corp. 7700
computer which ran complex software developed by TRW Systems. It was designed to
intercept incoming warheads at an altitude of 200,000 feet and to have a detection to
impact time of 15 seconds. Validation work on TDS was scheduled to be completed by
the end of 1980.^ The LoADS system was an improvement upon the TDS system,
designed to intercept warheads below 50,000 feet and to have a detection to impact time
of less than 10 seconds. Its phased array radar is about one-fortieth the size of the TDS
radar and it has a single stage interceptor half the size of the TDS interceptor.^
The LoADS system was designed to operate in conjunction with the Multiple Protective
Shelter (MPS) basing mode for the MX missile. The system would employ a single-stage
interceptor missile about 15 feet long armed with a nuclear warhead which, using an
internal guidance system and a terminal homing sensor, would travel at hypersonic speeds
to intercept nuclear warheads at altitudes below 50,000 feet. A small phased array radar in
a capsule would be used in conjunction with the interceptor missile, and whenever the
MX missiles were moved, the interceptor missiles and their accompanying radars would
also be moved. ^ Martin-Marietta, which had developed the Sprint interceptor for the
Safeguard system was to design the smaller, single-stage interceptor for LoADS.
McDonnell Douglas, which served as the Safeguard system integrator was to serve as the
system integrator for LoADS as well.^ Beyond this system, the Army was also working
on optics technology for terminal homing and non-nuclear warhead applications but,
because of the speed of the interceptor within the atmosphere, the technology was, at the
end of tiie 1970's, beyond tiie state of the art.^
In the early 1980's, the Army's Ballistic Missile Defense Systems Command had plans to
demonstrate a pre-prototype LoADS system by the mid-1980's. The House Armed
1 Carol

Planning New Antimissile Defense System",
September 1980, p. 11; Benjamin M. Elson,
"Kwajalein Range Plays Unique Role", Aviation
Week and
Space
Technology(AWST,)
June 16, 1980, p. 227.
2 Carol Feinman, "Army Planning New ...", op. c i t . ,
pp. 10-11;
"Demonstration Planned for MX Defense System", AWST, June 16, 1980, p.

Defense

220.

Feinman,

Electronics^

"Army

3 Carol Feinman, "Army Planning New ...", o p . c i t . , p. 11.
4 Clarence A. Robinson, "U.S. to Test ABM System With MX", AWST, March
19, 1979, p. 24.
5 "Demonstration Planned for MX Defense System", AWST, June 16, 1980,
p. 220.

6

Ibid.

Services Committee, in a report released in early 1980, gave the LoADS plan a strong
endorsement and urged the Army to expedite the programme. According to the House
committee, the Department of Defense needed to structure a BMD programme that would
"produce a demonstrated BMD capability that can be deployed in a time-frame responsive
and reactive to the [Soviet] threat". In the committee's view, the length of time then
needed to deploy an effective BMD system was excessive.^ The Army requested US$36
million in FY 1981 with which to start the development of the technology for LoADS and
projected that it would need about US$92 million for the program in FY 1982.2
In the 1960's the Army, under the Homing Interceptor Technology (HIT) project, funded
the Vought Corporation to develop a non-nuclear interceptor missile which was initially
conceived as an antisatellite weapon. The Army's programme in the 1970's to develop a
new exoatmospheric interceptor was based partly on this HIT programme, and partly on
the Spartan interceptor which formed part of Safeguard.^ Safeguard's exoatmospheric
system used ground-based radars and so it was not possible to discriminate effectively
between the incoming nuclear warheads and its accompanying booster fragments and
decoys. This required the Spartan missile to have a nuclear warhead. The new approach
sought to overcome these limitations by substituting electro-optical sensors in space for
the radar. This, in tum, meant that non-nuclear interceptors could be used.'^
The Homing Overlay programme was conducted by the Army's Ballistic Missile Defense
Systems Command under the Systems Technology Program (STP), with Lockheed
Missiles and Space Company acting as the prime contractor. The interceptor was to
consist of the first two stages of a modified US AF/Boeing Minuteman booster and a third
reaction-controlled homing and kill stage. The interceptor was to carry an infrared sensor
made by Honeywell, on-board data processing, and a non-nuclear kill device made by
Lockheed, that resembled a folded umbrella. An alternative non-nuclear kill interceptor,
designed to eject metal pellets to produce concentric circles was also being developed by
Honeywell.^ Before the Homing Overlay interceptor was launched an electro-optical
sensing device would be launched into space to acquire and track the incoming warheads.
This "ballistic trajectory probe vehicle" would be linked to a ground control centre which
1 I b i d . ; "House Unit Backs Low-Altitude ABM Effort", AWST,
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would control the launch of the exoatmospheric interceptors. The technology for this
probe was being developed by Boeing and Hughes Aircraft under the Designating Optical
Tracker (DOT) programme.^
The Homing Overlay system was considered to have a greater degree of technical risk
than the LoADS system, as it employed newer, yet-to-be-proved technology. It was being
developed to complement the LoADS system, and could be deployed with LoADS in a
two-tiered layered defence system. While LoADS was considered to be suitable for the
defence of MX missiles, layered defence was considered to be suited to the defence of
"softer" military targets, such as SAC bases.^ In addition to LoADS and Homing
Overlay, the Army also had a programme known as "Quick Shot" which aimed to develop
a small, relatively inexpensive hypervelocity missile for possible use in a "salvo-fired"
very-low-altitude terminal defence system,^
The Army's Ballistic Missile Defense Agency (BMDA) seems to have played a major role
in pushing for the development and deployment of its LoADS and Homing Overlay BMD
systems. Starting in 1978, the BMDA began conducting a series of seminars in
Washington. These seminars were attended by officials from the Pentagon and State
Department, consultants from a variety of defence think tanks and aides to key Senators
and members of Congress. Not surprisingly, the seminars were described as having "a
definite pro-ABM slant" by one of the congressional aides who attended. One of the
BMDA seminars, held in the Madison Hotel in Washington on September 18-19, 1979,
was tided "The Future of U.S. Land-Based Strategic Forces". The 60 or so participants
were treated to a series of conservative defence speakers on the US and Soviet forces
concluding with a presentation on "BMD's role in national survival, a first assessment".^
The Army's Ballistic Missile Defense Command was also involved in a number of
research and development projects on particle-beams and high-energy laser weapons.
These programmes were funded at a much lower level than LoADS and Homing Overlay,
and their technologies were at a much less advanced stage of development. In 1981, the
responsibility for the particle-beam projects was shifted from the Ballistic Missile Defense
Agency (BMDA) to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), but the
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BMDA remained as the agent for DARPA in contracting and maintaining particle beam
technology work, and as a technical adviser.^
There were two particle-beam programmes which were transferred to DARPA. First, was
an "autoresonant accelerator" designed to produce charged-particle beams of high-energy
ions for use in the point defence of missile silos.2 Second, was the "White Horse"
programme at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, which aimed to produce a neutral
hydrogen beam by accelerating a beam of negative hydrogen ions using a "radio
frequency quadropole linear accelerator", and passing this beam through a chargeexchange cell. Under the programme, a 5-MeV test stand accelerator was being
constructed initially, followed by an advanced accelerator test stand operating between 50
and 100-MeV. In 1981, it was being predicted that, if successful, this programme would
enable scaling to 500-MeV and packaging of the accelerator for space-basing providing a
"neutral-beam weapon for ballistic missile defense in the 1990's".^ Funding cuts in 1980
delayed the construction of the "White Horse" test accelerator for about two years as
DARPA had a commitment to the Triad chemical laser programme, and the Navy's "Chair
Heritage" particle beam programme.^
The Army was also involved with three laser weapon programmes. First was a tin-oxide
chemical laser, being developed by Bell Aerospace. Approximately US$250,000 per year
was being devoted to this project with a demonstration planned for 1983. Second was an
electric-discharge eximer laser being developed by Westinghouse, which used xenonfluoride gas as the lasing medium and an x-ray source to start the process. Some
US$300,000 per year was being devoted to this project in the early 1980's. Third was a
colspan vibrational electric transition laser device in which an electron beam was used to
'pump' a gaseous mixture of nitrous oxide and a cyanogen to produce the laser beam.
This project was being funded at approximately US$250,000 per year.^
4.3 THE MX MISSILE BASING DEBATE AND BMD
The MX missile evolved from the Strat-X study begun in 1967 and was conceived as a
mobile ICBM to supplement the fixed silo-based missiles. Development of the MX began
in 1972 but over $120 million was spent prior to that time looking at various schemes for
basing the mobile missile. By 1974, a wide spectrum of possible basing modes existed.
1 "Army Beam Programmes Moving to DARPA", AWST^ August 4, 1980, p. 51.
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ranging from road and rail mobile basing, to basing in shelters and trenches, and
extending to waterproof missile pods on the bottoms of ponds and reservoirs as well as
missiles in blimps and dirigibles. The basing of MX missiles in large transport planes was
also considered a viable option, a demonstration launch of a Minuteman missile taking
place in 1974.i Most of these concepts were rejected before being subjected to detailed
cost-effectiveness analysis. ^
By the late 1970's four basing modes for the MX remained as strong contenders - a
buried trench system, an air mobile system, a system of vertical multiple protective
structures (MPS), and a system of horizontal MPS.^ The Air Force was directed to make
a detailed study of the buried trench concept in October 1976. In this basing mode, 300
MX missiles would be deployed in concrete-enclosed trenches hardened to 200 psi and
covered with five feet of earth - some 42 feet wide, 21 feet deep, and 10-12 mñes long along which the mdssile's Transporter/Launcher would travel at random. The Pentagon
planned to construct these trenches in the Southwest United States where there is an
abundance of desert area and where they expected less resistance from environmental
groups.^ A cheaper version of this scheme was the hybrid trench in which there would be
one main trench of minimum hardness from which 20-25 hardened spurs would break
off. The missile would be based in one of these spurs.^ This scheme was dropped by the
Air Force in November 1977 because it was considered that it would be too easy for the
Soviets to destroy, it would be too expensive, and because test results had not been
encouraging.^
The Pentagon began a new study, and in May of 1978 vertical shelters emerged as the
favourite scheme, firstly known as Multiple Aim Point (MAP), but eventually known as
Multiple Protective Structure (MPS). The Air Force Space and Missiles Systems
Organization (SAMSO) and the MX Basing Ad Hoc Working Group of the Air Force
Systems Command conducted studies in 1978 which concluded that 200 MX missiles
could be deployed in some 4,500 vertical shelters each one hardened to 600 psi and
spaced about 7,000 feet apart. The shelters would be sited in the Great Basin of Nevada
and Utah, and the highlands of Arizona and New Mexico, at an estimated cost of US$30
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billion. The Air Force recommended to the Secretary of Defense in December 1978 that
such a system be built and be operational by 1986.^
In early 1979 the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) directed the Air
Force to review a number of air-mobile concepts, as well as further refining the vertical
MPS concept. The review study which the Air Force presented to the Secretary of
Defense on 31 March 1979 involved the acquisition of between 210 and 290 wide-body
jets or short-take-off-and-landing transports. Each of these aircraft, containing an MX
missile, would be stationed at one of five principal Air Force bases. During a missile
alert, the aircraft would become airbome or be shutded among some 4,500 small airports.
This concept was pushed throughout the spring of 1979 by the President's Science
Adviser and the Office of Science and Technology Policy, but was eventually rejected
because it was more expensive than the ground mobile concepts and because of certain
technical problems and operationalrisks.^
The fourth system, the horizontal MPS system, although never as comprehensively
analysed as the altematives, was the one eventually chosen on 5 September 1979, at a full
meeting of the National Security Council presided over by President Carter. A decision
was made to begin full engineering development of the system.^ The so-called 'race track'
system consisted of 200 closed-loop roads (one for each missile) with each having 23
spurs leading into horizontal shelters hardened to 600 psi and spaced approximately 7000
feet apart. The MX missile would be carried horizontally in its launch canister (some 120
feet long and 12 feet in diameter) on a transporter-erector-launch vehicle (TEL), a sixaxle, 24 wheeled vehicle which would weigh 670,000 pounds. In addition the TEL
would carry a 140,000 pound 'modesty shield', designed to prevent satellite observation
of the missile canister and its placement in any particular shelter. The missile loops were
to be located in southem Utah and Nevada.^
The Air Force was not in favour of the horizontal MPS system arguing that it was less
survivable than its preferred vertical MPS mode. The NSC opted in favour of the
horizontal basing mode because, argues Ball, of two considerations. Firstly, the NSC
staff wanted to ensure that there would be no infringement "of the principles regarding
either ICBM mobility of national technical means of verification ... that had been
negotiated in SALT". They were concerned that the Soviet reconnaissance satellites might
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not be able to properly verify that an empty silo did not contain a missile. Secondly, the
horizontal MPS system had greater mobility than the vertical system and would be less
vulnerable. 1 Under the vertical shelter system, it would take one hour just to lower a
missile into its silo, and about two days to relocate the entire MX force. Under the race
track proposal, the missiles could be driven straight into their shelters, and the entire
missile force could be relocated in 12 hours. In the event of a nuclear attack in which the
shelter containing the MX missile was targeted, it would be possible with the race track
system to 'dash' the MX missile to an untargeted shelter.^
Another possibility for MX basing was the use of ballistic missile defence to protect the
MX missiles in their shelters. This option was considered by the Carter Administration,
but it was not preferred because such a system would have abrogated the 1972 ABM
Treaty. In a statement in February 1979, Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering, William Perry, indicated that: "Ballistic missile defense is limited by the
ABM Treaty, which allows the use of only 100 interceptors. Abandonment of the ABM
Treaty would introduce a number of new problems, even if it eased our concerns about
ICBM vulnerability".^ Perry added that the US did maintain a "high technological level"
in BMD capability which may, in future "provide an enhanced survivability posture for
our ICBM force"but pointed out at a later date that BMD would only be an option that
would be considered "in a virtually incredible all-out arms race".^
Right from the start. Carter's race track basing proposal ran into problems. As already
mentioned, massive opposition to this basing mode arose in both Utah and Nevada. In
March 1980, Governors Scott Matheson (Utah) and Robert List (Nevada) came out
jointly against the deployment of MX in their states. They objected to the impact of the
MX project on the "water supply, grazing and pasture land, and the area's fragile
ecostructure, as well as the violation of the sacred lands of the Shoshone Indians and the
inability of the area to absorb a large influx of people".® The Defense Department
considered resiting the race track system in the southem high plains area of West Texas
and New Mexico. However, this area was far less desirable because the land was made
up "almost entirely of small, privately owned lots, a factor that would engage the
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department in lengthy, and potentially costly, negotiations. The great basin of Utah and
Nevada consists of public lands''.^
On May 6,1980, Carter's Defense Secretary Harold Brown, responding to the opposition
to the MX basing plan, announced that the closed loop race track had been replaced by a
linear race track system. There would still be the same number of missiles and shelters but
the spurs to those shelters would now branch off of existing country roads. This would
use less land and eliminate the need for additional road constmction. A new shelter design
was also adopted - the so-called "loading dock" concept. Rather than having a complete
TEL drive into the shelter, only the erector-launcher system containing the missile would
be off-loaded. The transporter would also provide the necessary shielding, eliminating the
need for a shield vehicle and making the shelters smaller since they did not have to
accommodate the transporter.^
During 1980, yet another MX basing plan was being hatched, this time at Los Alamos
National Laboratory in New Mexico. Early in 1980 Senator Pete Domenici, Chair of the
Budget Committee had asked the Los Alamos Lab to examine the prospects for BMD
technology. The Los Alamos study, released in June 1980 is reported to have concluded
that: "ballistic missile defenses could play a timely and vital role in national strategic
policy". If the Army's LoADS system were combined with the homing overlay system ,
the study concluded, even a large-scale Soviet nuclear strike could be .neutralized.^
Donald Kerr, Director of Los Alamos, and Robert Kupperman, echoing the Los Alamos
study team proposed that "MX launchers be built and placed in existing Minuteman silos;
that a fraction of these launchers have nuclear payloads as their front ends; and that the
remainder be outfitted with ... anti-ballistic missile payloads. The ICBM force could be
further defended by a localized missile defense, known as LoADS, intended to destroy
Soviet warheads which had leaked through the initial defense".'' This concept apparently
appealed to Republican Senators such as Paul Laxalt (Nevada), who was very close to
Reagan, and to Domenici.^
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In early 1981, the need for an ABM system to protect the MX missile in the MPS basing
mode was being discussed in the Senate. This discussion focussed on three questions: the
vulnerability of the MX missile; if vulnerable, whether or not the LoADS system should
be added to protect the MX; whether the LoADS system could be used "to lessen the
impact on Nevada and Utah" of the race track basing mode, "by providing defense of MX
missiles in existing" Minuteman silos; and, whether or not the Senate was willing to forgo
the ABMTreaty.i
When the Reagan Administration came to power it inherited the MX basing debacle. This
administration was opposed to President Carter's basing plan but had a very strong
commitment to the MX missile and was desperate to find a solution to the basing
problem. The Reagan Administration did not have the same commitment to arms control
that the Carter Administration had, so ballistic missile defence became a more serious
contender as a complement to any MX basing mode. At first the Reagan Administration
gave only a lukewarm response to the use of LoADS to protect the MX missile. When
Senator Proxmire wrote to Caspar Weinberger during his confirmation hearings asking
about his plans to use HMD to protect the MX, Weinberger responded that he believed
that "we must look very carefully at ABM technology. An effective ABM system may be
needed in the event the Soviets increase substantially the number of their hard target-kill
capable warheads. If we were to achieve a significant breakthrough in the ABM area, we
might - after extensive study - be able to deploy MX in fixed silos protected by ABM".2
When Reagan sent his revised defense budget to Capitol Hill in early March 1981 it
included a US$129 million increase in spending for ABM development.^
In the early days of the Administration the Pentagon began pushing Weinberger to
reactivate the abandoned ABM system at Grand Forks, North Dakota. Seymour Zeiberg,
Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Space and Strategic Systems and a number of his
fellow strategists, devised a plan to deploy 70 long range and 30 short range missiles to
protect the Air Force warning radar at Concrete, North Dakota, They argued to
Weinberger, and to some members of Congress in a secret briefing, that the radar at
Concrete was so vital that it was worth protecting, and further that such a deployment
would help to focus the Pentagon's currentiy diverse ABM research programme. This
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could be done without abrogating the 1972 ABM treaty. Weinberger said at the time that
he was "not leaning any way" on the proposal, but "certainly considering it".^
On July 1, 1981, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger appointed a 15-member "blue
ribbon" panel. Chaired by University of California physicist Charles Townes, to study
alternative basing modes for the MX missile.^ This panel examined many ideas for basing
the MX, including the Carter plan, but came to the conclusion "that virtually every idea
was flawed, because the Soviets could build warheads of sufficient power and in
sufficient quantity to destroy almost any land-based target".^ The panel was in unanimous
agreement that basing MX missiles aboard airplanes and basing them deep underground
were the two most promising alternatives, but argued that an interim basing mode was
necessary. The interim mode suggested was a variation on the Carter plan and resembled
the plan put forward by the Los Alamos team in 1980.Supporters of this plan were
concerned that the Air Force, who preferred a mobile land-based plan, should not be
upset. The main idea was not to let the missile itself disappear while the new basing
altematives were being examined.^
The Air Force pushed strongly to undermine the two alternative basing modes and thus
improve the chances for its preferred basing mode, keeping the chances for the Army's
BMD programme alive. The air basing idea consisted of placing the MX missiles aboard a
huge aircraft - known as Big Bird - which was to be constructed largely of plastic
reinforced with carbon fibres and powered by propeller engines. It was to get such good
fuel economy that it could stay aloft for more than three days, even while carrying up to
two missiles. The Townes panel sought independent confirmation of this proposal and
asked for a study by the Department of Defense. Weinberger directed this study to
DARPA, who had already rejected the idea once before. After less than a week the
DARPA panel, basing its work on an analysis undertaken by the Air Force, concluded
that Big Bird would weigh more than predicted, need a larger crew and would therefore
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obtain poorer mileage. The Townes panel would not accept this conclusion and awarded a
US$240,000 contract to Boeing to review the proposal. Not surprisingly, the Boeing
study team came to the conclusion that Big Bird was both technically and economically
feasible.^
The Air Force was far from pleased. Air Force commanders contacted senior Boeing
officials and asked that the results of the Boeing study be checked. Boeing, which had an
Air Force MX contract for US$1.5 billion, and stood to gain another US$8.5 billion in
follow-up contracts, ordered that the conclusions of the study be "audited". The audit
concluded that the performance of Big Bird was more uncertain than it seemed before.
Also, the Air Force, in July 1981, directed the Air Force Science Advisory Board to
review Big Bird. This panel found that Big Bird was not ready for engineering
development.2
Two forms of underground basing were proposed. Firstly, missiles would be placed in
buoyant canisters, which were lowered into narrow holes 3000-5000 feet deep, and then
covered with sand. After a nuclear attack, the sand would be saturated with water from a
storage tank buried alongside, and the missile would, supposedly, rise to the surface by
pushing its way up through the wet sand. The second concept - the "mesa/tunnel" plan was very much similar to the race track proposal except that everything would be hidden
about 3000 feet underground in an enormous outcropping of rock somewhere in the
West. In the event of a nuclear attack, the missile canisters would burrow their way to the
surface, and release their missiles. The Air Force was strongly opposed to this plan as
well. Deep underground systems in one form or another had been considered and rejected
at least 9 times in 20 years, and there was little enthusiasm for another look.^
When the Townes Panel met with Weinberger they persuaded him that some short-term
basing plan was necessary to keep the MX missile alive in Congress, otherwise it might
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be canceled or deferred. Weinberger was reported to be intrigued by both the Big Bird
and deep underground basing proposals. Even though many in the Reagan Administration
were reported to favour the interim basing scheme proposed by the Townes panel, it did
not find favour with Weinberger or Reagan, and Weinberger suggested instead that in the
interim the MX be put aboard modified Air Force cargo planes. The Air Force and its
allies on Capitol Hill lobbied against this proposal vigorously and it was soon dropped.^
While the Reagan Administration was grappling with how best to base the MX missile the
Army's BMDA continued to push its case, and support for BMD seemed to be growing.
Some in the Reagan Administration began to look at how the ABM Treaty might be
modified to allow for BMD systems. In the first half of 1981 both the Pentagon and the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency were reported to have studies under way on how
they could modify the ABM Treaty. In March 1981, the BMDA awarded a US$224,000
contract to Science Applications Inc., a Virginia-based think tank to conduct a "qualitative
and quantitative analysis" on the ABM Treaty and to recommend options.^
In mid 1981, Weinberger seems to have started considering the BMD more seriously,
directing one of three Defense Science Board (DSB) meetings in the summer of 1981 to
conduct a study of "what kind of ABM we could have by the mid or late 1980's", looking
specifically at the technologies developed by the Army's BMDA, and another approach
being pushed in the Pentagon at the time to use a Navy Aegis early warning radar system
with the Sprint ABM.^ When the DSB met with the Under Secretary of Defense for
Research and Engineering, Richard DeLauer, on Friday 14th August, 1981 they
recommended that the Reagan Administration go ahead with the land-based shelter
scheme for deploying the MX missile, as strong opposition to the air-mobile idea had
been expressed by the Air Force, and by key members of the Senate and House
committees. Also, the DSB members were reported to have urged the development and
ultimate deployment of a BMD system to protect the land-based MX missile. However,
Weinberger and Reagan remained firm in their opposition to the race track scheme, in the
face of the mounting resistance in Utah and Nevada against it, which had recentiy been
joined by the Mormon Church.^ Although Reagan and Weinberger did not yet seem to be
convinced of the need for BMD to protect the MX missile, Richard DeLauer was. He
hinted in August 1981 that should Reagan decide to build a scaled-down MX missile in
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Nevada it was highly likely that the Pentagon would step up the development of ABM
interceptors.^
On October 2, 1981 President Reagan announced an new basing plan.^ As explained by
Weinberger, Reagan's new basing scheme was twofold: The first 36 missiles would be
placed in the silos vacated by Titan n missiles, and hardened to 5000 psi. Then by 1984
decide among three options for deployment of the remaining 64 missiles in 1988-89. The
primary options were: air-basing, deep-underground deployment, and an ABM defence of
silo based missiles. Weinberger at this stage was still plugging for air-basing.^ The
interim basing decision was one of expediency. As Richard DeLauer put it: "We had to
put it somewhere or put it in a warehouse. There was no survivable basing scheme we
could count on right now and so what we said was we'll put 'em in existing holes''.^ It
soon became obvious however that this decision was "a product of substantial technical
and political miscalculation". It was discovered that the geology near the Titan silos was
unsuitable for superhardening to 5000 psi, and that the silo modifications would conflict
with the unratified SALT II Treaty.^ The Department of Defense announced on 31
December 1981 its decision to deploy the MX in Minuteman silos instead. This decision
"gave approval to a USAF recommendation for the interim basing mode".^
The Department of Defense established an executive committee to oversee a coordinated
USAF MX basing/ Army BMD programme. The new basing scheme required a slight
change of plan: the LoADS endoatmospheric system was now being called underlay, and
was redesigned to defend the MX in Minuteman silos. It drew heavily on the technology
developed for LoADS but the interceptor missiles for the underlay plan were required to
be larger to achieve an extended range and velocity."^ Even though it was now being
considered publicly as an option for MX basing, the Reagan Administration was reported
1 Bruce Ingersall, "Anti-missile system needed with MX - Pentagon",
Chicago Sun-Times, 26 August, 1981, p. 29.
2 R.C. Aldridge, op. cit., p. 113.
3 Christopher Paine, "Running in Circles with the MX", Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, December 1981, p. 8.
R. Jeffrey Smith, "Reagan's Plan for MX ...", op. cit., p. 151.
5 Ibid.
^ Four reasons were given for this new basing plan: (i) the funds for
superhardening were slashed by Congress; (ii) the location of the
Minuteman silos enabled more Soviet strategic sites to be targeted;
(iii) command, control and communication was easier with the Minuteman
silos, and; (iv) it was easier to defend Minuteman silos located 3-5
miles apart than Titan silos 10-12 miles apart, and BMD was considered
to be a long term possibility. "A bmd system could be used to defend a
flight of 18 Titan silos, but the US and USSR are limited to only one
BMD. It would be possible to defend all 40 missiles in Minuteman
silos.
(Clarence A. Robinson, "Pentagon Drops Superhardened Silo
Basing", AWST, 11 January 1982, p. 21.)
Ibid.

Ill
to be unwilling to commit itself to BMD because of uncertainties over cost and
effectiveness.^
Under pressure from Senator Tower and others in Congress who had publicly backed the
Carter plan, the Pentagon, two months after Reagan's decision, said that MPS would be
explored "as an option within the BMD program". The managers of the BMD programme
were reported to be "busily hatching schemes" to shuffle the MX among a series of
shelters. These schemes were supposed to be different from the Carter plan in that BMD
was to be incorporated from the start rather than added on later and less land and fewer
shelters would be used.^ In fact, even though the Administration was not publicly
promoting BMD, that it was emerging as the frontrunner among the three choices was
evident from the level of funding that it was attracting. Early in 1982 the Pentagon
proposed doubling the annual budget for BMD research to just short of one billion
dollars. The competing basing options such as Big Bird were to only receive one-tenth of
this amount, even though they were at a much less mature stage of development. The
BMD proposal had quite strong support. Firstiy, there was Senator Tower. Secondly,
General David Jones, the Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who had said after Reagan's
announcement that he still thought the Carter plan "was both affordable and would be
survivable". And thirdly, General Lewis Allen, the Air Force Chief of Staff, who said
"that Reagan and Defense Secretary Weinberger failed to grasp the merits of the Carter
plan despite his ... concerted efforts to sell it to them".^
Reagan's new basing scheme ran into trouble in March 1982, when Senator John Tower,
Chair of the SASC, announced that his committee would eliminate funds for the
production of the MX missile for FY 1983 to save the Administration from an ineffective
basing scheme, and thus to save the MX missile program from possible oblivion. A
SASC subcommittee voted 9-0 to delete US$1.5 billion for production of nine MX's in
FY 1983 and another US$200 million for work on temporarily basing MX in Minuteman
silos. They voted to require the Pentagon to select by December 1, 1982 a permanent
"survivable" basing plan that could be rushed to completion earlier than 1989.^ The
Pentagon publicly expressed disappointment at the decision of Tower's committee and
complained that it would not be able to come up with a new basing mode in time.
1 "Interim MX Basing Plan Spurs Reexamination of Army LoADS", AWST, 16
November, 1981, p. 18.
2 R. Jeffrey Smith, "Carter's Plan for MX Lives On", Science,
Vol. 216,
April 30, 1982, p. 492.
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Privately Pentagon officials were reported to hold fears that the President's plan was in
danger of defeat.^
With the collapse of the latest basing scheme, the Air Force began to study a new landbasing scheme known as the MX Deceptive Dense Pack Basing Concept - Dense Pack for
short - and BMD became even more likely to become an option. Under Dense Pack, the
100 MX missiles would be based in Wyoming and deployed in silos - superhardened to
15,000 psi - and spaced 1,800 feet apart in alternating rows of two and threes that would
stretch in nearly 14 mile north-south columns. The missiles would be rotated among the
silos and would be protected at the periphery by BMD interceptors. The aim of Dense
Pack was to aggravate Soviet accuracy and timing by forcing such close targeting that
incoming warheads would be destroyed or deflected by radiation blast waves and debris
from prior exploding warheads, a phenomenon known as "fratricide". It was thought that
Dense Pack would be easier to sell because the missile fields would take up a relatively
small area and so could be sited in existing military bases.^
There was a possibility that this basing mode would be susceptible to a Soviet "pin down
attack", whereby the Soviets would detonate nuclear warheads outside the earth's
atmosphere to produce nuclear radiation and electromagnetic pulses that would prevent the
launch of the MX missiles. It was argued that such an attack could be prevented using a
BMD system which could intercept the warheads in space before they exploded. The
Pentagon was reported to be considering the Homing Overlay system for this.^
Ballistic missile defence was starting to gain favour both in and outside the
Administration. In August 1982, Senator Tower announced that he thought that "ballistic
missile defense is going to be essential regardless of the basing system" for the MX, a
view he said that was shared by most of the members of the SASC. He added that it
would not bother him if the US had to scrap or modify the existing ABM treaty.^
Weinberger too seemed to be starting to favour BMD. He said, in October 1982, an ABM
system "would enhance any system's survivability", and that if it came "down to a
question of whether or not the most effective method of deploying MX requires some
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4 G e o r g e . C. Wilson,
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kind of revision in the treaties or something of that sort, I would suppose that we would
look at the way in which the treaties might be revised rather than give up the most
effective way of deploying it".^
President Reagan announced his new MX basing scheme - Dense Pack, which involved
100 MX missiles, spaced 1,800 feet apart over 20 square miles of Warren Air Force Base
in Wyoming - in early December 1982. Before the end of the month this scheme too had
be rejected. Reagan's treasured MX missile was in real trouble. Not only was the freeze
movement gaining support in Congress, but also many members of Congress had come
to believe that defence spending needed to be cut sharply to reduce the federal deficit - the
MX, costing billions of dollars, would be a prime place to start. In January, Reagan set
up yet another "blue ribbon" committee to try and find a solution to the MX basing
problem, this one called the Strategic Weapons Commission and headed by Brent
Scrowcroft, a retired Air Force general and former head of the NSC. In April 1983, this
commission recommended basing 100 MX missiles in existing Minuteman silos in
Wyoming. 2
The issue of the basing mode for the MX missile serves to illustrate the complexity of the
weapons development process. Space-based or land-based BMD systems cannot be
viewed as a weapons system in isolation. The future of ballistic missile defence was
linked to the basing mode chosen for the MX missile. Thus, the factors that were shaping
the basing mode for the MX were, indirectiy, also shaping ballistic missile defence. One
important factor here was the Air Force, which preferred a mobile land-basing mode for
the MX. The Air Force seems to have formed an alliance with the Army over this, and
together they actively worked through Congress to push MPS with LoADS and Homing
Overlay as the preferred basing mode and to undermine the alternatives. They were helped
in this endeavour with allies on Capitol Hill, such as Senator John Tower. Another
important factor shaping the MX basing mode were environmental, Indian and farming
groups, and the Morman Church in Utah and Nevada, who rose up in opposition to the
race track basing mode in their state. These groups, linked to national environmental and
groups, were able to apply so much pressure to the government that it was forced to
modify the basing plan. Also important was the wider political context, particularly in the
form of the Administration that was in power. The Carter Administration was in favour of
1 "ABM Could Guard MX, Weinberger Says", Los Angeles Times, 24 October
1982, p. 3B.
2 Michael Getler, "MX Panel Weighs Deploying up to 200 New Missiles",
Washington
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MX", Business
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p. 22.

detente and arms control, and so did not consider BMD as a serious option for MX
basing. The Reagan Administration had much less of a commitment to arms control and
was prepared to abrogate the ABM Treaty if necessary. This meant that the chances for
ballistic missile defence were much greater.
4.4 THE A m FORCE AND BMD
The Air Force programme to develop a direct ascent non-nuclear antisatellite (ASAT)
missile had its origins in Project SPIKE which began in the early 1970's, and was itself
based on research on non-nuclear kill mechanisms carried out in the 1960's. In April
1971 the USAF's Air Defense Command proposed the development of an air-launched
missile for use as an antisatellite weapon. The initial proposal was to use a modified
AGM-78 anti-radar missile which would be launched from an F-106 fighter. The Air
Force Space and Missile Systems Organization (SAMSO) conducted an assessment of
this proposal, and, although favourable, the project only received low levels of funding. ^
In 1975 the Air Force was reported to be beginning a three-year project to develop a small
ground- or air-launched ASAT weapon that would employ a Miniature Homing Vehicle
(MHV) to home in on a target satellite using a long-wavelength infrared (LWIR) sensor
and destroy it by direct impact. At this stage, three companies - Rockwell International,
Vought, and General Dynamics - were competing in the development project organized by
SAMSO. Rockwell seems to have been eliminated, leaving the competition to General
Dynamics and a team of contractors led by Vought and including Boeing and Hughes.^
The designs by General Dynamics and Vought were reviewed by the Office of Defense
Research and Engineering, and the Air Force Space Division, and Vought was finally
awarded the prime contract, worth initially US$58.7 million, in September 1977. The
design put forward by Vought drew heavily on earlier Army-sponsored work undertaken
by them under Project 922 on a direct-ascent infrared guided honing vehicle for ballistic
missile defence.3
The Air Force did not setde on the development of an air-launched missile for the
Miniature Homing Vehicle (MHV) until the end of 1978, the launching of MHVs from
ground-based ICBMs, and launching from orbiting satellites also being considered as
alternatives. These alternatives were considered to be less flexible than the air-launched
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system, ground-based systems in particular suffering from weather and geographical
constraints.^ As well as the MHV approach, work towards a space-based laser AS AT
system was being undertaken at the USAF Weapons Laboratory at Kirtland Air Force
Base, however it was not envisaged that such a system would be operational until well
into the 1990's. At this stage it was considered that such a system would require technical
advancements well beyond the state-of-the-art, especially in the areas of surveillance, and
command and control systems. ^
By mid-1980, the Air Force's AS AT missile programme was being described as
"essentially complete", and likely to be ready for operational deployment in the latter half
of the 1980's. The system was developed by Vought, Boeing and McDonnell Douglas as
associate prime contractors with Hughes and Honeywell as sub-contractors. It consisted
of a three-stage ASAT missile that would be launched from a modified McDonnell
Douglas F-15 aircraft. The missile consisted of three main stages: a modified Boeing
short-range attack missile (SRAM); a modified Vought Altair III rocket booster; and the
Miniature Homing Vehicle (MHV) developed by Vought, a small cylindrical object 12
inches by 13 inches which consisted of a cluster of small rockets surrounding eight
cryogenically cooled infrared telescopes, connected to a processor which enabled the
vehicle to home in on its target. Overall, the ASAT missile was approximately 17 feet
long, 18 inches in diameter, and weighed 2,600 pound.^ It was planned that the
squadrons of F-15's for the ASAT mission would be based at Langley Air Force Base,
Virginia, and McChord Air Force Base, Washington, these squadrons being capable of
attacking Soviet satellites in low-earth orbit, such as their ocean surveillance satellite
capable of targeting naval vessels and the Soviets killer satellite.^
In 1981, contracts totaling US$418.8 million were awarded to Vought (US$268 million)
and Boeing Aerospace (US$150.8 million) by the USAFs Space Division for further
research and development of the air-launched ASAT. In fiscal 1983, the Air Force
requested US$212 million for the ASAT programme, about one third of the service's
budget for strategic systems research, and announced plans to demonstrate the system in
1 p. B. Stares, o p . c i t . , p. 207; Craig Covault, "Antisatellite Weapon
op.
c i t . ,
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the not too distant future, so that it would be operational by the mid- to late-1980's. The
Space Defense Operations Center at the North American Aerospace Command's
(NORAD) underground headquarter at Cheyenne Mountain, which was planned to be the
focal point for command and control of the ASAT interceptors was reported in 1982 to be
conducting computer simulations and other studies in readiness for operational
deployment. The Air Force was obviously making a strong commitment to this form of
ASAT weapon.1
The Air Force's ASAT miniature homing weapon ran into trouble in early 1983 when the
General Accounting Office (GAO) conducted a review of the antisatellite programme.
According to an unclassified version of this report:^
[W]hen the Air Force selected the miniature vehicle technology as the p r i m ^
solution to the antisatellite mission, it was envisioned as a relatively cheap, quick
way to get an antisatellite system that would meet the mission requirements. This is
no longer the case. It will be a more complex and expensive task than originally
envisioned, potentially costing tens of billions of dollars.
The report went on to list four alternative technologies which deserved more careful
attention, these being: ground-based missiles, ground-based lasers, airborne lasers, and
space-based lasers.^
Some work on laser weapons for the ASAT mission had been conducted by the Air Force
since the 1970's, under the Advanced Systems component of the Space Defense
Program, this area receiving increased funding since about fiscal 1977. The funding
received for this programme through the late 1970's and early 1980's was: FY 1977 US$2.6 million; FY 1978 - US$9.8 million; FY 1979 - US$14.5 million; FY 1980 US$0.5 million and FY 1981 - US$2.1 million. This level of funding was not
comparable with that being spent on the MHV technology for the ASAT mission, this
programme receiving US$20.9 million, US$44.8 million, US$63.0 million, and US
$82.5 miUion in the years FY 1978 to FY 1981 inclusive.^
The USAF's Space Command seems to have responded to the gauntlet thrown down by
the GAO, by drafting, in eariy 1983 a formal "statement of need" for developing
antisatellite weapons using lasers. According to General James Hartinger, commander of
1 "Antisatellite Weapon Contracts Awarded", ANST, February 2, 1981, p.
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Plenum Press, New York, 1984, p. 249;
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3 I b i d . , p. 250.

4 p. B. Stares, op.
Antisatellite Effort",

c i t . ,

AWST,

p. 209; Craig Covault,
July 17, 1978, p. 14.

"U.S.

Pushes

the Space Command, the laser weapons were "a technology that looks like it could
possibly fulfill our requirements better than the air-craft-launched Asat we are developing
now".i
One question that can be asked is to what extent the Air Force, through its antisatellite
weapons programme acted as a driving force for the development of space-based laser
weapons. Ashton Carter argues that although, in some ways, the technologies used for
the ASAT and BMD missions are similar, that in actual fact the two missions are quite
different and thus the technological requirements are quite different. He points out that an
ASAT system cannot be easily upgraded to a BMD system, but that a BMD system could
quite easily, with some modifications, be applied to the ASAT mission, especially a
space-based laser BMD.2 To get more of an idea of whether those in the Air Force who
were working on laser technologies envisaged using these technologies for space-based
BMD, I shall look more closely at the nature of this research programme, and the
applications and time frames that were being proposed.
Out of all the military services, and DARPA, in the late 1970's and early 1980's it was
the Air Force who invested most heavily in research and development on laser weapons,
the main programme for the Air Force being the Airborne Laser Laboratory (ALL), a
programme to mount a high energy laser weapon on a KC-135 aircraft. This programme
was being undertaken at the Air Force Weapons Laboratory at Kirtland Air Force Base in
Albuquerque, New Mexico. ^
The Weapons Laboratory at Kirtland used a high-energy gas dynamic laser and an Air
Force developed field test telescope to shoot down a drone target at the Sandia Optical
Range at Kirtland in 1973. Since this successful test the Air Force has been working on
the technology to place a laser weapon on board the KC-135 aircraft, (a military version
of the Boeing 707), and shooting down an airbome target from the aircraft in flight.
Specifically, the programme aimed to put a 400,000 watt gas dynamic carbon dioxide
laser aboard the KC-135. The ALL was designed to test the feasibility of tactical Air
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Force lasers, and even if this mission could be accomplished, the ALL did "not have the
beam-steering equipment" required for even antisatellite tests. ^
It was envisioned by the Air Force that other missions might be possible using such lasers
at some time in the future. According to Ulsamer, in late 1977 the applications of air
based laser weapons included: "bomber self-defense, air superiority, satellite destruction,
and antisubmarine launched ballistic missile" missions. It was thought that the first of
these applications might be feasible within the next decade.^ Others were more boosterish
about the prospects for laser weapons. After a test conducted in January 1981 as part of
the ALL programme, in which the KC-135 remained grounded and stationary, and no
beam was actually propagated, the outgoing Air Force Secretary Hans Mark claimed that
the programme had passed a "significant milestone". "We can now think about shooting
down other fellows' missiles without using nuclear warheads", Mark claimed, it being
possible to eventually mount these laser weapons on satellites to destroy the enemy
missiles from outer space. Mark thought that such weapons would become an important
part of the United State's strategic arsenal in the next decade of so.^
Mark's optimistic predictions seem to have been somewhat premature. After the
successful test in January 1981, Air Force officials announced plans to use the Airborne
Laser Laboratory to shoot down sidewinder air-to-air missiles from the airbome KC-135.
Two such tests were conducted at the Naval Weapons Center in China Lake, Califomia in
mid-1981, but the missiles were not destroyed. It was not until mid-1983 that the ALL
actually did shoot down some sidewinder missiles.
There were forces in the Senate which were pushing the Air Force towards the
development of a space-based laser weapon capability, and perhaps some of the groups in
the Air Force who were working on such weapons were lobbying also. In early 1981,
Senators Malcolm Wallop and Harrison Schmitt put forward an amendment to the FY
1982 Defense Authorization Bill which would have added US$152 million to the budget
of DARPA, and US$97.5 million to the Air Force budget to expedite the building of a
space-laser weapon. The outcome was that the Air Force was given and extra US$30
million, and DARPA an extra $20 million, and the Secretary of the Air Force instructed to
set up a special Program Management Office for space-based laser weapons, and to
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conduct a "detailed system definition of the space-based laser weapons program, which
shall include costs, schedule, and identification of risks''.^
In August 1982, the Air Force was reported to be preparing a major study to determine by
1987 if it was feasible to launch laser battle stations into space. Air Force officials said
that a series of 18 requests for proposal from industry had been prepared to study issues
ranging from surveillance, to laser battle stations, servicing of the batde stations in orbit,
laser tracking, launch vehicles, battle management for laser weapons and so on. These
studies were to be under the management of the Air Force Space Systems Division in Los
Angeles and the Weapons Laboratory at Kirtland Air Force Base.^ Yet another Air Force
study which investigated the use of space-based laser weapons came to light in early
1983. The secret report, entitled "Air Force 2000: Air Power Entering the 21st Century"
was prepared at the direction of the then former Air Force Chief of Staff General Lew
Allen, and completed in June 1982. This study urged the development of space-based
antiballistic missile systems and argued that these weapons might enable the United States
to win a nuclear war in the event of a "massive exchange" with the Soviets.^
In late 1982, the Air Force was rearranged slightly, creating a new command which
centralized the Air Force's space activities. It might be expected that such a command
would tend to push for a wider space role for the Air Force in terms of space-based
ballistic missile defence. Robinson has pointed out that serious consideration was being
given to this proposal in early 1981, the reason being, he claims, that "the Air Force and
Navy are seeking to avoid space weaponry for defense and that any effort in this area
takes away from total obligational authority for other planned strategic weapon systems".
He further claims that there was "some concern over roles and missions between the
Army and Air Force as to where the Army's ballistic missile defense mission stops and
USAFs traditional space defense mission begins".^
The Air Force Space Command was formed on September 1,1982, with its headquarters
at Colorado Springs, Colorado. The new command, led by General James Hartinger,
took over the operations of the Aerospace Defense Center at NORAD, and it was planned
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that it would operate military versions of the space shuttle, the "great variety of spy and
other satellites" operated by the United State's and the antisatellite weapons which were
now in the advanced stage of development. In addition, General Lew Allen, then Air
Force Chief of Staff, said that the new command would be responsible for "planning and
operating any future manned military space vehicles that may be developed by the Air
Force ... and any orbiting laser weapons, if the U.S. decides to develop them". General
Allen said that within a year the Space Command would become a "unified command",
controlling the Navy and Army space activities as well, making the Space Command the
equal of the most important US military headquarters (such as the European and Pacific
commands), and putting space on an equal footing with the tactical and strategic air
operations.^ In a separate, but related move, the Air Force also created a Space
Technology Center at Kirtland Air Force Base, within the Air Force Systems Command.^
The formation of the Space Command was said to be in line with the thinking of the
Reagan Administration, especially the Secretary of the Air Force Veme Orr's views that
space was emerging as a fourth medium for military operations.^ The Defense Guidance
Plan approved by the Reagan Administration in 1982 stated that the "United States forces
should exploit opportunities through the use of space for increasing deterrence at all levels
of conflict" and instructed the armed forces to proceed with prototypes of space-based
laser weapons.'^ Representative Ken Kramer (R-Colorado), who had pushed for just this
change predicted that the creation of Space Command would, in the long run, be regarded
as the move "that turned national nuclear strategy away from mutual destruction to one
that will give us the capability to defend ourselves against nuclear attack from space",
using space-based laser weapons.^
4.5. PENTAGON'S RESPONSE TO THE SPACE WEAPONS LOBBY
Although we have seen that there were some groups within the Air Force who supported
the development of space-based lasers, either for antisatellite or BMD missions, in general
the proposals being put forward by Malcolm Wallop's 'laser lobby' were opposed by
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both the Army and the Air Force. The main objection to the proposals was that they were
premature, the Army and Air Force being more interested, in the short term, in bringing
their more conventional technologies to an operational capability, and content to consign
the exotic technologies to slowly paced research and development programmes.
When Maxwell Hunter's 'gang-of-four' produced the senate briefing for Malcolm Wallop
in 1979 it was, reportedly, "widely denounced as being premature and unrealistic". Army
and Department of Defense officials argued that countermeasures were available to outwit
the system and that "state-of-the-art technology in sensors and the complex battle
management necessary was not available to handle the high volume of ballistic missile
targets in the short engagement times required". The main objection was the estimated
time frame for the deployment of the system. The 'gang-of-four' had argued that a system
of 18 laser battle stations could be placed in orbit by the mid- to late-1980's and this was
felt to be unrealistic. Defense Department officials involved in the development of laser
technology were reported to be so upset about the briefing, that they put pressure on
"those companies funded under laser contracts to keep the members out of Washington".^
Another study conducted by the Department of Defense on high-energy laser weapons
was reported in Aviation Week and Space Technology in February 1981. According to
this smdy, the earliest estimated times for the deployment of space-based laser systems of
various capabilities were as follows: ^
*Test of a 5-megawatt/4-meter diameter weapon - 9 years.
^Development of a 10-megawatt/l 0-meter diameter weapon in a constellation of 10
satellites for full antisatellite and air defense missions, and light ballistic missile
defense -15 years.
•Development of a 25-megawatt/15-meter diameter weapon in a constellation of 100
satellites to provide full or robust BMD capability and for all other missions - 20 25 years.
Even these times, much longer than those proposed by the 'laser lobby', were supposed
to have assumed a "fast-moving, aggressively managed and committed program", but not
a "panic or crash effort".^

1 "Defense Dept. Experts Confirm the Efficacy of Space-Based Lasers",
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It is reported that in 1981 the Defense Department actively sought to sabotage the efforts
of the laser lobby' in the Senate Armed Services Committee. This was occasioned by
Malcolm Wallop's amendment, already mentioned, to the FY 1982 Defense Authorization
Bill to add US$250 million to the budget to be spent on laser weapon research. A briefing
on space-based lasers had been prepared by DARPA programme managers for the
National Security Council in time for the White House to add its approval to the
amendment before the floor vote on military authorizations. When DARPA's briefing was
submdtted to the Defense Department for approval it was reported to have been held up by
a Pentagon official from the Carter Administration, still in the Defense Department, who
was opposed to laser weapons. Because of this, the NSC briefing could not take place
and the White House could not add its approval in time.^
Further, a laser study panel convened by the Defense Science Board (DSB), headed by
John Foster, failed to submit a congressionally directed report in time for "the mark up",
providing only selected briefings in the Senate a day or so before the Wallop amendment
was put. Foster's panel was reported to have only undertaken the laser weapons study
after there was opposition within the Department of Defense to the study that was
submitted by DARPA.2 The report of the DSB was made to the Senate Armed Services
Committee in the hearings that preceded the passage of an amendment to add US$30
million to the Air Force and US$20 million to the DARPA budget in the FY 1982
authorization bill for space-based lasers, a watered down version of Wallop's proposal.
The DSB report, presented by Senator John Warner concluded that: "in the twenty first
century directed energy weapons such as space-based lasers are almost inevitable, but
achievement of an effective space-based ballistic missile defense system is far more
expensive and difficult than the most extreme enthusiasts admit".^
The DSB found many problems with space-based lasers. Firsdy, they questioned the
merits of assigning AS AT and air defence missions to space-based laser weapons as these
could be performed more cheaply by technologies such as miniature homing vehicles and
ground-based lasers. Secondly, the commitment to "Manhattan-type" projects necessitated
a commitment to chemical lasers. Shorter wavelength lasers, such as eximer lasers were
held to be more cost effective. Thirdly, even when the technical problems for space-based
BMD lasers had been resolved there were tremendous systems and operational problems
to overcome. Although pointing to these problems, and arguing that "it was too soon to
attempt to accelerate space-based laser development toward... ballistic missile defense".
1 Clarence A. Robinson, "Beam Weapons Technology Expanding", op. cit.,
p. 42.
2 Ibid.
3 Edgar Ulsamer, "The Long Leap Towards ...", op. cit., pp. 61-62.

the DSB recommended that US$50 million be added to the defence budget to help with
this work.^
Ulsamer, presumably reflecting the views of the Air Force, argued that the proposals for
the rapid deployment of space-based lasers such as that put forward by the 'laser lobby'
was a result of the "convergence of several political and 'public-relations' considerations rather than the realities of science and engineering". Such proposals had obvious media
appeal.2 He claimed that in the view of many in the Air Force, and other Pentagon
officials the "transient, mainly propagandistic advantages", of such proposals, would not
compensate for the disadvantages. He estimated that it would take about US$10 billion
just to build and "fly" a single prototype. "Premature investment of this magnitude in a
technology that most experts consider not yet ready for full-scale exploitation might sound
the death knell for the development of such weapons systems at a later time when their
underlying technologies have reached maturity", Ulsamer argued. Further, the diversion
of R&D funds for this purpose would slow down work on unrelated weapon
programmes that were ready for fuU-scale development.^
Officials in the Defense Department seem to have been in agreement with the DSB report.
High-level officials from the Pentagon were reported to have sought to persuade members
of the Senate that the technology for space-based lasers, "especially battle management
and pointing and tracking subsystems technology" was not available, and that "laser battle
stations would not become a reality until the next century".^ Dr. Richard Airey, described
as the Pentagon's chief specialist on space laser weapons, expressed confidence in the
long-term prospects of space-based lasers but claimed that it was the "consensus of
everybody in the community who is knowledgeable on the subject... that no matter how
much money we throw at the problem, we can't have an anti-missile space-based laser in
this decade".^ Even in late 1982 senior officials in the Defense Department who were in
charge of research and development were maintaining this line. Richard DeLauer,
Undersecretary for Research and Engineering told a meeting of the Air Force Association
that the military was "not doing all we could in space laser developments, but we are
doing all we should".®
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It would appear that even those who were charged with the development and future
operation of space-based laser systems were far from enthusiastic about their near-term
prospects. According to Lt. General Richard Henry, commander of the USAF Space
Division:^
Perhaps someday we will have the technology for an antiballistic missile system....
That could be done from space using beam weapons, in theory. The problem is we
don't know how to build the beam weaponry.
We probably could short-circuit the national treasury two or three times trying to do
that, and so the concept is probably in the future.
A report, described as a "unique stem-to-stem" analysis of the Air Force's changing role
in space was prepared by Lt. General Kelly Burke (USAF), the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Research, Development and Acquisition and his assistant Major General Jasper Welch,
some time in 1982. Welch, who was described as being "intimately involved" with the
USAF's laser program, argued that the United State's "should proceed with prudent and
measured speed down the general path we are on, meaning a balanced program consisting
of near-term efforts directed at more conventional AS AT vehicle to be launched from a
high-speed fighter and longer term efforts on a range of other promising possibilities",
pointing out that the Air Force was firmly committed to develop, test and deploy an airlaunched ASAT capability. The analysis by the two members of the Air Staff concluded
that "we are making progress and our current funding levels are about right. We simply
must not allow ourselves to be hurried as we enter the technology confirmation period
confronting us".^
Most of the criticisms of the High Frontier proposal concentrated on the Global Ballistic
Missile Defense (GBMD) proposal that had been put forward by Bud Redding of SRI
Intemational, and which formed the centre-piece of the High Frontier study. As General
Graham had predicted, the High Frontier study would stir up a hornets nest amongst
those in the Defense Department who were trying to protect their own turf. What
eventuated was perhaps even more vehement than Graham might have predicted. In a
memo prepared for General Stilwell of the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense
(Policy), Herbert Reynolds, the author of the memo, launches a character assassination
against Redding:^
1 "Space is a Place", Lt. Gen. Richard Henry interviewed by F. Clifton
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He seems to be very sincere in his attempts to uncover unique solutions to major
defense problems. Unfortunately, his sincerity and enthusiasm are seldom tempered
by practical engineering considerations. In fact he appears to be a master of self
deception and is not adverse to stretching the truth well beyond the breaking point.
As a result, his credibility within the defense community is very low.
Reynolds goes on to describe Redding's GBMD concept as being shallow, "no more than
one 'vu-graph' deep", and claims that Redding "continually modifies his concept as major
problem areas are identified during the course of his briefings". Three main objections to
the concept are identified. Firstly, Redding's "thoughts on defense strategy and
international implications related to the deployment of such a system are shallow and
naive". Secondly, the "cost and schedule estimates are so totally unrealistic as to be
unworthy of comment". And thirdly, there are certain technical objections such as the
technologies are not off-the-shelf, and that Redding has not considered the command,
control and communications problems of a very complex system. Reynolds, in short, is
unimpressed. He recommends that "we do nothing which might indicate to Redding that
we intend to pursue the subject further. I further suggest that you indicate to General
Graham, who is pursuing this concept at the highest levels of govemment, that perhaps
he should seek some expert assistance to evaluate Mr. Redding's concept".^
Reynold's hard hitting memorandum seems to have been based on a less colourful
technical critique of the GBMD concept prepared by a certain Captain Melanson for the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy). This report identifies four major
problems with Redding's proposal. Firstly, Redding had underestimated the number of
spares required for the 432 proposed orbiting space trucks. Based on afigureof 2 spares
to 1 operational satellite, Melanson estimated that the actual operational requirement would
be 1350 space trucks and 67,500 CVs. Secondly, partly because of these underestimates,
and partly because Redding had not used the "Air Force MV/dispenser unit cost planning
factor", the SRI cost estimate of US$5.3 billion increased to over US$100 billion, and if
the spares were included to over US$300 billion. Even these cost figures did not include
constructing infrastructure or the operational costs of the system throughout its lifetime.
Thirdly, the GBMD proposal had not taken into consideration command, control and
communications, such as coordinating space truck station keeping, self defence, and
battle management. Finally, major technical problems were associated with cryogen
storage for the long wavelength infrared sensors, on-board data processing for target
discrimination and battle management, the guidance of the miniature vehicles against
accelerating targets, and system weight.^
1 Ihid.
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Further, it was argued that the GBMD would be an unwelcome complicating factor in the
MX missüe basing debate. As GBMD was an alternative to the MPS basing mode for MX
combined with terminal defence, it had the potential of introducing "additional
uncertainty" into the MX decision process, Menlason felt. "It could also cause further
delays in this program while we wait to assess GBMD feasibility and affordability.
However, current GBMD conceptual immaturity argues against it being seriously
considered in the context for the present. A more prudent view of GBMD is to consider it
as a possible future complement to M-X and terminal ABM defense as part of a layered
system".^
The Air Force Systems Command's (AFSC) Space Division hosted a joint Army/Air
Force evaluation of the SRI GBMD proposal on 23-24 February 1982 with
representatives from the Space Division, the Army's Ballistic Missile Defense Office
(BMDO), the Air Force Contract Management Division, SRI and Boeing Aerospace,
amongst others, being in attendance. Several memos and summaries emerged from this
meeting prepared by the Army and the Air Force which pointed to about six major
objections to the GBMD proposal, (i) The proposed interceptor vehicle had insufficient
divert velocity capability required to accomplish its mission. It required a divert velocity
some 4 to 5 times larger, (ii) The technologies required were not off-the-shelf, and major
modifications or new developments were needed in the areas of the miniature homing
vehicle, surveillance technologies and in cryogenic cooling, (iii) The concept did not make
reference to prior studies of similar concepts - BAMBI, SAI study. Aerospace review of
BAMBI - and the problems identified by these studies, (iv) The proposal "grossly
underestimated" the number of interceptor vehicles required. The requirement for a higher
divert velocity coupled with the underestimation of the number of interceptor vehicles
meant that the "life-cycle costs" had been significantly underestimated - approximately
US$180 billion compared to US$5.3 Billion, (v) The MX did not have sufficient lift
capability to lift the weight of the space truck and its payload of interceptors into orbit,
and there were many logistical problems raising hundreds of space trucks into orbit using
the space shuttle, (vi) There was inadequate consideration of mission utility or system
effectiveness in the following areas: (1) survivability features; (2) susceptibility to
countermeasures; (3) negative payoff margins; (4) coverage area deficiencies.^
1 Ibid.
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Even when "several extrapolations of the operational parameters associated with the
proposed system were examined to determine if the proposal could be salvaged by
modification", the analysis concluded that the system still would not work. All of the
reports recommended that the proposal should be shelved: "This evaluation concluded that
the proposal has no technical merit and should be rejected".^ "Based on the above
considerations, it is our recommendation that the SRI unsolicited proposal not be funded
as proposed, nor modified and funded".^
The overall High Frontier study fared no better than the GBMD proposal. According to an
Air Force assessment of the study it had three main problems: "1) the technologies are not
"off-the-shelf ... 2) schedules are extremely optimistic in light of experience, and 3) the
cost estimates are very low".^ Regarding the silo point defence system proposed by ffigh
Frontier, the Air Force contacted the Army's BMDO at Huntsville. The Army pointed out
that they had been studying this technology since the 1960's and had always found such
proposals to have three serious limitations: (i) if a warhead was actually destroyed by the
system, it would detonate "destroying any capability to respond to a second" warhead; (ii)
systems used trilaterated low frequency radars "which are ineffective against jammers and
must be proliferated to avoid being targeted", and (iii) the systems had little range, which
meant that supply systems would be liable to damage.'^
Regarding the space-based laser system, the Air Force thought that it would be
"premature to commit to full scale development", and that the current level of research and
development was adequate. The Space Laser Program was investigating seven major
areas: vulnerability and hardening, utility, survivability, system definition, laser Triad,
weapon feasibility technology, and growth technology. The Air Force assessment argued
that when these "tasks" had been successfully completed the Department of Defense
would be in a position to make an "informed decision whether to recommend proceeding
with development and deployment of a space laser weapon system".^ The High Frontier
space-based laser had problems very similar to the GBMD: space transportation systems
Defense Examination (Ref HQ AFSC/XR TWX 27/23157 Jan 82), TO: HQ
AFSC/XR{Col. Steiner), March 1982; Telex, SUBJECT: Joint Army/Air
Force Global Ballistic Missile Defense {GBMD} Proposal, HQ BMO/SY
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were not adequate, a service vehicle would be required to replace cryogens, mirrors and
so forth, and the system could not be "developed and deployed in the period cited in the
report nor is the funding which is proposed adequate".^
The Air Force concluded that the High Frontier study was "replete with proposed systems
which use technology far beyond that which can be called 'off-the-shelf. This alone
would preclude the schedule suggested, even allowing the implementation of streamlined
management. The cost estimates are also highly dubious". Further, even though General
Graham conceded that his strategy was more important than the actual technology he was
proposing, the Air Force report argued that "it is difficult to divorce an evaluation of a
proposed strategy from the realities of its implementation".^
4.6 WHY THE PENTAGON OPPOSED THE SPACE WEAPONS LOBBY
Both the Army and the Air Force had made strong commitments to technology
development programmes based on 'conventional' technologies, which tended to
overshadow any research and development they were undertaking on the more exotic
technologies. The Army, through its Ballistic Missile Defense Agency, had been working
on the development of ballistic missile defence systems since the late 1950's, and from
this time had actively lobbied for the deployment of a land-based BMD system using both
endoatmospheric and exoatmospheric interceptors. The Army had been continually
frustrated in these efforts. Even when in the late 1960's it was able to force the Johnson
Administration to go ahead with the deployment of its Sentinal system, the ABM Treaty
was signed in 1972 limiting the deployment of ABM systems, and in 1975 the Army's
BMD system, now called Safeguard, was dismantled. In its LoADS and Homing Overlay
systems which the Army was developing in the late 1970's, and which were designed
basically to protect the MX missile, the Army saw another chance to finally deploy an
ABM system. The Air Force had been working on a direct-ascent antisatellite weapon
since the early 1970's. The Air Force had made a strong commitment to its direct ascent
antisatellite missile which would be launched from an F-15 fighter, and which was to
become operational in the late 1980's.
Both the Army and the Air Force were working on the more exotic technologies which
had the potential for space-based (or land-based) BMD and AS AT missions, but these
programmes were playing second fiddle to the more conventional programmes. They
were at a less advanced stage of development, and less funds were being devoted to this

1 Ibid.
2 Ibid.

area of research. Further, it was planned to use these exotic technologies mainly for
tactical missions in the first instance. While it might have been the case that some in the
Army, and more particularly some in the Air Force who were working on the exotic
technologies, were lobbying for space-based ballistic missile defence, they were running
against the tide in their particular branches of the armed services. There is some evidence
that the newly created Space Command was manoeuvring to acquire the control of all
space missions for itself, including ballistic missile defence, but Space Command arrived
too late on the scene to have much influence on this early development of space-based
BMD, and was itself committed to the operational deployment of the direct-ascent AS AT
system.
The area of space-based ballistic missile defence was a possible area of conflict between
the Army and the Air Force, the Army having responsibility for ballistic missile defence,
and the Air Force having responsibility for all space operations. At these early stages in
the development of space-based BMD there does not seem to have been a great deal of
rivalry between the two services over this mission. It remains a possibility as further
development of such weapons proceeds towards deployment. The most likely outcome of
such a competition would be that the Army retained responsibility for terminal defence,
and the Air Force gained the responsibility for space based defence. (A further possibility
might be that a new branch of the armed services is created to take control of operations in
space.) A reason for the lack of interservice rivalry at this stage may have been that the
Army and the Air Force had formed an alliance to push mobile land-basing of the MX in
conjunction with LoADS and Homing Overlay.
It is evident that the proposals put forward by the 'laser lobby' and High Frontier were
strongly opposed by both the Army and the Air Force. There were several reasons for
this. Firstly, both services were committed to the deployment of more conventional
systems. Further, both the Army and the Air Force were keen to promote temiinal defence
of MX missiles using LoADS and Homing Overlay as a neat solution to the vulnerability
of the MX missile. The space-based BMD systems represented a complicating factor in
the MX basing debate, which might hold up the deployment of the MX. Secondly, any
crash programmes aimed at developing exotic beam weapon technologies would take
funds away from the more conventional defensive programmes such as LoADS and
perhaps also away from offensive weapons programmes. Thirdly, crash programmes to
develop more exotic technologies, when these were still immature, might spoil the
chances for these programmes in future. Finally, while both the Army and Air Force had
their own research and development programmes on the more exotic technologies, they

were opposed to the timeframe for deployment that was being proposed by the 'space
weapons lobby'.
The reactions of the Army and the Air Force to the proposals put forward by the 'spaceweapons lobby' were to be expected from the model of the way in which military
technology is shaped developed in section 1.2. A sub-unit of the Army, the Ballistic
Missile Defense Agency had been given responsibility for the BMD mission, and had,
over several decades developed a terminal BMD system in which this mission had become
embodied. Similarly with the Air Force, which had developed a direct-ascent ASAT
interceptor based on 'conventional' technologies. Both services were expecting to deploy
their systems in the late 1980's. The exotic technologies proposed by the 'space-weapons
lobby' were seen as a threat to these 'conventional' programmes, and so were resisted by
preparing technical reports unfavorable to the near-term prospects of space-based
weapons, and by actively lobbying Congress and the Executive Branch.

CH. 5: THE MAKING OF THE 'STAR WARS'
SPEECH

5.1 INTRODUCTION

When President Reagan made his so-called 'Star Wars' speech on 23 March 1983, it was
widely reported the next day that he had two main reasons for giving it. Firstly, his
defence policy was coming under increasing pressure from the nuclear freeze movement:
the House of Representatives looked certain to pass a freeze resolution after Easter in
1983. By posing a nuclear umbrella Reagan might be able to seize the moral high ground
from the freeze movement. Secondly, there was growing opposition in Congress to
increased military spending because of the mounting deficit. Reagan's speech was
carefully timed to coincide with the Congressional debate on the defence budget.^ Two
other themes were evident in the early press reports, which gave some clue as to the
origins of the Star Wars speech. Firstly, it was suggested that Reagan's long-standing
interest in ballistic missile defence had been aroused six weeks earlier in a meeting with
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Secondly, it was suggested that in making the speech, Reagan
had gone against the advice of several White House and Pentagon aides.^
In this chapter I will consider the background of, and lead-up to. President Reagan's
March 23 speech. Starting with Reagan's "long-standing interest in ballistic missile
defence", I will consider the influence on Reagan of the 'space-weapons lobby' and the
way in which members of this group were placed to influence the policy of the Reagan
Administration. Next I will consider an early attempt by the Reagan Administration to
protect the population from the effects of nuclear war, through a civil defence programme.
This attempt failed miserably and only served to generate more opposition to the
Administration's strategic modernization plan. The growing peace movement, particularly
in the form of the "freeze movement", was, by the end of 1982, presenting a strong
challenge to the Reagan Administration and can be seen to have strongly influenced the
decision to make the speech. Finally, I shall consider the decision to make the 'Star Wars'
speech. Starting with a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who were preoccupied with
the MX basing problem, Reagan and senior members of the National Security Council
1
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became convinced of the need for strategic defence and began to hatch the speech in the
utmost secrecy.
5.2 REAGAN - A LONG STANDING INTEREST IN BMD?
It would seem that well before he made his so-called 'Star Wars' speech on 23 March
1983, which eventually led to the establishment of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI),
Ronald Reagan had an interest in implementing a new strategy which would not hold
Americans as nuclear hostages. General Graham, who had advised Reagan on military
matters during the 1976 Republican primaries, claimed that, even then, Reagan had
questioned the strategy of deterrence, based as it was on purely an offensive capability.
"He said it didn't make any sense to him", said Graham. "It was like two men with
cocked pistols pointed at each other's head; if either man flinched, then you blew the
other's brains out. It just doesn't make any sense". ^
In the summer of 1979 Reagan paid a visit to the North American Air Defense Command
(NORAD) at Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado. During the visit Reagan observed NORAD
radars tracking thousands of objects in space, and asked the commanding officer General
James Hill, what NORAD could do to stop an incoming Soviet missile. "The answer
was, 'Nothing'", Martin Anderson - Reagan's adviser on domestic policy and an
economist from the Hoover Institution - later recalled.^ Reagan recalled this incident in an
interview with journalist Robert Scheer during the 1980 Republican primary election
campaign:^
NORAD is an amazing place.... They actually are tracking several thousand objects
in space, meaning satellites of our and everyone else's, even down to the point that
they are tracking a glove lost by an astronaut that is still circling the earth up there. I
think the thing that struck me was the irony that here, with this great technology of
ours, we can do all of this yet we cannot stop any of the weapons that are coming at
us. I don't think there's been a time in history when there wasn't a defense against
some kind of thrust, even back in the old-fashioned days when we had coast
artillery that would stop invading ships if they came.
In August 1979, shortly after the visit to NORAD, Martin Anderson, who had
accompanied Reagan, drafted a campaign memo urging Reagan to propose the
construction of a "protective missile shield against Soviet intercontinental ballistic
missiles, perhaps exploiting laser beam technologies"S in conjunction with a build-up of
1 Transcript of interview with Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham by Lt. Col.
Baucom, 7 July, 1987, pp. 1-2.
2 Frank Greve, "Reagan's plan caught many administration insiders by
surprise", San Jose Mercury News, November 17, 1985, p. 20A.
3 Reagan interview in Robert Scheer, With Enough Shovels, Random House,
New York, 1982, p. 233.
4 Frank Greve, "Reagan's plan ...", op. cit., p. 20A.

conventional forces and accelerating the development of strategic offensive weapons such
as the cruise missile and the MX. Anderson further pointed out that such a strategic
defence would be more "appealing" to Americans than the prospect of nuclear annihilation
under the doctrine of MAD. ^ Reagan's senior campaign adviser, Michael Deaver, advised
against making this proposal. Deaver is reported to have liked the idea but not the timing,
fearing Reagan might appear to be too much the radical hawk "if he proposed sharp
changes in traditional nuclear doctrine".^
A toned down version of Anderson's memo was, reportedly, incorporated into the 1980
Republican platform which called for "vigorous research and development of an effective
antiballistic-missile system, such as is akeady at hand in the Soviet Union, as well as
more modern ABM technologies". It also called for new offensive missiles and an
"overall military and technological superiority over the Soviet Union".-3
Not only did Reagan show an early inclination towards ballistic missile defense but in the
lead-up to his election he received further encouragement from members of the 'spaceweapons lobby'. In the summer of 1979 Wallop and Codevilla sent Reagan a copy of
their article "Opportunities and Imperatives of Ballistic Missile Defense", which was
about to appear in Strategic Review. Reagan is reported to have returned the paper later
with comments and annotations.^ In February 1980, General Graham, who was one of
Reagan's military advisers for his 1980 Presidential campaign briefed Reagan on his ideas
about strategic defence. Reagan was reported to be very interested and writing down
notes.^ On 12 December 1980," Reagan, then president-elect, was visited by Senator
Harrison Schmitt, the incoming chair of the Senate subcommittee on science, technology
and space. At this meeting Reagan signaled to Schmitt his interest in developing an
effective antiballistic missile system based on laser weapons because he wanted to alter
strategic policy toward one of protection rather than mutually assured destruction. ^
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5.3 THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION AND THE 'SPACE-WEAPONS
LOBBY'
When Reagan did come to power, a number of people on his transition teams had links
with the 'space-weapons lobby', or were themselves space-hawks who advocated spacebased ballistic missile defence. His important defence and foreign affairs transition teams
were staffed by people who were counted amongst the members of the 'Madison Group'
or were members of the Committee on the Present Danger. Saffire has claimed that
'Madison Group' members John Carbaugh, Sven Kraemer (Senator Tower), Tidal
McCoy (Senator Gam), Richard Perle (ex-Senator Jackson), and Mark Schneider
(Senator Gam) were on Reagan's Defence transition team. Saffire also claims that
'Madison Group' members Michel Pillsbury and David Sullivan were on Reagan's Arms
Control transition team; John Carbaugh and Richard Perle the State Department transition
team; and, Mark Schneider and Angelo Codevilla (Senator Wallop) the CIA transition
team.^
Manno has pointed out that Edward Teller and retired Air Force General Bernard
Schriever, both long-time space-hawks, were on Reagan's Science Policy transition team.
Teller, we have already seen, was pushing for the development of the x-ray laser for
ballistic missile defence. Schriever, who wrote the transition report on space had, even
before the time of Sputnik, been publicly proclaiming that space would be the
batdeground of the future.^ In a speech Schriever made to Air Force Academy cadets in
April 1981, he said that there was "no question that space weapons will someday play a
part in national defense".^ In an interview in January 1983, Schriever advocated a "radar
surveillance system which allows you to spot everything that's moving, either on the
surface or above the surface of the earth. And if we had ... a high-energy laser, or
particle-beam weapon, or something else along with the pointing and tracking ability to
knock down airplanes and missiles, then you wouldn't even need to knock out cities; you
could knock out forces: You could pin your enemy down on earth. What would they do?
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1945-1995, Dodd, Mead & Co., New York, 1984, pp. 157-158.
3 Nina Bondarook, :"Space Weapons foreseen in defense",
Colorado
Springs Gazette Telegraph, 2 April, 1981, p. 3B.

If I control the high ground and you can't move, what are you going to do? You're going
to negotiate a surrender. That's what it's all about".^
All up, during the presidential campaign and the transition process, 46 members of the
Committee on the Present Danger served on Reagan's advisory task force. After Reagan
had been elected the CPD maintained its influence, with some 51 members of Reagan's
Administration having served on the Board of Directors of the CPD.2 It did not
necessarily follow that the CPD members who were serving in the Reagan Administration
would automatically advocate ballistic missile defence, especially space-based ballistic
missile defence. As we have seen some CPD members gave priority to the build-up of
offensive nuclear weapons (perhaps in conjunction with terminal defence to protect
missile silos), and others to the deployment of space-based ballistic missile defence to
provide population defence, as a way of achieving superiority over the Soviet Union.
Two prominent members of President Reagan's defence transition team, William Van
Cleave and Scott Thompson, were known to be "firmly on the former side". Those, such
as Daniel Graham, who favoured the defensive option found themselves outside of
Reagan's circle of influence in the early years of the Administration.^
Patrick Tyler has labeled groups such as the CPD and the 'Madison Group' as the
"survivalists", a group who believed that the United States needed to prepare to fight and
win a nuclear war. The "survivalists" claimed that the United State's ICBMs were
vulnerable to Soviet missiles, and pointed to Soviet civil defence programmes and
research into lasers and particle beams for antiballistic missiles defence as evidence of
Soviet intentions to win a nuclear war. They argued for the "hardening" of command,
control and communications networks and the development of ABM weapons. The
"survivalists" rejected the doctrine of mutual assured destruction arguing that their
strategic doctrine - mutual assured survival - was morally superior. They were well
represented in the Reagan Administration, dominating the National Security Council and
the Pentagon hierarchy, according to Tyler.^
That Ronald Reagan could be counted amongst the "survivalists" is evident from an
interview that was conducted by Robert Scheer in 1980. Reagan complained that the
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Soviets had violated SALT I and the ABM Treaty, and didn't hold to the same notion of
deterrence:^
The idea was the Mutual Assured Destruction plan ... that in an exchange of
weapons both countries ' populations would be decimated. And they didn't hold to
that - and for several years this was a failure of the interpretation of our intelligence.
... We paid no attention to the fact that the Soviet Union had put a high-ranking
general... in charge of civil defense. And they had come to the conclusion that there
could be a nuclear war and it could be winable - by them.
Reagan thought that it was "time to turn the expertise that we have in that field... loose on
what do we need in the line of defense against their weaponry and defend our population,
because we can't be sitting here - this could become the vulnerable point for us in the
event of an ultimatum". In addition to developing active and passive defences against
nuclear weapons Reagan thought that developing "superior offensive ability may also be
another form of defence", pointing to the tension that existed in the CPD between
offensive and defensive weapons.^
During his 1980 presidential campaign, Ronald Reagan had argued that the so-called
'window of vulnerability' - one of the important tenents of CPD dogma - represented a
major threat to the security of the United States, and what's more that the Carter
Administration was responsible for this. The 'window of vulnerability' was the supposed
vulnerability of the United States' land-based ICBMs to a first-strike attack by Soviet
land-based ICBMs. It was argued that this 'window' would open in the early 1980's with
the deployment of new, more accurate, Soviet ICBMs, and would not close until the
United States had deployed the MX missile in a survivable basing mode. Reagan was
pushing heavily the line that the MX missile, with its ten 300 kiloton warheads and high
accuracy was the panacea to cure this problem, along with other offensive strategic
weapons such as the B-1 bomber, cruise missiles and so on.^ On entering office, the
Reagan Administration initiated a large military build-up aimed at closing the 'window of
vulnerability', and seemed to be moving towards a war-fighting capability. In October
1981, fragments of the top-secret National Security Decision Directive #13 were leaked to
the press. This included a plan for "controlled escalation" in a nuclear war that would
allow the United States to win the war.^
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5.4 REAGAN'S CIVIL DEFENCE PLAN
As a prelude to ballistic missile defence - an active form of defence - the Reagan
Administration attempted to implement a nationwide civil defence programme - a passive
form of defence. At a meeting of the National Security Council on 3 December 1981,
President Reagan committed his Administration to the first major increase in funding for
the civil defence programme in two decades. In so doing Reagan acted against the advice
of his Office of Management and Budget and Air Force General David Jones, Chair of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. The decision was, however, in line with the Republican party's
1980 platform, which had pledged "to create a strategic and civil defense which would
protect the American people against nuclear war at least as well as the Soviet population is
protected".^
The plan was publicly disclosed on March 29, 1982, a seven-year civil defence
programme that would, supposedly, save 80 percent of the population in the event of a
nuclear war. The aspect of population protection was just one amongst a number of
considerations however. Included in a list of four objectives which Reagan issued to the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which was to be responsible for the
plan, were (i) that civil defence was an element of the strategic balance, which, in
conjunction with strategic offensive forces "should assist in maintaining perceptions that
this balance is favorable to the U.S."; and, (ii) that civil defence would "Reduce the
possibility that the U.S. could be coerced in times of a crisis".^
As part of the US$4.3 billion plan, Reagan proposed to Congress an increase in the civil
defence budget for FEMA from US$127 million in FY 1982 to US$252 million in FY
1983. Most of this money was to be used to plan for "crisis relocation", that is, the
orderly evacuation of people in "high risk" areas - in major cities or living near military
installations - to "low risk" areas in the countryside, where they would be accommodated
in primitive, anti-radiation fallout shelters. It was planned that this crisis relocation would
take place when the Soviets began to evacuate their cities as a prelude to launching a
nuclear attack, supposedly giving the United States three days warning.^
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The civil defence plan proved to be neither popular with the public nor congress, serving
only to stir up more opposition to the nuclear arms race. FEMA officials were charged
with being advocates of limited nuclear war, civil defence being held to increase the
resolve of nuclear war fighters to launch an attack. Furthermore, the idea of crisis
relocation became the "butt of ridicule from coast to coast", many cities and counties'
refusing to cooperate with the FEMA. The City Council of Cambridge, Massachusetts for
example "rejected a plan for a mass exodus to Greenfield, Massachusetts" and published
instead a booklet advocating nuclear disarmament.^
In April 1982, the Senate Armed Services Committee refused to support Reagan's plan,
and instead set the budget for FY 1983 at US$144 million, much less than the US$252
million that Reagan had sought. It was reported that almost every Senator attending the
closed meeting of the SASC "contended that there was no way to protect civiliansfroman
all-out nuclear attack and that to try to do so would be a waste of money". Several
Senators "also warned that to undertake such preparations would only fuel the movement
here and abroad against further development of nuclear weapons". Even the committee's
hawkish chairman. Senator John Tower was reported to have questioned the
administration's claims about civil defence.^
5.5 THE NUCLEAR FREEZE MOVEMENT
The movement that the Senators were worried about was the growing Freeze Movement,
which had been called into existence largely by the Reagan Administration itself. It seems
to have had its origins in 1979 when the Senate refused to ratify the SALT n treaty. The
American Friends Service Committee called a meeting of arms control and disarmament
advocates to try and develop new strategies to stop the arms race. The strategy devised by
the meeting was to freeze the production and deployment of nuclear weapons and to
worry about disarmament at some later date.^ By AprU 1980, Randall Forsberg, one of
those present at the meeting, had published the first freeze "manifesto", and along with
Randy Kehler was organizing a mass movement based around the freeze. Kehler
managed to get non-bindingfreezeresolutions placed on the ballot in the November 1980
elections, in three senate districts in western Massachusetts. Even while Ronald Reagan
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was sweeping to power, the freeze resolution carried by a margin of 2 to 1 in those
districts, even though all returned a vote for Reagan by a considerable majority.^
The freeze movement gained momentum throughout 1981, mainly as a grass-roots
movement and it wasn't until early 1982 that it began to make an impact in Congress. The
first freeze resolution was introduced by Senators Edward Kennedy (D-Massachusetts)
and Mark Hatfield (R-Oregon) on March 10,1982, and called for the United States and
the Soviet Union to "pursue a complete halt to the nuclear weapons race", and to negotiate
a mutual and verifiable freeze on testing, production, and further deployment of nuclear
arms, and then to pursue mutual and verifiable reductions in the nuclear stockpiles. On the
day of its introduction the resolution was co-sponsored by 17 senators and 122 members
of the House of Representatives, and it soon had 25 co-sponsors in the Senate and 125 in
the House.2
However, even before Senators Hatfield and Kennedy had the chance to present their
resolution. Senators Henry Jackson and John Warner drafted a counter proposal with the
aid of Jackson's former aide Richard Perle. This resolution argued that afreezeon nuclear
weapons should be imposed only after the United States and the Soviet Union negotiated
"equally and sharply reduced levels of forces". The resolution was introduced into the
Senate on 30 March, 1982 and was co-sponsored by 62 senators. President Reagan
publicly supported this proposal, claiming that it was the Soviets who had the superior
nuclear forces. In the Senate, the freeze was rejected "on a near party-line vote in the
Foreign Relations Committee".^
Several Freeze resolutions were also introduced into the House, and it was here that it had
its greatest success, when on June, 1982, the House Foreign Affairs Committee voted
26-11 to recommend freezing US and Soviet nuclear weapons at current levels, with 19
of the 21 Democrats and 7 of the 16 Republicans voting in favour of the motion.^ On the
5 August, 1982, afreezeresolution introduced by Clement Zablocki (D-Wisconsin) failed
by only a narrow two-vote margin to pass, the vote being 204-202 against.^ Donner
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claims that this loss was quite impressive nonetheless, given that some 2000 corporate
lobbyists opposing the freeze were reported to have applied pressure before the vote.^
The Administration's approach to the freeze movement was twofold: firstly, to express
sympathy with the ultimate aims of the freeze supporters, but claim that their methods
were wrong, and secondly to claim that they were being manipulated by the Soviets. For
example, on March 11, 1982, the Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military
Affairs, Richard Burt, expressed sympathy for the "spirit that motivates the freeze
efforts", but argued that it was misguided because: (i) the US would be frozen into a
position of military inferiority; (ii) the negotiation of arms control agreements such as
START required a strategic modernization programme to give the US negotiators
credibility; and (iii) that the freeze did not go far enough, the US being engaged in
intermediate nuclear forces talks which would go far beyond the freeze.^ President
Reagan, at a press conference on 31 March, 1982, said that because the Soviets enjoyed a
"definite margin of superiority" it would be "disadvantageous - in fact, even dangerous"
for the United States to agree to a freeze.^ On October 4,1982, Reagan, indulging in a bit
of red-baiting, claimed that the freeze movement was "inspired by not the sincere, honest
people who want peace but by some who want the weakening of America and so are
manipulating honest people and sincere people".^ Casper Weinberger claimed that "A
nuclear freeze would be one sided, and would not be matched by the Soviets".'5
Notwithstanding the admonitions from the Reagan Administration and the difficulties that
freeze resolutions encountered in Congress, thefreezemovement and the peace movement
in general continued to grow. From freeze resolutions being passed at 300 New England
town meetings, in 30 city councils and in six state legislatures at the start of 1982, the
movement had grown by August 1982 to freeze resolutions being passed at 400 New
England town meetings, in more than 120 city councils, and by one or both houses in 12
state legislaUires. Active freeze campaigns were underway to put nuclear freeze proposals
on the ballots in the elections that were to be held in November 1982. On June 12,1982,
to mark the United Nations' Second Special Session on Disarmament, nearly a million
people marched in New York, the largest demonstration in the history of the United
States.^ In the elections, nuclear freeze resolutions won in eight of the nine states and in
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the District of Columbia, and in all but two of the other 29 jurisdictions in which they
were on the ballot. The freeze resolution passed even in California, President Reagan's
home state, by a margin of 52.5 to 47.5 percent, the state in which both sides had
mounted their largest campaigns.^
Besides coming under mounting pressure from the freeze movement, the Reagan
Administration ran into even more trouble in the form of the American Catholic Bishops
who were responding to the renewed concern about nuclear weapons. In June 1982 the
Bishops put out the first draft of their pastoral letter - The Challenge of Peace: God's
Promise and our Response' - which oudined the Church's position on nuclear weapons.
On 26 October, 1982, the Bishops released the second draft of their pastoral letter, which
was even stronger than the first, despite condemnation from and heavy lobbying by the
Reagan Administration. (For example, William Clark, Reagan's National Security
Adviser had sent a seven-page letter to the Bishops arguing that a nuclear freeze would be
counterproductive because it would "remove the incentive for achieving reductions".) The
second pastoral letter called for an immediate freeze on nuclear weapons and deep cuts in
the nuclear arsenals of the superpowers.^ Furthermore, the Bishops argued that nuclear
weapons were immoral. "We find", the Bishops wrote, "the moral responsibility of
beginning nuclear war not justified by rational political objectives". They rejected the
production, use and threatened use of nuclear weapons, and even advocated that the
United States move forward with unilateral disarmament initiatives.^
5.6 THE MAKING OF THE 'STAR WARS' SPEECH
In the lead-up to his 'Star Wars' speech, as we have seen, Ronald Reagan had quite a deal
of contact with members of the 'space-weapons lobby'. Daniel Graham had spoken to
Reagan about his ideas on strategic defence in February 1980; Senator Harrison Schmitt
had spoken to Reagan on 12 December 1980 about space-based infrared lasers for
ballistic missile defence; Graham had met with Reagan again in February 1981 and
shortly after with his Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger; Karl Bendetsen, William
Wilson, Joseph Coors and Edward Teller met with Reagan on 8 January 1982, and
subsequently on two other occasions, one in the early months of 1983; Edward Teller had
met with Reagan alone on 14 September 1982 and urged him to develop x-ray lasers for
ballistic missile defence; between October 1982 and January 1983 Teller is reported to
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have met repeatedly with members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. All in all, before he made
his speech, Reagan had met with members of the 'space-weapons lobby' on at least seven
occasions.
Although President Reagan was favourably disposed to space-based ballistic missile
defence, senior members of the Administration reacted much more cautiously to the
approaches made by the 'space-weapons lobby'. One early supporter in the Reagan
Administration was Secretary of State, Alexander Haig. On the other hand, Richard Burt,
Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs, seems to have been set against it.
In an August 1981 memorandum on the High Frontier study Burt argued that while Bud
Redding's GBMD concept had an "outside chance of being feasible ... its cost and the
stiff technical requirements it would have to meet make its prospects much less sanguine
than" General Graham suggests.^ In a January 1982 memo to Haig, Burt went further,
arguing that, on the advice of the Army, the cost of the GBMD and site defence would be
prohibitive. "Even then", Burt argued, "many technical uncertainties would remain along
with any number of possible countermeasures available to the Soviets". Further, Burt
thought that "a high-energy BMD laser system in space is still more than a decade away,
if it is feasible at all". Summing up, Burt claimed that "while General Graham's ideas
have much innate appeal, they have serious technical and economic shortcomings that are
well recognized in the technical community".^
The opinion of the Defense Department seems to have been quite similar. Writing to
General Graham in September 1982 Frank Carlucci, Deputy Secretary of Defense, said
that it was "somewhat of an overstatement" to say that the High Frontier proposals had
been "widely accepted as practicable". Carlucci pointed out that such a system would be
very expensive, and he was not sure "[wjhether this would be a wise expenditure of
defense funds''.^ Even Caspar Weinberger, writing to Graham in November 1982, only
four months before Reagan made his speech, was not so sure about the High Frontier
proposal. Weinberger told Graham that both he and his Undersecretary of Defense for
Research and Engineering, Richard DeLauer, differed with Graham "on availability of
^
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technology to support such a policy". They were unwilling to "commit this nation to a
course which calls for growing into a capability that does not currently exist". Weinberger
said that his advisers had "serious reservations with High Frontier's projections on the
availability of off-the-shelf technology and components, at affordable cost and within
schedules we can project".^ It is evident that Weinberger and Burt had been heavily
influenced by the arguments of the Army and Air Force conceming the High Frontier and
'laser lobby' proposal.
That some of Reagan's senior advisers were not overly in favour of space-based ballistic
missile defence was not a major obstacle. The decision to go ahead with the 'Star Wars'
speech was made without consulting them.
In February 1983, General John Vessey, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, called
a meeting with the other Chiefs of Staff to discuss what they would talk about with
President Reagan at the next of their monthly meetings. At this meeting Admiral James
Watkins, Chief of Naval Operations, proposed that the Chiefs consider the "possibility
that new technologies would make it possible to defend against a Soviet ICBM attack".
Watkins did not propose a crash programme. He suggested only that the United States
might pursue the technological advantage it held over the Soviets in this area, in careful
consultation with its NATO allies.^
Watkins, a devout catholic, was reported to have been deeply troubled by the pastoral
letter put out by the Catholic Bishops which condemned nuclear weapons, and was
actively involved in the church's nuclear ethics debate. He had, reportedly, made his
doubts about the ethics of the policy of MAD the focus of a secret Navy White Paper. At
the meeting with the other Chiefs, Watkins argued that it was "more moral" to protect
Americans than to leave them vuhierable to nuclear annihilation under the MAD doctrine.
"Wouldn't it be better to save lives than to avenge them", he is reported to have said.
Admiral Watkins was influenced in his thinking by Edward Teller, with whom he had met
on several occasions between October 1982 and January 1983, Teller briefing him at
length on the x-ray laser. Further, during this same period Watkins had several meetings
with Robert McFarlane, Reagan's deputy National Security Adviser.^
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The Joint Chiefs met with President Reagan on February 11,1983, largely to discuss the
vulnerability of land-based ICBMs and the basing of the MX missile. We have already
seen that the issue of MX basing had become a major headache for the Reagan
Administration and the Pentagon, and that the fortunes of BMD had become closely
linked to this.^ The Joint Chiefs were reported at this time to "see an urgent need for a
new ground-based ABM to help overcome the vulnerability of America's Minuteman
ICBM force and any future deployment of MX missiles".^ The Chiefs suggested five
options to Reagan regarding the problem of ICBM vulnerability, including shifting from
reliance on land-based ICBMs toward sea-based ICBMs, increasing the level of
conventional forces, expanding the Navy, and strategic defence. Out of these Reagan
selected strategic defence as his preferred option. The Chiefs' ideas about strategic
defence were reported to be "vague and philosophic in tone", not distinguishing between
the protecting of missile silos and the protection of cities, or between the different forms
of ballistic missile defence.^ According to General Edward Meyer, then Army Chief of
Staff, "The next step, we figured, would be to put a group together and see what was
feasible and what the alternatives were". However, when Admiral Watkins presented his
briefing on strategic defence President Reagan is reported to have "perked up".'^
Robert McFarlane, who was also present at the meeting is reported to have been
preoccupied with strategic defence. McFarlane had read Watkins' White Paper and had
been briefed on the x-ray laser by Edward Teller. When Admiral Watkins brought the
topic up at the meeting McFarlane is reported to have "stepped in to elaborate on the theme
of a new strategic vision". He was concerned about the effect that the growing peace
movement would have on the Administration's strategic modernization plan, and with the
new weapons systems that the Soviets were bringing on line, especially a mobile landbased ICBM which would put at risk the United States' land-based ICBMs but be
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themselves invulnerable. The idea of a space-based strategic defence system as a way of
stealing the thunder of the peace movement had been pushed by Edward Teller, and was
one of the main selling points of the High Frontier study. McFarlane in a later interview
claimed that strategic defence "was an initiative whose time had come".^
Robert McFarlane may not have been the only member of the National Security Council
who had an interest in space-based ballistic missile defence. In 1981 it was reported that
the NSC was considering the policy issues associated with this area "to take advantage of
the new technology to defend ourselves against attack and in so doing gain a quantum
leap ahead of our adversaries". The NSC was interested to move into this area, an
Administration official claimed, "because of departmental policy issues and bureaucratic
lethargy". 2
Within hours of the February 11 meeting, and unknown to the Joint Chiefs, McFarlane
assigned three senior Air Force officers on the staff of the National Security Council to
work on the concept of strategic defence. The project for this small group soon became to
draft a short speech - known as the 'Annex' - outlining the new vision of strategic
defence, which was to be included as the last five minutes of a speech that Reagan
planned to deliver on March 23,1982 to support Defense Secretary Weinberger's call for
a 10 percent increase in the defence budget.^ This would be a so-called "threat speech",
the alarming depiction of the Soviet threat which routinely preceded an administration's
appeal for an increase in military spending. McFarlane ordered that the Annex was to be
kept secret from those who were writing the first part of the threat speech, and also from
the Pentagon and State Department, and other bureaucracies outside the White House
which might expect to be informed. The fear was that the plan might be killed off if
knowledge of it leaked out. ^
George Keyworth, the President's Science Adviser, was given only five days warning of
the forthcoming speech, and was given a role in its drafting, but only as an afterthought it
would seem. According to an NSC member Keyworth was included only after they asked
themselves: "How can the president go on the tube directing a major high-technology
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Florida on March 8, 1982. In that speech Reagan had attacked communism
as the "focus of evil in the modern world", and argued that the
nuclear freeze proposal ignored "the aggressive impulses of an evil
empire". (Frank Greve, "Reagan's plan ...", o p . c i t . , p. 25.)
4 Frank Greve, "Reagan's plan ...", o p . c i t . , p. 21A; Gregg Herken,
"The earthly origins ...", op. c i t . , p. 25.

initiative and tell his science adviser nothing?" McFarlane called Keyworth into his office
on the morning of March 19, 1982, to inform him about the Annex. Herken claims that
McFarlane told Keyworth that the President had only decided to go ahead with the speech
after discussing it with William Clark, the National Security Adviser and McFarlane the
previous day. The President had asked a question, McFarlane told Keyworth. "'Is now a
good time to renew our efforts in strategic defence?'" Keyworth is reported to have been
"shocked" by Reagan's question, and inclined initially to say no. However, he
remembered the findings of a year long study on emerging defence technologies that had
been conducted by the White House Science Council and completed in January 1983.
This study, although dubious about the military utility of the exotic beam technologies in
the near future, argued that some of the requisite technologies such as adaptive optics,
were developing rapidly. After some hesitation, Keyworth finally answered "yes" to the
President's question.^
Keyworth was to entertain serious doubts about his answer over the next 24 hours. He is
reported to have sought advice from Salomon Buchsbaum and William Baker, two
members of the White House Science Council, and he may have sought advice from
others. The reaction from his scientific colleagues was reported to have been almost
entirely negative, Keyworth being encouraged by some to publicly resign over the issue.
He had his doubts assuaged at a subsequent meeting with McFarlane and his deputy John
Poindexter.2
During the next two days after this meeting Keyworth was chosen to be the messenger to
inform senior officials in the State Department and the Pentagon of the President's
intention to include the Annex in his speech. Some of these officials were reported to be
stunned, and "deeply upset" that they had not been involved in the decision to make the
speech.3 In the final days before the speech some of the officials who had been informed
weighed in with protests, and managed to influence the eventual form of the speech,

1 The study by the White House Science Council was conducted largely as
a response to the meeting that Bendetsen and Teller's group had with
Reagan in January 1982. It considered chemical lasers, beam weapons
and x-ray lasers but was dubious about their military applicability.
The panel is said to have taken a second look at x-ray lasers at the
insistence of Edward Teller, who was also a member of the Science
Council and found these to be the most promising technology but still
far away from weapons application. The report identified adaptive
optics, which could compensate for the distortion of laser light
passing through the atmosphere as a promising area. (Frank Greve,
"Reagan's plan
op. c i t . , pp. 20A-21A; Gregg Herken, "The earthly
origins
op. c i t . , pp. 25-26.)
2 Gregg Herken, "The earthly origins ...", op. cit., p. 26; R. Jeffrey
Smith, "Reagan Plans New ...", op. c i t . , p. 171.^
3 Gregg Herken, "The earthly origins ...", op. c i t . , p. 26.

which was not yet set in concrete. Those writing the speech were evenly divided between
including the promise of high technology conventional weapons as well as strategic
defence, but decided, for the sake of simplicity, to concentrate only on strategic defence.
They were caught between offering protection to only missile silos or to the whole
population. Reagan apparently decided this one, telling the speech writers that the last
thing he wanted was "some kind of string of terminal defenses around this country".
Finally, the speech writers were worried about the offensive potential of the weapons that
could be used for strategic defence. (Robert McFarlane is reported to have discussed with
Keyworth the possibility of assassinating Muammar Qaddafi using space based lasers,
but Keyworth thought that this would not be very cost effective.) ^
When Secretary of State George Shultz was informed of the Annex, two days before the
speech, he was apparently livid. Shultz had not been consulted and was given an "eyes
only" copy of the speech which he was not allowed to share with any of his advisers,
even Paul Nitze his arms control adviser. (Nitze learned about the speech on the morning
of 23 March.) Shultz was woiried about the impact the speech - with its hint of a shift
away from offensive to defensive weapons - would have on the European allies. On this
same day Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and Assistant Secretary of Defense
Richard Perle - who were in Lisbon, negotiating agreements on several military bases were also informed, as were the Joint Chiefs of Staff.2 The draft of the President's
speech was cabled to Weinberger and Perle in Lisbon. Seeing the paragraphs outlining the
Strategic Defense Initiative tacked onto the end of the speech, Perle said he was
"stunned". Perle informed Weinberger of the speech and the Defense Secretary was
happy to leave matters in Perle's hands.^
Once they learned of the speech, Richard Perie, ringing from Lisbon, and George Shultz
arranged a number of meetings with President Reagan and McFarlane to voice their
concerns. They felt that the Soviets would find the speech too provocative, as with such a
system the United States had the potential to launch a first strike attack and protect itself
from the retaliation. These arguments, according to Greve, led to the inclusion of this
sentence in the speech: "I clearly recognize that defensive systems have limitations and
raise certain problems and ambiguities. If paired with offensive systems, they can be
viewed as fostering an aggressive policy, and no one wants that". Both Perle and Shultz
argued that the speech had to take into consideration the effect on NATO allies, Perie
1 Ibid.,
pp. 23, 26; Frank Greve, "Reagan's plan
op. c i t . , p.
A21.
2 Frank Greve, "Reagan's plan ...", op. c i t . , p.l; R. Jeffrey Smith,
"Reagan Plans ...", o p . c i t . , p. 171.
3 Sidney Blumenthal, "Perle and the Diminished Dream", The
Washington

Post,

1987, p. C2.

pointing out that as Western Europe was much closer to the Soviet Union its perspective
on defence was considerably different to that of the United States, and Schultz stressing
the need for consultation. These arguments led to the inclusion of the following line in the
speech: "Tonight, consistent with our obligations under the ABM Treaty and recognizing
the need for closer consultation with our allies I'm taking an important first step".
Further, Perle was able to limit the focus of the strategic defence that was being proposed,
to protection against only ballistic missiles. Originally it was proposed that such a system
would protect against bombers and cruise missiles as well, but Perle argued that this
would make the system too complex and costly.^
The speech also reflected the concerns of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that strategic defence
not interfere with the acquisition of new offensive nuclear or conventional weapons.
According to Greve their influence "appeared more powerful the following day when the
White House briefers explained that 'Star Wars' would be a consolidation of existing
research programs, not a Manhattan Project, and that no new spending for research was
foreseen in 1983 and 1984".2
The list of senior Administration officials who were given little or no warning about the
speech is quite long. Fred Ikle, the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, learned of the
speech only nine hours before it went to air, and pleaded in vain to be allowed to inform
NATO leaders. Richard DeLauer, tiie Undersecretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering was informed at the same time. John Gardner, the Director of defensive
systems at the Pentagon, and Robert Cooper, the Director of DARPA were not informed
at all, and listened in surprise as Reagan announced what would potentially be a large new
research and development program.^ These were people who might well be expected to
have sabotaged the efforts of the President and his NSC advisers to get the strategic
defence on the national agenda.
The importance of President Reagan's March 23 speech was that it had raised space-based
ballistic missile defence to the level of a national priority which was backed by tiie
President. Before this it had been a collection of research and development projects which
were having to play second fiddle to more conventional weapons development
programmes of the Army and the Air Force, which were much nearer to operational

1 Frank Greve, "Reagan's plan
op. cit., p. A21; Gregg Herken,
"The earthly origins . . . o p .
clt., pp. 26-27; R. Jeffrey Smith,
"Reagan Plans
op. cit., p. 171.
2 Frank Greve, "Reagan's plan ...", op. cit., p. A21.
3 Ibid., p. 1; R. Jeffrey Smith, "Reagan Plans
op. cit., p. 170;
"The Star Wars gambit riles the experts", op. cit., p. 22.

deployment. The President's speech was by no means the end of the shaping process for
space-based BMD weapons. It just moved it into a new phase, which is still in progress.
5.7 WHY 'STAR WARS*?
That President Reagan played a major role in placing space-based ballistic missile defence
on the national agenda is undoubted. But his role must be placed in context. Reagan in
many ways was a product of the Committee on the Present Danger. He had swept to
power pointing to the growing 'Soviet threat' and a 'window of vulnerability' which was
opening and through which the Soviets might launch an attack. Reagan vowed to close
the 'window of vulnerability' and to reassert American dominance over the Soviet Union
through a massive military build-up. Both the 'Soviet threat' and the 'window of
vulnerability' had been contrived and sold to the public by the CPD. Reagan was himself
a member of the CPD and his administration was dominated by CPD members. The
rhetoric and the policies of the Reagan Administration in the area of foreign policy and
defence were copy-book CPD. Both a build-up in offensive counterforce weapons and
civil and ballistic missile defence were part of the Committee on the Present Danger's
agenda, but many of Reagan's key advisers argued that the build-up of offensive
weapons was a priority.
It was this build-up of offensive weapons which created massive problems for the Reagan
Administration, problems for which space-based ballistic missile defence was a possible
solution. Firstly, there was the MX basing debacle. The MX was, for the Reagan
Administration and the Pentagon, the key to closing the 'window of vulnerability'.
However, the Reagan Administration was unable to find a solution that was politically
acceptable to the public. Congress, and the combined weight of the Air Force and the
Army. Because of this, the Reagan Administration was being forced to put MX missiles
back in Minuteman silos to keep the MX programme alive. These were the very missile
silos which they had claimed were vulnerable to a Soviet first strike. Ballistic missile
defence was being pushed by the Army and the Air Force as a way of making the MX
invulnerable to such an attack.
Secondly, there was the 'freeze movement', which was just part of a resurgent peace
movement in the United States and Europe, which had grown in response to the military
build-up instigated by the Carter Administration but continued with a vengeance by the
Reagan Administration. The peace movement had influenced groups such as the Catholic
Bishops to come out against nuclear weapons and to declare them immoral. Similar action
had been taken by the Mormon Church in response to massive opposition to the basing of

the MX in Utah and Nevada. The 'freeze movement' grew so large that it gained influence
in Congress, and held the potential to halt the Reagan Administration's military build up,
threatening deployment of the MX. From the Administration's viewpoint, the 'freeze
movement' threatened to freeze in place the 'window of vulnerability'.
Although Reagan seems to have favoured space-based ballistic missile defence for quite
some time, it was not until his meeting with the Joint Chiefs in February 1983 that he was
moved to act, and elevate it to national importance. The 'space-weapons lobby' seems to
have played an important part in planting the idea of space-based ballistic missile defence
in Reagan's mind, and in the minds of his key advisers. This was a deliberate effort on
their part. Graham, Wallop and Teller realized that if they were going to have spaceweapons deployed in the near future, then they would have to convince the President, as
they were sure to, and actually did, run into stiff opposition from the Pentagon. Only the
President could impose a decision on the armed services. The groups which had the best
access to the President had the greatest chance of influencing the President's decision. All
of the groups operated within the same ideological framework as the Reagan
Administration which made access easier. It seems to have been Teller's group, which
included members of Reagan's so-called 'kitchen cabinet', which had the easiest access.
The members of the 'space-weapons lobby' urged that space-based BMD be used to
provide a 'nuclear umbrella' and to implement a strategy of Mutual Assured Survival.
Such a strategy could be sold as being more moral than Mutual Assured Destruction as it
proclaimed to protect Americans but not kill Russians, and so had the potential to
undermine the nuclear freeze movement.
That the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed the possibility of balHstic missile defence seems to
have been very much connected to the issue of MX basing. The possibility of space-based
BMD to solve the problem of MX basing and to steal the thunder of the peace movement
seems to have been taken up and pushed by senior members of the National Security
Council. Given the President's predisposition towards space-based BMD it would have
taken little to convince him of the need for such weapons. Having gained Presidential
support, a deliberate strategy seems to have been developed by these NSC members to
keep the scheme under raps, so that the armed services and senior officials in the
Department of Defense and State Departments could not sabotage their efforts. When they
were informed, only two days before the speech was made, senior officials such as
Richard Perle and George Schultz did weigh in with protests, but it was too late to make
much of a difference.

The study of the making of the 'Star Wars' speech has shed some light on the function of
the Executive Branch in the weapons development process. It is evident that like the
armed services, contractors and weapons laboratories, the Executive Branch is itself a
complex bureaucracy. In the area of weapons development it seems to be the National
Security Council, Department of Defense and State Department which are most important,
but departments like the Office of Management and Budget also have some influence. In
this case it seems to have been the NSC which played an important role. The political
nature of weapons technology is evident also. The importance of space-based BMD to the
senior staff in the National Security Council was not so much any military role that it
might have, but rather its political function of undermining the freeze movement and
regaining support for a build-up of offensive nuclear weapons.

CH. 6: CONCLUSION
In this thesis I have considered the development of space-based ballistic missile defence in
the late 1970's and early 1980's, leading up to President Reagan's speech on 23 March
1983, in which he announced a research and development programme to make nuclear
weapons "impotent and obsolete". I have focused on four groups, which I call the 'spaceweapons lobby', which were pushing for the development of ballistic missile defence
during this period. I have traced the evolution and progress of the groups which
comprised the 'space-weapons lobby', paying particular attention to the ideology of the
different groups, the interests which they brought to bear on the problem of ballistic
missile defence, and the way in which the ideology and interests of the different groups
influenced the technologies which they were advocating for ballistic missile defence. I
have considered the links that the different groups had with the Reagan Administration
and the way in which they attempted to sell the idea of ballistic missile defence to the
Administration. Also I have considered the way in which the Army and the Air Force
reacted to the proposals which were being put forward by the 'space-weapons lobby'.
A major aim of this thesis was to use the case study of the development of space-based
ballistic missile defence to explore, refine and extend the model of the weapons
development process constructed in section 1.2. This model is based on Kaldor's notion
of a weapons system, a technological system interlinked with a social organization,
around which the armed forces have become functionally organized. The weapons system
serves to differentiate the armed services (Army, Air Force, Navy), and to define the lines
of command within the different armed services. The concept of a weapons system
explains why the armed services act as a conservative force in the weapons development
process. As each service, and military unit, is associated with a certain military mission,
and the capabilities required to undertake this mission have become embedded in both the
weapons and the social organization of that military unit, any radically new technologies
pose a risk for organizational survival, and so are resisted.
Kaldor argued that in peacetime, there were two main institutions which provided an
impetus to the weapons development process, essentially the defence contractors and the
weapons laboratories. Firstly, Kaldor argued that the weapons laboratories act as the
source of 'revolutionary' technologies, which have to be taken up by "maverick
constituencies" in the military. Secondly, Kaldor points out that the defence contractors
are required to make a profit, but also are dependent on the armed services for their
contracts. This leads to a follow-on imperative for the defence contractors in which they
are always seeking to develop the technologies for the next weapons programme in

collusion with the armed services. The impetus to the weapons development process that
was provided by these two institutions is then mediated by the armed services.
In this thesis I made four modifications to Kaldor's model. Firstly, it was modified to
take into account the role of Congress and congressional committees, and the Executive
Branch in the shaping process. In particular, based on the work of Schurmann, the
importance of the President is emphasized. Secondly, it was argued that the model needs
to take into consideration the different levels of complexity at which bureaucratic politics
operates in the armed services: inter-service rivalry, intra-service rivalry, and bureaucratic
disputes within military units. Thirdly, it was felt necessary to locate this bureaucratic
model within the wider political context, both on a domestic and an international level.
Finally, it was felt that the model needs to take into consideration the function that
weapons serve beyond their military or economic role. Hence there is a need to consider
the ideology of the groups which are involved in the weapons development process.
Although the case study of the development of space-based ballistic missile defence has
provided much support for the model developed in section 1.2 it would seem necessary to
make four main changes. Firstly, when considering the shaping of a particular weapons
system, it is important to take into consideration the different levels of complexity at
which bureaucratic politics operates in the defence contractors, weapons laboratories, and
Executive Branch of government. Neither the defence contractors nor weapons
laboratories can be treated as single actors, but are comprised of different departments and
project groups. These departments and groups may be in competition with each other, and
any weapons development project must be placed within its institutional context.
Similarly, in the Executive Branch it is necessary to be sensitive to the inter-departmental
rivalry and intra-departmental rivalry that may have a bearing on the weapons
development process.
Secondly, some modification is required to the concept of a follow-on programme. Given
that the prime contractors are likely to be working on several weapons contracts and
development projects at any one time, and that they are dependent on the armed services
for future contracts, it might not be in the contractor's interest to push every development
project as a follow-on programme. As was the case with Lockheed and laser weapons,
the armed services may oppose certain projects which they feel threaten their more
conventional programmes which have near-term deployment prospects. The armed
services might threaten to withdraw current contracts from, or not award future contracts
to, a defence contractor which is pushing a weapons system which they feel is too exotic.

Thirdly, it is too simplistic to argue that defence contractors with an economic interest,
and weapons laboratories with a scientific/technical interest, are the only institutions
which provide the impulse to the weapons development process. In addition to these it is
possible that the institution providing the impulse might be essentially ideological or
political in nature. A good example of this is the High Frontier group led by Daniel
Graham. In general it would seem that these groups bring people with a political mission
together with those from defence contractors or weapons laboratories. This has important
consequences for the nature of the technology that is developed, as it would seem to be
the ideology of these groups which shapes the broad nature of the weapons system which
is being proposed.
Finally, when considering the development of a particular weapons system it must be
remembered that it is just one of many weapons systems that exist or are in the process of
being developed. It may be that the development of one weapons system has implications
for the development of another. Thus, the factors which are shaping the development of
one system may, indirectly, have an influence on the other weapons system. An example
of this was provided by the MX missile and ballistic missile defence. The debate on the
basing of the MX missile influenced the development of space-based BMD as ballistic
missile defence was one of a number of options which could be used to make the MX less
vulnerable. As the competing basing modes ran into trouble, the chances for ballistic
missile defence improved.
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